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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on the local defence-related industry as a beneficiary under the 
Department of Defence’s defence industrial participation (DIP) programme, managed by 
Armscor. Attention is given to the main construct of the development theory and how the 
DIP process in South Africa compares with the international reciprocal trade phenomena 
commonly referred to as ‘countertrade’. The author does an in-depth analysis of the 
Government’s policy regarding the defence-related industry (DRI) that forms part of the 
local defence industrial base (DIB), as well as the DIP policy, procedures and practices and 
their subsequent bearing on the local defence industry. The study is further substantiated 
with a comprehensive review of the consequences and outcomes resulting from the largest 
defence package deal (SDP), signed in December 1999, between the Department of 
Defence and several major foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and 
subsequently benchmarked against academic discourse on the subjects of international 
countertrade and development theories.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH DONE ON THE DEFENCE 
INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION (DIP) PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
1. Purpose statement 
 
This research, analysing the South African DIP process, is intended to determine to 
what extent the process, managed by Armscor, is actually achieving its objectives of 
creating and sustaining the defence-related industry of South Africa. The DIP 
process forms part of the Department of Defence’s (DoD’s) policy, and is a sub-set 
of the National Industrial Participation Policy of SA. DIP includes activities such as 
work-share, training, skills development, technology transfers, exports and 
investments, and focuses on the retention of capabilities and capacities in the local 
defence-related industry. The DIP policy is specifically assessed as a national 
development tool, supporting the defence-industrial base (DIB) in South Africa.  
 
2. Why this research? 
 
The decision to research this specific topic was taken based on the author’s 
knowledge of all issues surrounding the DIP policy and their effect on the ‘well-being’ 
of the defence-related industry in South Africa.  The author1 is aware of specific 
gaps and shortcomings in the existing policies, and he intends to demonstrate to the 
policymakers what steps to consider in rectifying identified shortcomings. To reach 
this conclusion he uses analytical and empirical research methodologies to analyse, 
assess, compare and benchmark issues related to the topic. The author has a 
personal interest in this matter, as he has been involved in the subject matter since 
1996, and specifically the local defence industrial participation (DIP) process. In 
2001, he joined the defence industry as an employee of Denel – the major role 
player, and still the biggest defence company in South Africa, despite its poor 
financial performance the past ten years. The author is of the opinion that this 
research has national worth, as it can be linked directly to the practical relevance 
                                                 
1 The Author – Johan J van Dyk, as related to this research dissertation. 
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that the defence-related industry has, on the brink of receiving recognition as one of 
the cornerstones of the broader industrial base in South Africa. The defence-related 
industry is seen as a key building block for innovative and higher-end technology 
developments.  This research, supported by academic empirical findings and 
recommendations2, will also be used to inform policy makers on how to go about 
solving some of the practical problems in the defence-related industry in South 
Africa. 
 
3. Aims and objectives 
 
Specific attention is given to aspects such as: 
• Maintaining local defence-related industrial capabilities; 
• Creating local defence-related industrial capacities; 
• Technology transfer principles; 
• Skills development principles; 
• Economic benefit considerations; 
• Socio-economic benefits (jobs, black economic empowerment (BEE), small, 
medium and micro enterprises (SMME); 
• Globalisation principles; 
• Foreign direct investment (FDI) and partnerships; and 
• Sustainability. 
 
4.    Focus on the DIP policy  
  
 In order to put this research in context this dissertation specifically focuses on a 
comprehensive, but critical assessment of the DoD’s DIP policy, (within the context 
of defence acquisition and procurement processes), and subsequent Armscor 
policies on the same subject3. Specific attention is therefore given to explain DIP’s 
                                                 
2 “Deciding on the topic of research.”  The Research in the Social Sciences.  Study guide RHC 201-H.  UNISA. 
3 Armscor is by law, ito the new Armscor Act no 51 of 2003, as promulgated in 2006 now mandated to manage the DIP process. 
Author’s note: The DoD is reportedly considering the repeal of Act 51/2003 and the restructuring of the acquisition function and the 
incorporation of Armscor into the DoD. This is reportedly planned to be completed by 2008/9. 
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intended aims, goals and objectives as subsequently implemented and managed by 
Armscor. The latter is the legally appointed acquisition agency for all DoD acquisition 
programmes, and was appointed by the DoD to manage the DIP process in its 
entirety. In the initial phases, the DIP requirements form part of the Armscor 
tendering process, setting the DIP process in motion.   
 
5. This research topic is a current topic of social interest 
 
 The SA government plans to restructure Armscor and tasked the Department of 
Trade & Industry (DTI) to implement a defence-related industry (DRI) strategy. This 
strategy should create possible incentives under the banner of the national industrial 
development programme, ensuring that key strategic defence-related capabilities 
are maintained. The DRI sectoral strategy holds far-reaching development 
implications for the local DRI, and will inevitably have an impact on the DIP and NIP 
processes. Presently, the DIP and NIP processes have comparable elements and 
activities, but are not interchangeable, except for some aspects relating to “dual use 
capabilities” in the DRI environment. In April 2007, the Department of Public 
Enterprises (DPE) introduced a Competitive Supplier Development Programme 
(CSDP)4 to further the development of the local manufacturing and services bases, 
using the anticipated R400-billion infrastructure budget – defence is however not 
part of this.  
 
6. The topic of this research is: “An evaluation of the South African Department of 
Defence’s policy on Defence Industrial Participation (“DIP”), as a defence 
industrial development mechanism”. Attention is given to the role of the policy 
writer as a change agent – specifically the role that the author  played in the creation 
of the DIP policy and associated processes and procedures to manage it. The 
dissertation therefore consists of the following: 
 
                                                 
4 Interview with Mr Sean Philips, DPE CSDP Unit. 26/03/07 and the DPE website – www.dpe.gov.za 
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? Chapter 1 – Introduction to the research done on the defence industrial 
participation process in South Africa. Why, from an academic and social point of 
view, is this research needed, how can it be interpreted in the context of South 
Africa’s general development goals and how does this impact on the defence-
related industry as a whole? 
? Chapter 2 provides an international view and theoretical perspective on what 
countertrade is all about. Why do countries apply this reciprocal form of trade? 
Some examples are given within the context of the South Africa programme, 
while views of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are discussed briefly. Issues 
such as the realities of penalties and incentives in the form of multipliers are also 
touched upon. 
? Chapter 3 discusses the subject of research per se and although many scholars 
may have written extensively on the subject, the author deems it  necessary to 
reflect on the various approaches to research and research methodology, and to  
assessing its academic reference value as related to  this research on DIP.  The 
chapter shares the approach that was followed in order to ensure scientific rigour 
on academic empirical levels. 
? Chapter 4 describes the relevance and applicability of this research on the 
defence industrial participation process in relation to national development 
objectives. Questions being asked include: (i) How did the defence-related 
industry end up as a beneficiary of DIP programmes? (ii) What led to the South 
African government playing a key role in leveraging the power of procurement to 
advance industrial and economic growth objectives? 
? Chapter 5 contains the review of the White Paper (WP) on the defence-related 
industries (DRI) in South Africa, covering all prevailing issues relevant to the 
debate at that time on the local DRI.  As there are presently many developments 
in respect of issues pertaining to the DRI environment, a fair amount of attention 
is given to elaborative comments on most of these. The WP focuses primarily on 
the DRI in South Africa, and within the context of DIP programmes. In this 
dissertation, the WP is commented on as a development mechanism, aiming to 
maintain a strategic defence industrial capability in South Africa. In order to put 
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the DRI in perspective, it was necessary to pay attention to (i) the background of 
the DRI, its history, how it developed and eventually got marginalised; (ii) its 
contribution to the economy, and to human development, and (iii) its anticipated 
role in supporting safety and security issues in South Africa in the future. 
? Chapter 6 reflects on a DoD policy document that was approved in May 1997, 
relating to the implementation of a defence industrial participation (DIP) process 
governing all defence procurements with a foreign contract value5 of USD2-
million and more. This policy exists independently from that of the DTI’s formal 
policy on ‘National Industrial Participation’ (NIP), approved by Cabinet in the 
same year. NIP is relevant to those defence contracts with a foreign 
contract/imported content value of more than USD10-million. Comment is thus 
made in the context of the present relevancies and possible improvements of this 
policy document. The aim is to provide an analytical review of the DoD’s Defence 
Industrial Participation (DIP) policy, which is a ‘sub-set policy’ of the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) policy 
of 1997. The DoD’s policy document is therefore assessed, analysed and 
subsequently discussed and commented on, against the background that led to 
its inception in May 1997. The author reflects on the rationale that governed the 
thought process that resulted in the drafting of the DIP policy, and compares the 
policy with requirements stipulated in international benchmarks.  
? Chapter 7 - Data and information were gathered through an extensive literature 
search on the subject of industrial participation in South Africa as applied by 
Armscor. This was complemented by selective interviews over time, feedback 
from questionnaires and the author’s personal and daily experience in DIP 
activities, and how these activities manifest in the South African DRI. Data was 
subsequently analysed by using descriptive analytical statistics and qualitative 
analyses, whereas classification of data and its correlation analysis were both 
used for qualitative and quantitative analysis. Considering Habernas’ theories on 
communication for more efficacious development, the White Paper on the DRI 
was subject to a structured process that aimed to derive the proposed and 
                                                 
5 Author’s note: There remains some confusion on the meanings of foreign contract value versus imported content versus foreign 
content values to be used as basis for calculating the DIP/NIP obligations. 
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desired result, namely to create an understanding and an acceptance of the DRI 
as an integral part of the broader industrial base of South Africa. 
?      Chapter 8 – Conclusions and recommendations. The question  is asked, whether 
DIP delivered the results and objectives that motivated its implementation, and 
whether any changes should be made to the existing process? If one considers 
each of the specific comments passed on each element of the DIP policy, as 
described within the context of the research analysis being done on this 
reciprocal trade phenomenon, the answer has to be a qualified ‘yes’. In 
assessing whether the policy is effectively introduced and applied in practice, a 
procedural and regulatory perspective indicates that there is room for 
improvement. 
 
7.     The research model (see Figure 1) used, is to a large extent based on the research 
process model of D.R. Cooper & P.S. Schindler6, while E. Babbie & J. Mouton’s7 
work provides a secondary paradigm, forming a basis for the approach to the 
collection of primary and secondary data, both being in numerical text formats. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                 
6 Cooper, D.R. and Schindler, P.S. 2001. Business Research Methods. 7th ed. McGraw-Hill 
7 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research.  OUP. SA edition. 
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8.   In terms of the research design process, regular reporting on the progress of the 
assignment was shared with the author’s promoter, Prof Richard Haines. Reports 
included the following milestones: 
Step 1: Compiling the dissertation research topic approval paper; 
Step 2: Securing NMMU approval for the research topic;  
Step 3: Structuring the scope of the research – as per par 6;  
Step 4: Identifying relevant research sources and concluding an extensive 
literature search on the topic; 
Step 5: Identifying and engaging selected entities in the DRI;  
Step 6: Issuing questionnaires to targeted respondents; 
Step 7: Conducting interviews and recording observations;  
Step 8: Writing the research methodology chapter; 
Step 9: Analysing literature and recording subsequent findings; 
Step 10: Concurrently testing the findings and observations (practical and 
academic);  
Step 11: Compiling a final research analysis, as a conclusion; 
Step 12: Stating the anticipated outcome and making recommendations; 
Step 13:  Notification that the first draft was ready for submission; and 
Step 13: Updating final draft with comments and suggested changes, finalising and 
printing document and submitting dissertation for final examination.  
 
9. Applied research methodology 
 
This research was done by means of collecting and assessing empirical data to 
determine how successful the DIP process is and to what extent the intended 
objectives, aims and goals are effectively met, while identifying possible hurdles and 
making recommendations to the DoD, Armscor and the DTI regarding possible 
changes and/or improvements.  The results that were obtained are presented in a 
coherent manner, enabling the ‘practitioners’ (i.e. the Chief of Acquisition at DoD 
and the Senior Manager at DIP Division of Armscor) to access, and use such 
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information to improve aspects identified during this research, also providing 
academic insight into the development role of countertrade. 
 
This research provides data in a summarised evaluation format, reflecting on the 
outcome and the end-result of the information collected, analysed and interpreted 
against the empirical data relating directly to this research topic on DIP. 
 
10. The quantitative approach 
  
 This approach ensures that the research examines the generally-accepted 
explanations of the DIP policy, by contextualising its aims and objectives against a 
more universal background, such as recording DIP outcomes and its impact on the 
local defence industrial base (DIB), which is also referred to as the DRI. 
 
The quantitative approach ensures that the research is directed, structured and 
controlled through specific data-collection techniques, such as the use of structured 
questionnaires. 
 
11. The qualitative approach 
 
  As the aim of the research is to measure the outcomes of DIP in the local DIB 
(defence industrial base), or more commonly referred to as the DRI (defence-related 
industry) at large, and on Denel, both being benefactors of DIP. The DRI and Denel 
are included as ‘objects’ of investigation. In order to arrive at a meaningful 
conclusion, it is necessary to adopt complementary data collection techniques, such 
as conducting interviews relating to the general experience of participants involved 
in the DIP process; soliciting input from other DRI companies through their 
representative organisation, namely AMD (Aerospace, Maritime and Defence 
Industry Association), and including extensive literature research, covering the 
research subject matter between late 1999 to late 2007. 
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The intention is to describe the influence of DIP on these institutions (the ‘objects’) 
being investigated, while assessing the local DIB holistically and explaining the 
internal and external influences that may affect  the effectiveness of this defence 
industrial development tool. 
 
The research is purposeful and directed towards a variety of matters representing 
interrelated subjects of the same phenomenon, such as countertrade as a discipline, 
but with the focus on DIP and the DRI. It is furthermore used as a means of 
observing and commenting coherently on the inter-related effects that DIP has 
across the spectrum of issues governing the research topic, and related to the DRI 
specifically. 
 
Due to the author’s personal involvement with the DIP process over the past eleven 
years, it is inevitable that perceptive and practical insights are primary drivers in this 
research study, although substantiated by empirical research data and findings, 
especially in the explanation of the rationale, aims and objectives that still drive the 
DIP process in South Africa and what it had achieved to date. 
 
12. Multiple method rationale 
  
By using the quantitative and the qualitative research approach in parallel, data so 
gathered was analysed and interpreted in a coherent, complementary and non-
conflicting manner. Data collection governed the subsequent process of 
developing and designing a structured questionnaire, which was followed with 
interviews, literature research, content analyses, observations and contextualised 
conclusions. This interactive process ensured the validation, verification and 
relevance of information used in this research. 
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The research activities, as it relates to this researched topic, were approached 
as detailed in the following flow process model: 
 
Figure 2 (JJ van Dyk’s adaptation8) 
 
Exploratory research. This research, assessing the influence of DIP on the local 
DRI, and specifically Denel, is a topic that has been reported on, and speculated 
about in the media, and also extensively debated in Parliament, but never 
independently researched in any substantive and detailed fashion, notwithstanding 
the emerging field of research internationally and in South Africa, on the impact of 
defence offsets. What is interesting to observe is that this research reveals that 
further research could, and should be done on this topic, as the author’s efforts to 
analyse and assess DIP are primarily based on qualitative data collection, with the 
‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of DIP clearly defined. 
 
Descriptive research. The DIP process proves to be a series of structured 
activities, and it is therefore anticipated that descriptive details of the environment 
and relationships surrounding DIP, be included in research of this nature.  Such 
information delineates the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of the topic. 
 
                                                 
8 From Cooper, D.R.  and Schindler, P.S. 2001. Business Research Methods.  7th Edition. McGraw-Hill 
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Explanatory research. This aspect of the research concentrates on gaining insight 
regarding the context of DIP in relation to the research topic related to development, 
attending to the ‘why’ element of the subject. 
 
13.  The research content 
 
In concluding the research content process, secondary and tertiary data were added 
to deal with the various evaluative modes, related to research in general. 
 
From this point of view, the research subject (i.e. the DIP policy’s influence on the 
local DRI) was explored with the aim of describing the practice in a descriptive 
manner, and explain it in the context of the actual policy intent (the causality test), in 
order to arrive at an evaluation of the real influence and effect, based on an 
evaluative approach. This exploration offered the opportunity to measure the 
process within the context of historic events and practices, supported by statistics 
collected through a methodological and meta-analytical approach. The 
conceptualisation of DIP within the DRI, and the national development and industrial 
constructs resulted in recommendations for changes that can ensure improvements. 
 
These findings were also tested against the current theoretical discourse and 
perceived wisdom on the international subject of countertrade and offsets in its 
widest form, in order to arrive at a conclusion based on normative parameters, i.e. 
how the South African DIP process, and its aims, objectives and achievements 
weigh up against international practices. 
 
Case study research. As part of the ‘research time dimension’ the research 
focused on a specific topic (being DIP), within a specific cluster (i.e. the local DIB 
and specifically, Denel, as a major role player in the local market and major 
beneficiaries under the DIP programme), for a specific period – from late 1999 to 
late 2007. The process was also benchmarked against international trends and 
perceptions, shared in various reports. 
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Data collection. This was primarily by means of literature search and analyses 
(including various scholars’ views on the countertrade phenomena world-wide, the 
DoD policy documents, Armscor’s annual reports and internal DIP policy, 
procedures and practices applied by Armscor, as well as media reports), statistics 
(as available from Armscor’s annual reports and within Denel). The research was 
further complemented by structured questionnaires and selective interviews with key 
players. The author used a two-step process in his research, namely a description of 
the phenomenon, followed by an interpretative explanation based on findings, 
observations, conclusions and recommendation, as alluded to above and elsewhere 
in this document. 
 
Literature and sources. This research very specifically focused on the following, as 
legitimate and credible sources of information, statistics, facts, quotations, notations, 
debate, argument and academic empirical discourse: 
• The DoD’s DIP policy and the subsequent Armscor DIP policy, procedure and 
practice (issued since 1997); 
• Armscor’s annual reports, reflecting on the progress made with the execution of 
DIP (since late 1999 to mid 2007), complemented by relevant statistics; 
• Studies concluded by the Institute for Security Studies and/or other academic 
institutions on the topic of DIP; 
• Literature published by various scholars and/or academics and practitioners 
working in the countertrade and offset discipline; 
• Local and international media reports relating to DIP; and 
• Internal Denel statistics on DIP. 
• Structured DIP questionnaires and interviews were used as tools to mainly 
verify the views of the DRI on the development and economic benefits of the 
DIP process for the industry. This information was used to complement 
personal observations and served, mainly as a secondary source of data. The 
members of AMD have been identified as the key respondents, based on their 
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respective roles as DIP benefactors (at various levels) in the strategic defence 
package deal (SDP) of 1999, supplying the respective foreign OEMs. 
• As a tertiary data source, media reports and academic articles on the subject of 
DIP were consulted and selectively used, such as the independent research 
done by the DRI organisation AMD during 2005/6. 
• The physical time frame in which this specific research project was done 
stretches over a period of 22 months, during 2006/2007. (It must be noted that 
the author is still actively involved in the execution of the DIP process and has 
been involved in the DRI since September 1980, and in DIP activities since 
1996). 
 
14.       Data analysis and interpretation 
 
According to E. Babbie & J. Mouton9, the process of the research design (as applied 
and used by the author in this research process) follows the following route – as per 
Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3
Type of Study/research
Empirical Non-Empirical
Using Primary data
- surveys
- case studies
- evaluation
- interviews
Analysing existing data
Text data
- discourse analysis
- literature
- content analysis
Numerical data
- statistics
 
 
                                                 
9Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition. 
 21 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
Analysis. Based on the research done, the data that was gathered, was interpreted 
and reproduced in a variety of formats, using descriptive statistics (in order to 
understand underlying patterns in data), tables and graphs to depict the summarised 
data in a logical manner, with written records observing trends and correlations. 
 
Interpretation. By using the data so collected, it was possible to make a distinction 
between the nature of the reality (‘ontology’), i.e. the outcome of DIP when the 
process is applied in practice at industry level, versus the nature of knowledge 
(‘epistemology), referring to  the intended outcome in relation to the DIP policy 
statements in this respect. Because of the empirical structure of the DIP research, 
data was acquired in the form of systematic, formalised and enumerated information, 
constituting the quantitative measurement that confirms causal regularities (i.e. 
tendencies or patterns) within the researched topic, and used as a means of 
expressing the quantum of the researched subject. On the other hand, interviews 
and observations (for example the interpretation of the actual policies and 
procedures prescribed by government) were used as a means of qualitative 
measurement, providing actual meaning (and a comprehension of the topic), 
alternatively expressed as a means of interpretation or explanation. 
 
Dealing with ‘don’t know’ answers from respondents. According to Cooper and 
Schindler10 the “I don’t know” response presents special problems in data 
interpretation. Although ‘don’t know’ responses can have a legitimate status, it can 
also mean that the respondent prefers not to answer the question, although the 
answer is known. Having taken cognisance of the prospect of too many ‘don’t know’ 
or neutral responses, care was taken with the structuring of the research 
questionnaire to minimise evasive responses, with more attention being given to 
written reports than to verbal feedback. 
 
Reliability and validity tests. The reliability of the data collected is based on the 
premise that the findings will deliver the same results when repeated, whereas the 
                                                 
10 Cooper, D.R.  and Schindler, P.S. 2001. Business Research Methods.  7th Edition. McGraw-Hill 
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validity of the data, on the other hand, is based on the commonly accepted fact that 
DIP (as a particular concept) has a very specific meaning to the local DIB (or DRI), 
and that information reflected on, can be substantiated by controlling authorities 
(such as Armscor in this instance). Confidential data is not available in the public 
domain and is protected by South African law. Due also to the particular nature of 
the defence-related industry, dealing with sensitive equipment that has a 
direct bearing on national security, it will never be easy or even possible to 
replicate in-depth research based on the exact details of the DIP policy and 
related commercial processes.  
 
15.    Ethical principles applicable to this research 
 
  Having given careful thought to the ethical issue relevant to this research proposal, 
the following issues were ascertained: 
• The data relevant to the research topic is readily available and the research 
methods identified are well-suited to extract data in a meaningful manner; 
• The research approach is both practical, and feasible and would not entail any 
costs to conduct, except for the researcher (author) and respondent to make 
personal time available;  
• The actual research is structured on the basis of an existing phenomenon, while 
alternative comment is solicited as to the validity and relevance of the contents of 
the research, and all endeavours were made to remove any subjectivity, or 
biasness towards the researched subject matter of DIP in the DRI; 
• The data collected, directly relates to commercial business activities of the DRI, 
as well as those of international companies. It reflects on the applicability and 
practicability of the DoD/Armscor DIP process. From a commercial point of view, 
as well as from a controlling government authority’s point of view, the use of data 
so collected cannot be exploited for any other purpose and will not compromise 
any commercial confidential information, or concerns of any party or process so 
observed, or reported on. 
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16. In conclusion   
 
The decision to research this specific topic related to the DIP policy, and its effect on 
the ‘well-being’ of the defence-related industry in South Africa, resulted in a 
comprehensive research report, which not only identifies the anomalies, gaps and 
shortcomings in the existing policies, but also reflects, in an empirical manner, on 
how industrial participation in the South African context, (referred to as DIP) 
compares with international practices. It also  indicates the benefits to the local DRI 
that did, and did not accrue. In this dissertation, the author  demonstrates to the 
policymakers which steps they should consider to rectify identified shortcomings, 
and to this extent  he already made presentations to the DRI’s representative 
organisation’s Board of Directors, the AMD, on 25 October 2007. The author and the 
Executive Director of AMD, Simphiwe Hamilton, started a process of inviting 
Armscor to deliberate and discuss actions they need to take that relate to DIP. This 
process will in all likelihood be entrenched  during the first half of 2008. In parallel to 
this activity, AMD is also involved with various actions and initiatives preparing 
submissions to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence, regarding various 
aspects influencing the DRI that need to be reviewed.  
 
It is the author’s opinion that the DIP process largely achieves its aims and goals, 
securing desperately needed income for the DRI during a period where there was an 
obvious endeavour from government to give preference to foreign defence 
equipment to re-equip a depleted SANDF inventory. Simultaneously this foreign 
procurement process re-affirms certain bilateral North-South relations that can 
strengthen the standing of the SA government. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SEARCH - THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
EXPLAINING WHAT COUNTERTRADE CONSTITUTES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The meaning of the terms countertrade, barter, offset or industrial participation may 
not always clearly define their real implications when used in the context of domestic 
and global trade, industrial and economic/socio-economic environments and 
development concepts. 
  
This dissertation intends to shed some light on the international countertrade 
discipline, as a means of causing reciprocal trade or other benefits. The 
arrangement, at its most fundamental level, is straightforward - a purchasing 
government obliges a foreign seller to include extra benefits with the sale of the base 
goods.11  
 
The word in itself is the collective noun, referring to various forms of countertrade, of 
which there are more than fifteen – see figures 5 and 6.  All these various forms of 
countertrade are used in various degrees, combinations and permutations. This 
chapter does not explain each one of the options in detail, but concentrates on the 
respective principles governing each one of the most prominent forms of this 
reciprocal trade phenomenon. 
 
Countertrade is probably as old as the earliest civilisations. It primarily started as a 
bartering activity (in other words a commodity-for-commodity type of exchange), in a 
period when there was no money in use.  However, as money became the accepted 
method of payment, direct commodity exchanges reduced, but never ceased. 
Today, in modern economies, there is a constant shortage of money and many 
                                                 
11 Taylor, Travis K. September 2002. College of Business, Alfred University. New York. Working Paper: Using offsets in procurement as 
an economic development strategy. International Conference on Defence Offsets and Economic Development. 
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countries resort to barter deals and all sorts of intricate trading mechanisms, even 
swapping (exchanging) debt. 
 
The sophistication of markets, however, led to the principle of commodity trade and 
structured finance deals of a very complex and intricate nature. Close to 100 
countries reportedly still use countertrade in all its various forms. Even first-world 
countries (such as the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries) use it for industrial 
cooperation purposes. Although the World Trade Organisation (WTO) appears not to 
be in favour of countertrade, it published some exceptions, making it possible for 
countries to use this form of trade. Countertrade remains an important part of trade 
and it is the author’s view that it will probably remain for as long as there is trade. In 
some instances it can be regarded as a ‘nuisance factor’, as it can be prescriptive, 
but looking closely, the bottom line remains that the buyer can dictate to the market, 
and as long as the buyer wants a reciprocal benefit through countertrade, sellers will 
have to comply. 
 
Although countertrade is sometimes regarded with extreme suspicion, it remains an 
opportunity that is supposed to benefit both the buyer and the seller alike. Needless 
to say, there are various types of constraints that restrain the process; aggravated 
by the fact that countertrade does cost money. Countertrade is not about welfare, 
and although it may include some aspects of goodwill, most of it is about sound 
business principles. Countertrade is only limited by the lack of creativity and 
innovativeness on the part of practitioners – mostly acting on behalf of government 
controlling authorities. 
 
Countertrade involves cost and risk – both of which buyer and seller must make 
peace with when engaging each other in reciprocal business. Most governments 
requiring countertrade on foreign purchases expect that whatever form of 
countertrade is required that it should not increase the price of the goods procured, 
but in reality it does. The issue to debate is how much a government is prepared to 
pay for the reciprocal benefit that countertrade poses. How does one really evaluate 
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the economic and intrinsic value of foreign companies being allowed to become 
involved (even entrenched) in any given country’s industrial, economic and socio-
economic affairs, whether at national or global levels? 
 
Since the ’80s the concept of countertrade, linked to defence purchases, started 
gaining popularity, but was not limited to deals of such nature. Countries 
implemented various requirements and associated conditions of countertrade to 
ensure work for their industries and reduce the net outflow of foreign currency, in 
those instances where they had to procure defence equipment from foreign 
suppliers. 
 
The most commonly used forms of countertrade are alleged to be: 
 -  Barter: an exchange of commodities for arms, or commodity for commodity 
without the direct exchange of money. 
 -  Counter-purchase: where the seller of arms is required to counter-purchase 
certain goods and commodities from the buyer’s country, by causing exports. 
 -  Offsets developed into a mechanism used to compel sellers of defence 
equipment to contract certain work on that equipment back to the industries in 
the buyer’s country, or to effect high-tech exports from such countries’ industries. 
 -  Other: there is a host of other countertrade mechanisms used in various 
combinations and permutations, while some are rather complex – refer to figure 
6.   
 
2. An introduction to countertrade 
 
2.1.  Countertrade is a common term used for different and distinct modes of international 
reciprocal-type trade arrangements. These may involve either one, or a combination 
of aspects, such as, build-operate-transfer (BOT, or variants thereof), buy-back, 
barter, co-production, blocked funds, counter-purchase, joint ventures, evidence 
accounts, offset, swap, technology transfer (ToT), tolling and switch trading, as well 
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as pre-offsets. Not to mention aspects related to compensation and economic 
enhancement programmes. 
 
2.2 In addition to, and depending on, market conditions and specific country 
countertrade practices, one may find various usages of different terminologies for 
countertrade. The most recent examples of synonyms used, include Industrial 
Participation (South Africa), Local Content (Australian Industry Involvement 
Programme (AIIP)), Industrial Cooperation (Israel), and Partnerships for 
Development (Oman), with the most recent development in Libya been referred to 
as economic enhancement. The concept of public-private partnerships (PPP) is also 
an aspect that appears to be more favoured. Much of these apparent terminology 
changes are viewed mainly as attempts by countries (developed or less-developed 
alike) to circumvent possible problems relating to WTO rules. (Refer to paragraph 5 
below.) 
2.3 The extent, to which countries are involved in countertrade, depends largely on the 
political and economic environment of such a country, and the availability of hard 
currency; closely followed by industrial development and market access issues. It is 
estimated that more than 100 countries practice this form of trade internationally. It is 
further estimated, as also quoted elsewhere in this dissertation that internationally, 
countertrade represents up to 40% of all international trade, which constitute a trade 
phenomena that cannot be ignored. 
 
2.4 Where traditional marketing actions are directed towards mainly satisfying the 
equipment needs of a country, countertrade, on the other hand is required to attend 
to the socio-economic and industrial needs of the buyer country – mostly in the form 
of work-share and economic and socio-economic activities. It calls for a fine act of 
balancing the effects of foreign currency outflow from the buyer country, while 
retaining some levels of work-share for the selling company, and still making a 
reasonable profit.  
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This rather complex process is depicted in the following flow chart: 
 
 
Figure 4 (Source: JJ van Dyk) 
 
2.5 Although commonplace, offset12 requirements vary considerably from one country to 
another and policy differences reflect different experience and objectives. S. Martin13 
actually observes that this international diversity makes for interesting comparative 
study, but at the same time he alleges “economists have long neglected defence 
matters although the level of resources devoted to defence spending, as well 
as the offset element attached to it, warrants substantially increased research 
effort”. He also remarks that due to the relatively unavailability of reliable data 
on offsets, researchers have to rely on the goodwill of those in the defence 
industry and the controlling authorities. M. Rowe14, for example, remarks that, 
“… many companies hide their countertrade commitments as they would secret 
vices.” 
 
2.6 Martin makes the observation that as defence budgets reduce, competition will 
become fiercer and offsets are thus likely to become more, rather than less, 
important. He continues his argument by reflecting on research work that was done 
                                                 
12 Author’s note: Academic literature and research studies constantly use the term “offsets” which is normally associated with defence 
procurements.  “Offsets” as such is however a sub-set of Countertrade, which is used as the collective term.  (J.J. van Dyk) 
13 Martin, S.  1996. The Economics of Offsets.  Defence Procurement and Countertrade.  Harwood 
14 Rowe, M. 1997. Countertrade. 3rd edition. Euromoney Publ 
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on offsets, covering countries such as the United States of America (USA), Australia 
and the main players in Europe, with various offset projects been implemented in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and South Korea. He also remarks that 
countertrade appears to have grown in importance and in application since the ‘60s, 
especially in Eastern Europe and the West. From the ‘70s onward, the lesser-
developed countries (LDC) increasingly used countertrade.15 Martin, however, 
distinguishes between two categories of literature when he assesses the subject of 
countertrade – the one emanating from countertrade authorities (as policies and 
guidelines to aid suppliers from a regulatory and buyer-demand side), and the other 
source creating literature that more seeks to stimulate further academic discourse on 
the subject matter.  
 
According to T.K. Taylor16 offset often appears under the guise of compensation 
packages, industrial benefit programmes, cooperative agreements and countertrade 
policies. The US is one of the few large economies left that does not apply any 
explicit offset policy. 17 Governments use offsets as a convenient way of extracting 
‘rent’ that achieves a multiple of objectives, such as acquiring foreign investments, 
improving capabilities and technologies to gain new market access and promoting 
exports earnings, while forming important and strategic alliances. Taylor views 
offsets as a more effective tool than tariffs, quotas and subsidies, but accepts that it 
remains a complex subject and that economists are only beginning to understand 
this trade phenomenon. Benchmarking studies done by B. Udis and K. Markus18, as 
well as P. Hall and S. Markowski19 establish a neoclassical economic offset theory. 
The work of P. Liesch20 and T. Taylor complement the theory by highlighting the 
importance of transaction cost and capacity expansion strategies of procuring 
governments. 
                                                 
15 Martin, S.  1996. The Economics of Offsets.  Defence Procurement and Countertrade. Harwood 
16 Taylor, T.K. September 2002. Using Offsets in Procurement and Economic Development Strategy. College of Business, Alfred 
University. Presentation made to the International Countertrade Conference on Defence Offsets and Economic Development. Cape 
Town 
17 Author’s note: What Taylor forgot to mention is the fact the “Buy American Act” forces preferential procurements for US companies as 
well as forcing foreign suppliers to involve local US companies in any product so supplied. 
18 Udis, B. and Markus, K. 1991. Offsets as Industrial policy: Lessons from Aerospace. Defence Economics Publication no 2.  
19 Hall, P and Markowski, S. 1994. On the normality and Abnormality of Offset Obligations. Defence and Peace Economics No 5. 
20 Liesch, P. 1991. Government Mandated Countertrade. Aldershot. UK. Avebury 
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J. Bauer of the College for Business Administration of the Augusta State University 
of the USA, echoes similar views regarding the economic aspects of offsets in arms 
trade. He shared his views in an academic paper delivered at the International 
Defence Offsets and Economic Development conference at Cape Town during 
September 2002. 
 
P. Hall and S. Marowski21 express the view that mandatory arms trade offsets in the 
form of a specific offset percentage, create  a trade diversion, a trade distortion and 
a welfare diminishing effect. They hold the belief that voluntary offsets, on the other 
hand, have a ‘welfare enhancing’ nature. 
 
T. Ellingsen22 makes the observation that for the period 1960 to 1990, the market 
price typically increased and welfare decreased as a result of various countertrade 
policies. This statement led to the USA adopting anti-trust offsets practices, also 
referenced against the WTO (GATT at that time). Ellingsen also makes some 
econometrical, mathematical analyses to explain the so-called ‘Cournot equilibria’, 
describing and explaining aspects related to the relationships between buyer and 
seller, demand and price, profit and loss, monopolies and duopolies and welfare 
impacts and competition. He states that the notion of countertrade may be profitable 
in oligopoly markets. This is reportedly also justified by known empirical regularities 
and has unambiguous welfare implications, which on the other hand seem to 
indicate that Cournot, or quantity, or competition is justified partly on the grounds of 
simplicity, and because it is not too strongly prejudiced towards welfare analysis. 
Ellingsen concludes by alluding to the fact that although his analysis supports the 
general view that countertrade is harmful to overall welfare, it is also clear that clever 
tradesmen may have good reason to keep applying it. 
 
                                                 
21 Hall, P and Markowski, S. 1994. On the normality and Abnormality of Offset Obligations. Defence and Peace Economics No 5 p173-
188 
22 Ellingsen, T. A Model of Countertrade. London. School of Economics and Political Science. Discussion Paper No EI/3, March 1991. 
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Brinley Salzman23 for example, observes that the effect of offsets in the UK 
maintained at least 250 000 jobs over time and that its “importance to the UK 
defence industry is enormous”. Offset has also grown in importance and is used as 
some sort of defence industry protectionist tool, becoming a critical factor in the 
award of international defence contracts. While many companies perceive offset 
negatively, others do view it as an opportunity with positive benefits in general. In 
countries without indigenous defence industries, offset is used as a protection, 
and/or tool to develop local economies, and as a counter to the outflow of foreign 
exchange. Despite opposition to this trend, especially from the US, offset is here to 
stay. Offset authorities should, however, be encouraged to ensure that offset policies 
are achievable. Likewise, a process of educational awareness is essential for 
effective mechanisms to be adopted within companies. Salzman also expresses the 
view that there is an increasing need to create an offset network throughout the 
supply chain, as offset increases in volume and complexities around the world. 
 
Lindsay Shanson, the editor of the international publication ‘Countertrade and 
Offsets’, is of the opinion24 that global offset is a form of countertrade referring to 
various forms of unconventional trade, including barter, counter-purchase and 
compensation (also known as buy-back) activities. In some competitive situations 
offsets have been pre-emptively offered as a sweetener. There is a discernable 
trend towards the transfer of a part of the production and capacity of a Western 
prime contractor, to other countries. This is reportedly achieving a dual benefit by 
accessing cheaper production, while also earning offset credits. He also remarks 
that there is an increasing trend to ignore WTO prohibitions in the use of civil 
offsets.25 Shanson’s report on a Price Waterhouse Consulting finding in 2002 relates 
to the procurement and offset process in the Netherlands, indicating that the cost of 
                                                 
23 Salzman, Brinley - is the Exports Director of the UK Defence Manufacture’s Association (DMA), providing support to UK defence 
exporters. 
24 Shanson’s (Lindsay) contribution to the Brazilian publication of Offsets (Panorama da Practica do Offsets no Brazil. 2004). Pages 189-
197. “Reflections of the evolution of Offsets” 
25 Author’s note: Kuwait has in April 2007 announced its decision to invoke offsets on all their civil procurement programmes as well. In 
the past civil programmes could be used to offset defence offset obligations. This would under their new regime be extremely difficult to 
do anymore. 
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doing offsets is at an average 2.9% of the value of acquisition. It was also found that 
the cost of direct offsets is less than the cost of indirect offsets.26 
 
Christian Hadjimas27, on the questions of “Why offsets” and “Are they worth 
something and do they really contribute anything?” – or “Do they simply feed a 
whole industry?” comments that although one often hears about the abolishment of 
offset, it is instead increasing. He states that offset, in simple terms, and despite its 
apparent shortcomings, is really “akin to a virus that nobody seems able to get rid of, 
or more precisely, nobody really at the end of the day wants to risk letting them go”. 
He concludes that an offset cannot be measured and evaluated in strict economic 
terms and that, at best, it can only be assessed on an indirect basis on the surface 
as a peripheral side-effect of a dialogue resulting in the sharing of brain power, 
cultural exposure and the promotions of a country always in search of ways to 
‘score’ while keeping a flexible approach. 
 
2.7 The principal reason for being in countertrade is need versus necessity. Industrially 
developed countries want to sell their goods and services to either maintain a share 
of the market, or increase it.  This is the ‘need’ factor.  Third-world countries, such as 
Eastern Europe, the Post-Soviet republics and least-developed nations need to 
acquire certain machinery, equipment, knowledge and technology to develop, or 
even maintain and grow their own industries. This translates to the ‘necessity’ factor.   
 
The primary reasons why countertrade are used by countries also appear to the 
author to occur when there is a shortage of hard currency and commercial credits or 
foreign exchange, it is used as a tool to stimulate economic activity as an effort to 
establish or to stimulate and develop local industries in a developing country, along 
with the need to develop new export markets. It is a tool used to advance 
infrastructure in support of the total effort, while it also acts as a reflection of political 
                                                 
26 Author’s note: The reason why direct offsets may be cheaper to perform is as a direct result of such business being core to the 
seller’s business and actually becomes an natural extension of the normal execution of the programme. 
27 Hadjimas, Christian  -  of Epicos, Greece – in his contribution to the Brazilian publication of Offsets (Panorama da Practica do Offsets 
no Brazil. 2004). Pages 189-197. “Reflections of the evolution of Offsets” 
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and economic policies, to balance foreign trade and to secure foreign investments. It 
tends to develop, or to retain, or gain advantage over competition globally, for 
example through the creation of joint ventures where globalisation of the local 
industry is a key driver, as is the fostering of strategic international partnerships, to 
enable a developing country to secure direct foreign investment, and to stay clear 
from development assistance, or constrictive aid from industrially-development 
countries, or the World Bank. It is furthermore seen as a method through which 
capabilities can be enhanced through technology and skills transfers, as well as 
training and skills developments, socio-economic growth stimulation, job retention 
and creation. 
 
2.9 Martin also makes the observation that there are basically four distinct types of 
arguments governing the generalist views on countertrade: 28 
? The first is the so-called ‘hostile view’ as expressed by the WTO and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), interpreting 
countertrade as a threat (to Western exporters) and portraying the activity as 
being harmful at global level, saying that such liberalisms run counter to the spirit 
of an open and multi-lateral international trade system as propagated originally 
by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), now replaced by the 
WTO. This view is not only echoed by Coetzer,29 but also by the Bureau of 
Commerce of the USA and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Defence Manufacturer’s 
Association (DMA); 
? Secondly, there is the view that those governments imposing countertrade are ill-
informed and irrational, as there is little that countertrade can actually achieve; 
? Thirdly, there is a group of commentators that cautions against immediate 
opposition to all countertrade transactions. Their view is that cost and benefits of 
each transaction need to be taken into consideration, and that there can be no 
general presumptions that all countertrade is inefficient; and 
? Fourthly, and finally, there are those who see the various forms of countertrade 
as a rational response to the costliness of effecting some types of transactions 
                                                 
28Martin, S., 1996. The Economics of Offsets. Defence Procurement and Countertrade.  Harwood.  p17-19 
29 Coetzer, J.H. 1995.  International Countertrade Contracts:  Principles and Practice.  Info Africa Nova CC 
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along a more conventional ‘cash-for-goods’ line, which is a combination of the 
barter/counter-purchase/buy-back mechanisms of countertrade deployed in a 
structured manner. Martin, however, cautions against this fourth view as he is of 
the opinion that it tends to be too generalistic, and says he would rather see all 
the elements of countertrade operating in a homogenous manner, which is not 
presently the case in practice. 
 
2.10 In the research findings done by M. Brenan30 he states that international trade 
contain between 8% and 30% countertrade-related transactions. He is of the opinion 
that countertrade can be categorised as commercial countertrade, involving mainly 
barter and counter-purchase; and industrial countertrade, which involves practices 
such as buy-back, offsets, joint venture and compensation. He depicts his views 
on countertrade in the following manner: 
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Figure 5 (Source: M. Brenan) 
 
2.11 From the literature of various countertrade and economic academics (such as 
Brenan31, Banks32, Cohen33 and Neuman34) it is observed that they identify the 
                                                 
30 Brenan, M. Government Pro-active Countertrade: A Decade of deals. Murdoch University. Working Paper 17. June 1998. 
31 ibid 
32 Banks, G. The Economics and politics of Countertrade. World economy Vol 6. Jun 1983. 
33 Cohen, S. and Zysman, J. Countertrade, Offsets and Buybacks. California management Review Vol 28 No 2. 1986. 
34 Neuman, S.G. 1985. Co-production, Barter and Countertrade: Offsets in the International Arms Market. Orbid. 
 35 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
following aspects as giving substance to the phenomenon of           
international countertrade, namely shortages of hard currency; promotion of exports; 
using countertrade as a method of disguising the sales price of the countertrade 
goods, without upsetting existing trade agreements, linking administrative or political 
factors of exports to imports – used to disguise impositions of an economic austerity 
programme without overtly resorting to discriminatory tariff barriers, by using the 
seller’s larger international infrastructure and capacities as a gateway to new 
markets, and increasing technological improvements to increase a country’s level of 
technology, through joint ventures. 
 
2.12 Former Soviet Union (USSR) and COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance used by the East Block countries) countries have been known for 
practicing countertrade among themselves since World War II.  In the Post-Soviet 
Republics and the Post-COMECON era, these countries are still continuing doing 
so, joined by various other developing countries throughout the world. It was, for 
example, reported in 1999 that Iran has been using oil as its primary countertrade 
tool in all its foreign transactions. It was especially after the Cold War ended that the 
new Russian Federation, on many occasions, implemented debt swap deals by 
using arms transfers to especially the East Block countries, as a means to repay 
their debts in those countries. 
 
2.13 In the category of “newly industrialised nations”, countries such as South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore set the pace, while Malaysia strongly features in the Asian 
race, with India, Brazil and Chile (under “Mercosur – the South American common 
market and trade coordinating alliance”) are marginally included, with Mexico 
appearing to position itself for further growth.  Countertrade is important to all these 
countries, in order for them to acquire technology transfer, the latest state-of-the-art 
machinery and equipment, industrial goods to ensure their countries’ growth, and to 
improve access to Western markets.  These countries are also known for applying 
protective import and export measures, and place restrictions on certain activities. 
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2.14 According to Martin’s findings, offsets are used to grow infant industries in other 
countries, to protect local markets and further job creation and employment, to justify 
the economic benefits of spending, to reduce the adverse impact on balance of 
payment and to create industrial competitiveness from the seller’s point of view. 
 
He however, also states that economical empirical data is not generally available 
and it is therefore extremely difficult to make any empirically justified finding. He 
concludes that it seems as if vendors and buyers alike underestimate the scope and 
impact of offsets, and that the general trend is to move away from a best-endeavour 
type of approach, to a more structured one that aims to secure a longer-term 
relationship between the seller (and its country) and the buyer’s industry (and its 
government).35 
 
2.15 Most of the OPEC (oil-producing exporting) countries are involved in various forms 
of countertrade. Since the early ‘90s, these countries have placed an emphasis on 
the building of petrochemical plants, aluminum smelting complexes and 
manufacturing facilities in petroleum-related industries (petrochemicals). Since the 
latter half of 1980, however, countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been insisting on the creation of other value-
adding countertrade transactions, by excluding their petrochemical industries. Both 
UAE and Kuwait appear to be moving more to the establishment of a defence 
industrial base in their respective countries. 
 
2.16 Dr Pompilu Verzariu, the director of the financial and countertrade division of the 
International Trade Administration of the US Department of Commerce, makes the 
observation that both industrialised and emerging, or developing countries apply 
defence offsets. He says  the type of offset mainly depends on the sophistication of 
the hardware procured and that offset practices are at the same time a ‘non-tariff 
barrier’ to trade and a cost of doing business in an imperfect, international 
                                                 
35 Author’s note: Major defence deals are constantly characterized by Government to Government agreements and lesser a case of a 
seller engaging the buyer country on its own. Case in point was the South Africa Defence Package Deal of 1999 and the recent A-Darter 
missile del with Brazil (2006). 
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marketplace, acting as “concession to importers influencing their choice of 
suppliers”. 
 
He asks for example the following question on behalf of obligors: “Can the buyer 
country absorb incremental offset investments in a viable and efficient manner, and 
at the rates and frequency prescribed by such buyer’s country?” He also questions 
the process by which a country can properly and quantitatively assess the real, or 
actual medium and long-term value and costs of projects proposed as offsets, as 
well as the reforms necessary and actions to be undertaken to facilitate and 
streamline offset processes. He appears eager to understand how offset 
arrangements can support programmes that accelerate regional integration, or 
integration into the global production chains. 
 
2.17  In a similar fashion, Martin36 remarks on the views of Alon Redlich and Micavage 
who in turn argue that offsets should be seen as an opportunity, rather that a 
burden. He further alleges that it presents the opportunity for cooperation rather than 
adversarial opposition and that offsets can indeed be beneficial to both the seller 
and the buyer. Offsets should be viewed as an extension of industrial policy and not 
always aim at increasing domestically manufactured goods, as a country’s industrial 
base may be too small to absorb such work. 
 
2.18 Dr C.G. Alexandrides (a Professor Emeritus of management at the USA Georgia 
State University)37 on the other hand states that the most obvious reason for the 
increasing strictness of offset requirements is that the buying countries have the 
power and can therefore make demands. Direct offsets are reportedly much easier 
to quantify than indirect offsets. He states that direct offsets do not require strict 
regulations because the economic outcomes remain very predictable. On the 
indirect offsets side, the risks are much higher as investors in non-defence sectors 
are required to set up non-core related commercial business and the outcomes are 
almost impossible to predict. Government, therefore, has little choice but to protect 
                                                 
36 Martin, S. 1996. The Economics of Offsets. Defence Procurement and Countertrade. OPA 
37 Presentation made at the International Offsets Conference in Abu Dhabi  “Offsets in the 21st century” 22-23 March 1999. 
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itself by introducing strict terms and conditions related to the execution of the offset 
commitments. Alexandrides propagates the use of more indirect offsets as a way to 
balance the respective countries’ (buyer and seller alike) economy, and improve 
shrinking defence budgets. 
 
2.19 R. Mirus and B. Yeung38 support the view that countries with foreign exchange 
constraints tend to resort to countertrade in order to “guarantee that future exports 
will generate” foreign exchange earnings. Countertrade is used as a “substitute for 
an absent futures market” and still used as a means to also diversify exports. 
 
 
3. Types of countertrade 
 
The following types of countertrade activities are found internationally and can 
basically be divided into three broad categories of commercial compensation, 
industrial participation and a third category that falls outside of the first two sectors, 
which is termed as “Other”:  
 
Note: This diagram as devised by the author in 1997/8 is much more comprehensive 
than the model proposed by M. Brenan at Figure 5 above. 
                                                 
38 Minu,s R. and Yeun,g B. 2001. The Economics of Barter and Countertrade. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
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Figure 6 (Source: J.J. van Dyk) 
 
What follows hereunder is a broad description of some of the various components of the 
model depicted above, as applied in practice, and explained in more detail specifically by 
Coetzer39 (there are numerous other academic works and literature available on this 
subject matter): 
 
3.1 Barter 
This type of import/export transaction covers the direct exchange of commodity-for-
commodity of equal value, where no cash is involved. In this form of countertrade, 
the export of goods and services is often delayed until sufficient revenue has been 
earned from the sale of the so-bartered commodity. A country’s clearing bank 
assumes the role of representative of both the seller and the buyer, based of the 
barter transaction that results in goods being exported or imported. Sometimes 
barter is used as a mechanism of trade if the buyer is either reluctant, or unable to 
                                                 
39 Coetzer, J.H. 1995. International Countertrade Contracts:  Principles and Practice. Info Africa Nova CC 
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pay for the goods in terms of the original agreed agreement. It is reportedly mostly 
cash strapped countries that opt for this mechanism. 
 
3.2 Evidence accounts 
Evidence accounts look at cumulative export/import dollar value turnovers within a 
specific period – mostly between one and three years – and the key requirement is 
to balance the export of goods to the import of goods between two specific 
countries. This is true for large government-to-government bilateral agreements that 
involve multinational corporations, or traders with extensive ongoing export/import 
business activity in their specialised areas, with trading partners in specific countries.   
 
The monetary value of such accounts is balanced by the participating enterprises of 
the two trading partner countries, within an agreed period of time – generally up to 
three years – either by payment of cash, or by goods. The evidence accounts are 
maintained by the reserve (central) banks in the trading partners’ countries, or by 
commercial banks designated by the central banks of the respective countries.   
 
3.3 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
BOT projects normally manifest in major infrastructure turnkey projects in power, toll-
roads and the transport sectors. These sectors are ideally suited for this kind of 
deals and normally involve a consortium of foreign investors and suppliers, with local 
partnerships in the making. They then ‘build’ the project, and operate it for profit 
over a pre-agreed number of years. Turnkey contracts lower exchange risks by 
shifting the risk from the buyer, to the seller.40  All revenues generated from the 
project are used by the consortium to pay the suppliers of the machinery, equipment 
and services, as well as servicing the payment of any debts. After the end of the 
term of the contract period, the ownership of the project is transferred to a local 
concern, generally a local or state government body (or a combination). 
 
                                                 
40 Taylor, Travis K . September 2002. College of Business, Alfred University. New York. Working Paper: Using offsets in procurement as 
an economic development strategy. International Conference on Defence Offsets and Economic Development. Page 18. 
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As a general practice, one of the members of the consortium is always a 
government body that will ultimately take over the project from the private BOT 
consortium at the end of the fixed term. 
 
Other variations of this method include BOOT (build, operate, own and transfer) or 
BOO (build, operate and own) or even BLT (build, lease and transfer). In each 
instance the contracting model, duration and terms differ. Implementation inevitably 
takes a couple of years and return on investment (ROI) happens over a longer 
period. Programmes of this nature may also include aspects related to Private 
Financed Investments (PFI), as well as Public Private Partnerships (PPP's). 
 
 
3.4 Buy-back 
This form of countertrade tends to be long-term and for larger financial transactions. 
Under its provisions, a supplier of capital goods agrees to reimburse the investor, 
partially or in full,  sometime in the future, from the resulting output of the capital 
goods exported to a country, including its own. 
 
Several parties are involved in a buy-back transaction  and it normally involves 
investments (in the form of equity, capital equipment, loans, management and 
infrastructure support and technology transfer). The supplier of the machinery and 
equipment needs to finance the acquisition; a broker may be involved in the country 
importing the goods; the importer, in need of the equipment, will plan to install the 
machinery; purchase the raw material, including local contents; schedule production; 
while the production output may be transported directly by the supplier, or sold 
through a broker in a third country. Bankers act as trustees of the fund until the final 
Example: 
Morocco, for example, invited tenders during 1996 for a BOT-
type project, involving the building of a motorway of 100 km 
between Cassablanca and El-Jadida. 
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payment is made to the supplier. The implementation of the deal can take a couple 
of years. 
 
    
 
3.5 Co-production 
Co-production is used mostly by oil-producing countries. Due to the size and overall 
impact of such a project, there is, however, a limited number of major multinational 
oil and gas companies that can take part in ventures of this nature. Downstream 
petrochemical activities are fairly lucrative and primary industry beneficiation can be 
secured through co-production. 
 
An oil and gas company, for example, can enter into a joint venture agreement with 
a government of a developing country to search for oil or gas reserves, and to 
explore and to produce oil and gas, either onshore or offshore. The oil and gas 
company makes the total investment in exchange for certain rights, which are limited 
to the number of years it is involved in the joint venture deal. Oil and gas thus 
produced, is shared in accordance with the agreement between the parties, and sold 
on the global, or local market. This inevitably poses risks, but also profit-sharing 
aspect, and may take some time to fully develop into a profitable business. 
 
As stated in par 2.15 above, the trend is for oil-producing countries to move away 
from the traditional approach, focusing on downstream value-add related to 
beneficiation activities. 
Example 
 
In general, ‘buy-back’ deals are opted for when a production facility is established, 
upgraded or modernised in a developing country, with the import of new equipment 
(capital investment) happening in terms of joint ventures, technology transfer or 
production sharing. In this instance, the one country sells a chemical plant to the buyer 
country and separate agreements are concluded to buy-back a percentage of the 
plant’s production over a negotiated period of time. 
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3.6 Blocked funds 
Blocked funds constitute a monetary process posing very strict fiscal controls, where 
the Central Bank of a country will not allow repatriation because that country is short 
of hard currency. Blocked funds are generated when a foreign manufacturer 
operating in a country, cannot transfer his earnings, capital and/or profits to his own 
country of origin. This situation reportedly appears to be prevalent in most of the 
Latin American countries, and countries with small and slow moving economies. It 
normally involves large sums and is a form of countertrade where the borrowing 
country pays money into funds that are transferred to a bank of the borrowing 
country. Banks, brokers, traders and industries use various methods, usually at large 
discounts, within a country’s foreign exchange regulations, to repatriate the funds 
and lower a country’s external debt.   
 
Commercial banks provide some compensatory benefits to all parties, including the 
reduction of external debt of a country. The involvement of government and the 
Central Bank in these deals, is inevitable, but parties have to work through a lot of 
red tape and manage processes instituted by bureaucracies. 
 
3.7 Counter-purchase 
Counter-purchase agreements take various forms to suit the needs of the exporter of 
capital goods. The exporter needs to market the goods and services received, and 
as a condition of the sale, in a separate contract, accepts to purchase for cash, or on 
credit, goods and/or services from the country in which it is selling the goods.  The 
value of the counter-purchase can be less than, equal to, or higher than the original 
export order. Counter-purchase may specify the markets in which the received 
goods may be sold, it may carry penalties for non-performance, as well as other rigid 
conditions. This form of countertrade can deliver results fairly quickly and is 
reportedly one of the more favoured and profitable avenues. It is also referred to as 
commodity trade deals. It can, however, be a very restrictive process if the buyer 
country is too prescriptive about the types of commodities that will qualify. 
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3.8 Joint ventures 
Companies in industrial countries lure local companies to become part of joint 
ventures, offering them full participation in all aspects of commercial activity, 
including the financing process.  Joint ventures can involve two or more parties in a 
related industrial sector. In most countries, joint ventures are considered to be 
private contracts between one or more parties, specifying the role of each party 
within such venture, stipulating objectives, liabilities, management and risks. Certain 
countries require that citizens of that country hold equity positions, with laws 
specifying that the majority equity in the joint venture will be in the hands of local 
citizens. In most countries, 100% foreign ownership is allowed. It is reported that 
Kuwait use to restricts foreign ownership to only 35%, but indications are that it may 
consider lifting this restriction.. The UAE still has a requirement of at least 51% UAE 
ownership in any offset enterprise (or other business), although, lately there some 
relaxations have been announced for the export processing zones (EPZ). 
 
Joint ventures should ideally be separate legal entities, based in the country in which 
the joint venture activity is performed. It is essential that one fully comprehends the 
commercial financial (mercantile) laws of such base country. A joint venture may 
take some time to deliver the desired results. If a foreign party, however, takes a 
stake in a running concern, it can contribute to the internationalisation and credibility 
of local companies, strengthening their export position. 
 
3.9 Offset 
 Offsets are part and parcel of government-to-government sales of defence 
equipment, infrastructure projects; and/or high-price-tag technology related to 
manufactured goods, such as civil aircraft, telecommunications and power 
generation.  Offset stipulates respective requirements for direct and indirect offset. 
 
3.9.1 Direct offset 
Under direct offset, the seller is required to include locally-produced content in the 
products it is selling to the buying country/company. In some cases, technology will 
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be transferred and/or joint ventures established to manufacture a product and/or to 
build a production facility to produce sections of the final product that is then sold to 
the country in question. Direct offset, in general, is used when civil aircraft and 
defence equipment are sold to a country, and aligns with the industrial development 
goals of a country. Some countries are using this kind of offset to secure business 
for its indigenous defence industries (such as Canada, Australia, the UK, Nordic 
countries and South Africa, to name a few). 
 
Governments insisting on ‘local content’ in defence contracts must, however, ensure 
that there is a proper defence-industrialised base  exists, and should offer 
preferential procurement incentive schemes to ensure the long-term viability and 
sustainability of the business so acquired.  
 
3.9.2 Indirect offset 
Indirect offset can be part of the defence and/or civil industrial sectors and basically 
contains the same type of work-share as required in direct offset, with the main 
difference relating to the export of the end-product. 
 
Example: 
In the case of South Africa, the defence industrial participation programme requires at least a 50% of the full 
amount of the purchase cost of equipment imported from foreign suppliers. DIP is thus required when foreign 
exchange is leaving the buyer’s country. A foreign seller must effectively ensure that activities related to the sale 
are assigned to  South African companies.  This return (reciprocal) business takes on various commercial forms, 
such as: 
? orders for the manufacturing of parts or components 
? orders for various other forms of work on test, integration, qualification and certification 
? orders for the export of manufactured goods 
? foreign investments in existing or new businesses (this includes tooling and machinery) 
? training and the transferring of skills, know-how and  technology. 
 
Denel has been actively involved in this approach in the past five years after it has been nominated as a 
beneficiary under the Armscor DIP programme that resulted from the Strategic Defence Package deal.  [More 
details in Chapter 7]. 
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In the case of indirect offset, the buyer (country or company) requires the seller to 
undertake economic, industrial and social development projects, approved by the 
buyer. The ratio of these projects, in general, is dependent on the policies of the 
relevant country. South Africa poses a unique situation in the sense that it has an 
indirect requirement under both its DIP programme and its civilian, or non-defence 
industrial participation (NIP) programme. 
 
3.10 Trade-offs 
Trade-off transactions are normally restricted to the swapping of credits in one 
country, in exchange for credits in another country. These types of transactions (also 
referred to as waivers, abatements or swaps) involve the exchange of offset 
obligations in those industries supplying defence equipment to the defence forces of 
such countries. The obligation and the swap have to take place within the same time 
period. Such a swap, however, requires specific agreements between the obligated 
companies and the relevant government authorities in each country. During the past 
six years, Armscor has assisted the local DRI in concluding relevant agreements in 
numerous such transactions41.  
 
                                                 
41 The Author was personally involved in setting up and concluding several swap deals to the value of several hundred millions of 
Rands over the past seven years in the interest of several companies. 
Example 
Typical examples of indirect defence offsets in South Africa include: 
- the selling of brass parts for ammunition 
- commercial aircraft parts. 
 
Typical examples of indirect civil offsets include the export of: 
- processed wood chips 
- fabricated gold chains. 
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3.11 Technology transfer 
Technology transfer is a common practice related primarily to offsets in many 
countries, and mostly when an importing country wants to develop, expand, or 
enhance its own industrial capabilities. Activities may include the transfer of patents, 
licenses, industrial processes, and machinery and equipment not available in the 
importing country. The valuation of technology remains problematic, as the 
establishment cost of the developer cannot always be fully discounted in the sale 
amount. The eventual value and intrinsic nature of such technology being 
transferred, pose many questions. Many countries, therefore, resort to upfront 
multipliers. Martin states that technology transfers are a common form of offset and 
that many countries use it as a mechanism to increase the sophistication of their 
industries. However, the chances of any beneficiaries, or recipients of such 
technologies to exploit such transfers become highly debatable. According to Martin 
the neoclassical economic theory stresses the advantages of exchanging money for 
goods in a conventional manner. However, high-tech transactions (for example the 
aerospace) are characterised by oligopolitic distortions and industrial policies 
(through the application of offsets) and used as a second-best outcome in an 
attempt to justify ‘economic rent’ generated in such imperfect markets. 
 
3.12 Tolling 
Tolling is a form of countertrade that sees a seller exporting the raw materials to a 
factory in a developing country, using its spare, or unused capacity to produce the 
finished goods. The factory supplies the finished goods to its customers, who pay 
the seller in cash for the raw materials supplied. The supplier in such instances, 
retains ownership of the raw materials so supplied, as well as the finished goods, 
Example 
A South African defence company has an obligation in another country (B). A company in that country B 
has an obligation in South Africa. These two obligations are then swapped on a 1:1 basis. A more 
complex process may involve more than two countries. 
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until the supplier receives payment from the factory’s customer(s). Tolling is used in 
cases where raw material shortages keep a factory from supplying goods to its 
customers. These occur mainly in countries facing hard currency shortages, 
including most of the Post-Soviet republics, Georgia, Belarus and the Ukraine in 
particular.   
 
3.13 Switch trading 
Switch trading is evident in third-party trading. If a country shows a disparity in its 
long-term bilateral trading agreements, switch trading is used to balance an 
ambiguous surplus (also see evidence accounts). These transactions, also known in 
the trade as a ’swaps’ or ‘switches’, typically involve the switching of the destination 
and the documentation of goods on the high seas, influencing different markets, and 
many buyers, sellers and brokers. 
 
3.14 Pre-offset 
Pre-offset, also called a banking arrangement, involves a process where a foreign 
supplier, who is of the opinion that it may be successful in securing a supply contract 
for its country, decides to do business in another country on a pro-active basis. The 
company enters into a ‘strategic partnership agreement’ (or pre-offset agreement) 
with the countertrade authorities of the other country. 
 
In terms of this agreement the prospective supplier may start doing ‘indirect’ 
business in the other country, with the understanding that the credits so acquired 
can be used, at a later stage, to offset its commitment. In the event that the 
prospective supplier is not successful in acquiring future business, and cannot apply 
the credits gained, it may transfer the accumulated credits to another supplier. The 
process allows a country to start doing business in another country before a defence 
Example: 
An un-cleared trade surplus between Country A and Country B can be cleared by the sale of goods by 
Country B to Country C. Country C pays Country A to clear the imbalance in export/import trade between 
Country A and B. 
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contracts is awarded (which may take quite some time due to defence budgetary 
cycles). In most instances, pre-offset credits accumulated have a limited shelf life -  
this also varies from country to country. 
 
In South Africa, Armscor concludes a ‘pro-active DIP agreement’ with a potential 
foreign supplier, even before a Department of Defence contract has been awarded. 
Such an agreement allows such potential foreign suppliers to start doing defence-
related business in South Africa, with DRI companies, pro-actively, banking such 
credits for future use. DIP banked credits can be traded, with the prior approval of 
Armscor, and credits are only valid for four years. The DTI’s Strategic Partnership 
Agreement’ (SPA) allows for the banking of credits in non-defence sectors. Credits 
can, however, not being traded and also expire in four years. 
 
3.15  Economic enhancement 
The concept of economic enhancement, (claimed to be pioneered by Summit42) in 
Libya, for example, specifically aims to derive the maximum benefit from the 
enormous leverage that the buyer has over potential suppliers involved in the 
procurement process of large government contracts. The additional value created as 
a result of implementing economic enhancement policies, is to be closely aligned 
with existing government objectives, and yet, at the same time, derives benefit from 
capabilities, expertise and contacts that the supplier is able to provide. 
 
Economic enhancement can be described as the next logical step in the evolutionary 
countertrade development process, as it makes a transition from barter, to counter-
purchase, to indirect offsets. There are some core principles that must be 
acknowledged in understanding the concept: 
                                                 
42 Author’s note: Founded in 1998 by Grant Rogan, Summit Corporate Services, UK specializes in using its experience and expertise in 
Economic Enhancement, offset and countertrade to develop structured programmes and provide first class consultancy services to 
governments, corporations and companies throughout the world. 
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• The concept is not confined to defence or aerospace contracts, as it can be applied 
to any large contract through which the state is procuring something; 
• Economic enhancement forges partnerships between buyers and sellers, exploring 
avenues whereby the seller’s resources can best be harnessed to contribute to the 
achievement of existing strategic national objectives; 
• It can be put into practice by integrating traditional countertrade mechanisms (such 
as counter-purchase, direct and indirect offset) with a broad range of financial tools 
(such as PFI, PPP, BOT), in order to generate sufficient funds for any chosen 
programme, reducing bulk expenditure by the client, or nominated parties. 
Economic enhancement should work to further the national socio-economic and 
geo-political objectives of the client country. 
 
In order to ensure the maximum potential of economic enhancement, it is essential 
that it should be enshrined in a country’s legislation, and regulated by a legally 
recognised oversight agency, offering openness and transparency to all potential 
suppliers.   
 
3.16 Considering offsets in the USA, it was reported43 that an Interagency Team from the 
US Department of Commerce consulted with authorities in Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK. The team’s report states that many nations believe that the USA is 
practicing offsets through its ‘Buy American Act’, and that the US market is 
perceived to be closed to foreign competition. The Interagency Team estimates that 
offsets may increase the price of equipment by as much as 15% to 30%. No 
evidence is, however, presented to substantiate these estimates. The team states 
that offsets are not only persistent, but are also increasing. US prime contractors 
view offsets as an indispensable business tool. In its report the team recommends 
maximum flexibility and suggests that the European Union (EU) should develop, in 
collaboration with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an internationally agreed 
                                                 
43 Countertrade & Offset. Vol XXV No 4. Feb 26, 2007. Available at: www.cto-offset.com 
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model for offset, ensuring that the value baseline takes the value of contracts and 
capacities of suppliers into account. 
 
4. Considering a practical approach to countertrade requirements 
Based on the author’s personal experience in this field, it can be confirmed that 
more and more countries require foreign sellers to substantiate proposed 
countertrade solutions already at the tendering stage. In many instances, such pre-
qualifying requirements form part of the tender adjudication value systems, with non-
compliance normally leading to disqualification. 
 
The countertrade proposal must be in the format dictated by the tender and comply 
strictly with the terms of the tender. Caution needs to be exercised as to whom the 
proposal is addressed to, as it can be rejected if not addressed to the proper 
authority and/or not copied to designated authorities, or departments. 
 
The ‘countertrade tender checklist44’ is a handy tool to verify one’s compliance with 
aspects such as: 
- Countertrade ratios, macro-multipliers, micro-multipliers and country rules and 
regulations pertaining to these and other intrinsic benefits; 
- Confirming already-negotiated agreement(s) and the terms related to pre-offsets, 
back-to-back agreements, and other agreements supporting the bid; 
- Direct or indirect activities (through brokers and 3rd parties) and required ratios, 
minimum and maximum requirements, restrictions and exclusions, or inclusions 
of strategic needs requirements; 
- Reporting schedules, officially prescribed formats and scheduling, and the target 
audience; 
                                                 
44 Author’s  note: Tenders are legally binding documents, and once accepted by the buyer country, one cannot renege on promises 
made. Buyer countries are therefore very prescriptive in especially the countertrade part of the tender, where terms such as “… we will 
endeavor to…”, or “best effort” or any other word/phrase that does not constitute a firm irrevocable commitment, are regarded with the 
utmost suspicion. 
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- Credits and credit accumulations, recommended methods, formats and 
scheduling, and applicable rules; 
- Local content – very clear understandings need to be reached, and limitations 
analysed; 
- Imported content – restrictions, rules, calculation, proof required; 
- Licenses – restrictions and royalties; 
- Training, skills and support plan and the prioritised areas; 
- The recommendations pertaining to education, including disciplines, methods 
and trainer profiles;   
- Payments – when, how, where, against what proof; 
- Performance guarantees, the amounts and release formats; 
- Insurance provisions; 
- Legal regulations, conditions and order of precedence, if applicable; 
- Completion period, negotiation period, credit model and conditions concerning 
discharge to be included in the legal countertrade contract; 
- Management of the commitment, the organisation chart and roles of people key 
players; and 
- the compilation of a detailed, executive summary, including conclusions. 
 
5. WTO (World Trade Organisation) issues, related to the subject of countertrade 
 
5.1 According to the WTO analysis done by S.K. Treahan, editor of News World’s Red 
Book (1999 –2000 edition), the WTO Agreement on countertrade applies to any law, 
regulation, procedure or practice regulating the government procurements of any 
WTO member country, with exceptions as identified in its Appendix I (Annex 1 to 
Annex 5). Relevant thresholds are specified for each country in the relevant 
country’s Annexure to the WTO Agreement. Such an Annexure may have been filed 
at the time the country’s government ratified the agreement, and/or may be filed as 
part of an agreement with the WTO concluded the future. The following salient 
features of the WTO are highlighted by Treahan’s reviews. 
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5.2 The WTO agreement applies to procurements by any contractual means, including a 
purchase, or as lease, rental, or hire purchase, with or without an option to buy, for 
any combination of products and services. 
 
5.3 Where entities, in the context of procurements covered under the WTO agreement, 
require enterprises that are not included in its Appendix I to award contracts in 
accordance with particular requirements, Article III of the WTO agreement applies 
mutates mutandis to such requirements. 
 
5.4 The WTO agreement applies to any procurement of a value equal to, or exceeding 
the relevant threshold specified in its Appendix I of the agreement. 
 
5.5 One of the key articles in the WTO agreement, is Article V that relates to developing 
countries. 
 
5.5.1 Objectives of Article V state that - “Parties shall, in the implementation and 
administration of the WTO agreement, through the provisions set out in this article, 
duly take into account the development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countries, in particular least-developed countries, in their need to: 
 
i. Safeguard their balance-of-payments position and ensure a level of 
reserves adequate for the implementation of programmes of economic 
development; 
ii. Promote the establishment, or development of domestic industries, 
including the development of small-scale and cottage industries in rural or 
backward areas; and economic development of other sectors of the 
economy; 
iii. Support industrial units that are wholly, or substantially dependent on 
government procurement’; 
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iv. Encourage economic development through regional, or global arrangements 
among developing countries presented to the Ministerial Conference of the 
WTO, and  approved by the conference.” 
 
Treahan states that consistently, with the provisions of the agreement, each party 
(country) has to, in the preparation and application of laws, regulations and 
procedures affecting government procurement, facilitate increased imports from 
developing countries, bearing in mind the problems that least-developed countries 
and countries at low stages of economic development experience. To ensure that 
developing countries are able to adhere to this agreement and that the terms are 
consistent with their development, financial and trade needs, the objectives listed 
in the paragraph 1 of Article V need to be duly taken into account in the course of 
negotiating procurement contracts in developing countries. When developed 
countries prepare their coverage lists (these are lists indicating products and 
services) as per the provisions of the WTO agreement, they need to endeavour to 
include entities that will deliver products and services that developing countries can 
export. 
 
Treahan points to the fact that a party that is a developing country may modify its 
coverage lists in accordance with the provisions for modification of such lists, 
contained in paragraph 6 of Article XXIV, as long as attention is given to the 
development, financial and trade needs of such countries. Such countries may 
request the committee in charge of government procurement (the Committee) to 
grant exclusions from the rules on national treatment, for certain entities, products 
or services that are included in its coverage lists. A developing country may also 
request the Committee to grant exclusions for certain entities, products or services 
that are included in its coverage lists in the light of its participation in regional or 
global arrangements among developing countries, having regard for the particular 
circumstances of each case. 
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5.5.2 Treahan also analyses Article XVI and concludes that the WTO’s guidelines on 
offsets are contradictory. In Article XVI (1) on offsets, the WTO, for example, 
states that the “entities shall not… impose, seek or consider offsets”, but in part (2) 
it allows offsets to be “used only for qualification to participate in the procurement 
process…” Treahan points to the contents of Article XVI, which read as follows: 
 
“Part 1:  Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, 
products or services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of 
contract, impose seek or consider offsets. 
 
 (Offsets in government procurement are measures, according to the 
WTO, used to encourage local development, or improve the balance-
of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of 
technology, investment requirements, countertrade or similar 
requirements.) 
 
Part 2:  Nevertheless, regarding general policy considerations, including those 
relating to development, a developing country may at the time of 
agreement negotiate conditions for the use of offsets, such as 
requirements for the incorporation of domestic content.  Such 
requirements shall be used only to qualify participation in the 
procurement process, and not as a criterion for awarding contracts. 
Conditions shall be objective, clearly defined and non-discriminatory.  
They shall be set forth in the country’s Appendix I and may include 
precise limitations on the imposition of offsets in any contract subject to 
this agreement. The existence of such conditions shall be notified to 
the Committee and included in the notice of intended procurement and 
other documentation.” 
 
 In concluding the debate on the WTO’s stance on offsets, it is Treahan’s view that 
the WTO permits countertrade. According to his Red Book (1999 – 2000 edition)the 
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WTO agreement permits countertrade when taking into account the development, 
financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular least-developed 
countries, in safeguarding their ‘balance-of-payments’, “to promote the 
establishment or development of domestic industries”, and to encourage “economic 
development through regional or global arrangements among developing countries”. 
 
6. Penalties and countertrade 
 
? Liquidated damages 
 In most countertrade regimes a contractual requirement for the seller, who 
becomes the obligor, is to submit a guarantee for liquidated damages, which is 
commonly referred to as a non-performance penalty. 
 
 Penalties vary considerably, from a low five percent to a hefty one hundred 
percent. 
 
 Certain countries do not accept liquidated damages, but only penalties. In some 
cases, however, a penalty does not release the obligor of its obligation. In the 
case of Turkey, for example, any unfulfilled obligation rolls over to the next 
discharge milestone, with an added escalation portion (normally based on the 
escalation formula as contained in the main agreement).  
 
? Blacklisting 
Some countries, although not always publicly acknowledged, resort to the 
blacklisting of non-performing sellers (obligors), which means that even and 
although such a seller (obligor) may have opted for a penalty as a ‘walk away 
liquidated damages settlement’, the non-performing party is forever blacklisted as 
a non-credible supplier of that market. The reputational impact of such actions on 
such a company’s business is incalculable. 
 
? Best effort obligations 
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In contrast to the concept of penalties and liquidated damages, this type of 
performance model relies solely on the morals and goodwill of companies/seller 
and its governments. Although the obligation is a firm and contractually agreed-to 
commitment, it holds no legal impact to the seller in the event of non-
performance. However, due to the ‘reputation of offsets there are not many 
countries that allow best effort discharge, and at this stage it is probably only the 
UK and Israel following this practice, with a country like Pakistan expecting 
‘voluntary participation’. 
 
Without any legal and binding document stipulating the obligation and with no 
recourse, obligated companies/sellers tend to attend to such obligations on an 
incidental basis and very little time and resources are in fact allocated and spent 
on any active execution programmes. Resources, time, effort and money are 
required to discharge obligations that pose a business risk to the obligor. 
 
7. Multipliers 
In an article on “International offsets: An international trade development tool”, 
written by K. Barry Marvel in 199545, he alludes to the common perception (even 
then) that “…the world of offsets somehow seems mysterious and dangerous”.  He 
poses the following question, asking why a company will, for example, commit to 
offsets of say USD120-million, while the actual sales transaction with that country 
only amounts to USD100-million. The answer hereto is allegedly to be found in the 
application of so-called multipliers. Multiplying practices are used as a means of 
attracting countertrade activities into specific industrial or social or socio-economic 
sectors in a country, or to attend to the development needs of such a country. 
 
Multipliers are usually negotiated when a sales deal is concluded, and in most 
instances these multipliers have an arbitrary value – sometimes prescribed by a 
country’s countertrade policies, or otherwise set after negotiation, after the seller has 
been made aware of certain strategic, or niche requirements of the buyer country. 
                                                 
45 Marvel, K.B. Contract Management October 1995. USA. Marvel is an attorney at law. Salt Lake City and a defence analyst and 
consultant. 
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Multipliers are commonly allowed in areas of foreign investment, training and 
technology, as well research and development – especially in identified areas of a 
country’s industrial and technology base.  
 
Marvel also remarks that the “large values of offset commitments published 
internationally” make the numbers meaningless, as the effect of multipliers is not 
taken into consideration. However, in the case of South Africa’s strategic defence 
package deal of December 1999, the DIP and NIP commitments of around 340% of 
contract value, were negotiated and agreed to with all the respective foreign 
suppliers. This figure was achieved without any multipliers46. 
 
8. In summary 
In conclusion, it is worthwhile sharing some of the views on the future of 
countertrade, as expressed by Dr Pompiliu Verzariu.47 Firstly, he remarks on an 
observation that governments in many emerging markets are increasingly 
questioning the offset process and the quantitative assessment of real economic 
value caused by offsets. On the other hand, he expresses the opinion that defence 
suppliers are concerned over offsets in specific relation to a country’s abilities to 
actually absorb incremental offset investments in a viable and efficient manner, and 
at those rates prescribed by such countries’ offset requirements. He also observes 
the following global trends, namely that: 
? Aerospace weapons-related offsets will continue to form the bulk of offset 
practices; 
? The continuous drop in defence spending will be counter-balanced through a rise 
in offset demands; 
? The value of offset multipliers is shrinking; 
? Indirect offset is increasing; 
? The accumulation of offset commitments by suppliers causes them to bid against 
each other’s supply chains; 
                                                 
46 The Author was directly involved with the contracting process of the 1999 SDP. 
47 Verzariu, Dr P. US Department of Commerce. Chapter on “the Global landscape of offsets in the new millennium”. 2004. Panorama do 
Offset do Brasil. 
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? Emerging markets are spilling offsets into the civil sectors and more stringent 
requirements are enforced; 
? Western suppliers are encountering heightened difficulties with identifying viable 
indirect offset projects and end up competing with independent ‘cross-border 
business’; 
? Buying countries are playing-off the European suppliers against the US suppliers, 
in order to secure more lucrative offset deals; and 
? Offsets tend to outweigh other (traditional) procurement criteria. 
 
He states that the tightening and enforcing of offset conditions by governments, are 
increasing the cost of doing offsets, and that offsets are becoming more difficult to 
perform. He also comments that because US companies are “pre-eminent suppliers 
of defence items, they are highly vulnerable to offset demands”.48 Finally, and as 
also observed by Martin49, there is no indication that offsets are likely to disappear in 
the foreseeable future and it will remain a complex and intricate challenge for all 
defence suppliers across the world. 
 
9. In conclusion 
Having considered all the various types and forms in which countertrade manifests 
in practice, it is clear that such a discipline is difficult to comment on in context and in 
direct relationship with what it is intended to achieve. The scholars on the subject, as 
can be seen in this chapter, submit a combination of positively and negatively 
perceived aspects of the subject matter under research. There are also cautious 
neutral views on the subject. It was deemed crucial for this research paper to also 
look at what is happening internationally and how the South African DIP programme 
fits into this international trade realm. This aspect is more fully argued and 
deliberated on, in later chapters of this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
48 Author’s note: The US Department of Commerce, is a staunch opponent of anything that remotely resembles offset and had been 
trying its best to “kill” offsets as a protectionist measure for their defence industry. (Similar opposing views to offset are also expressed by 
the UK Defence Manufacturer’s Association, also in an endeavor to protect their industry against the effects of offset and the threat of 
loosing work share to another country) 
49 Martin, S.  1996. The Economics of Offsets.  Defence Procurement and Countertrade. Harwood 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the preparations done to conduct this research that culminated in the writing of 
this dissertation, due recognition was given, throughout the process, to the 
respective paradigms and methodologies governing social research. 
 
On the subject of social research E. Babbie & J. Mouton50, observes that the ability 
to produce knowledge and subsequently use it effectively, are some of the most 
important features of the modern society of today. It has become crucial to properly 
collect and manage information. Knowledge comes in various forms and the authors 
comment that one has to recognise the importance of differences between various 
types of knowledge, which are to be found in everyday life, as they occur and 
manifest in the public domain of society, compared with knowledge that is based on 
well-researched scientifically validated data that are empirically valid. 
 
They see the process of research as being systematically impartial and objective 
and supported by qualitative and quantitative evidence or truth. “Scientific 
knowledge comprises statements, which are better or worse approximations of 
reality [TRUTH], which are accepted by the scientific community after having 
scrutinised these [RATIONALITY] and which are based on the best supporting 
evidence gained through the application of rigorous methods and techniques 
[OBJECTIVITY].”51  
 
The relationship between social science concepts and the everyday constructs 
(Schultz52) leads to two methodological postulations for social science research, 
namely, the assumption of logical consistency and the postulate for adequacy. 
                                                 
50 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. The Practice of Social Research. 2006. OUP. SA edition. 
51 ibid p10-13 
52 ibid p29 
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Logical consistency requires theories of the social world to be coherent within the 
larger system of social science, whereas adequacy requires that such theories and 
interpretations of the social world be recognisable and understandable, having been 
the subject of observation (the research). 
 
The research process into the identified research topic of defence industrial 
participation (DIP) and its effect and/or impact on the local DRI was investigated 
within the paradigms of social research and complemented by the author’s own 
participatory role (as an active participant since 1996) in the development of the DRI 
and industrial participation policies and process in South Africa. The author also 
shares his observations in this regard and assesses the outcomes of the 
implementation of relevant policies and processes, accordingly. 
 
The relevancy of the social research paradigm in relation to this dissertation’s 
research topic, can therefore be summarised and reflected on, as in par 2 
hereunder. 
 
2. Types of research applicable to this research 
  
According to W.L. Neuman53 the following research issues need to be observed, 
namely that: 
 
a. Basic research tends to expand on fundamental knowledge, which in this instance 
focuses on “what is DIP all about?” This type of research also refers to academic 
research, or pure research. The researcher first states the phenomena and then 
describes and explains it. This type of research attempts to support, or reject theories, 
explain social relationships, as well as interpreting changes in communities, in an 
endeavor to enhance new scientific ideas and knowledge about a social phenomenon. 
                                                 
53 Unisa. Faculty of Arts Study Guide - RSC201. Research into the social sciences. 2000. (RSC201-H: 2001 – 2003) 
 p 83 
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The basic research methodology deployed in this dissertation, relates to exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory methods. This type of research is, however, often 
criticised for its inability to provide short-term practical solutions, but reportedly, on the 
other hand, it does provide for advantages in the sense of creating knowledge and 
understanding of the topic so researched. 
 
Some researchers have for decades been using basic knowledge to offer solutions to 
problem areas, whereas other researchers cited applied knowledge to solve short-
term solutions that span over several months, and not many years. This is true for the 
South African industrial development process – as such, a process heavily influenced 
by government’s policies and objectives, as more fully elaborated on in chapters 4, 5 
and 6. 
 
b. Applied research focuses on specific problems and immediate solutions, and not so 
much on the theory aspect. It adopts a descriptive approach and can thus be applied 
almost immediately after the research results have been obtained. This is in line with 
the actions taken by the defence-related industry (DRI) association, AMD, in 2005/6 
and the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), in collaboration with the 
Departments of Defence (DoD) and DTI in 2006/7, to effect a thorough study on the 
status of the DRI, with the collective view of establishing, for the first time, a DRI 
sector strategy to be implemented by the DTI. These findings will reportedly be tabled 
at Parliament in 200854. 
 
c.   The main types of applied research used for the drafting of this dissertation, include: 
? a process through which people, or organisations that are studied, participate in the 
research process itself, in the form of so-called action research. This type of 
research includes ordinary and everyday knowledge, it focuses on empowerment, it 
tries to foster awareness – focusing attention, it relates directly to political realities, 
and it can involve policy-making research. It aims at evaluating the consequences of 
                                                 
54 Interview with the Executive Director of AMD on 4 Dec 2007. 
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social change and is usually used by government entities to set certain policy 
paradigms. This type of applied research is commonly used in matters pertaining to 
community services, social welfare, economic benefit or loss, health and/or 
psychological well-being of people, and matters that influence demographics and the 
environment. 
 
? The process of value judgment, based on evidence,  is used in two sections 
pertaining to the evaluation research, covering a wide spectrum of issues, and is 
being applied to the formative evaluation, using a built-in monitoring mechanism that 
provides continuous feedback and ensures  a continuous, progressive evaluation of 
the progress made. Secondly, a summative evaluation, which is a reflective process, 
with the emphasis on outcome, i.e. evaluating the end result has been applied to this 
research. 
 
? G.M. du Plooy55 identifies the following five different participatory research 
strategies (as per Burke, Innes, Kentridge, Perold and Stroh) and makes the 
observation that such participation is a means of achieving perfect democracy, while 
recognising the immediate problem of ‘freedom’ versus the need for control. For 
example 
- The educational-therapeutic strategy is aimed at citizenship training where 
participation is a form of therapy, used to develop individuals and/or 
organisations; 
- The behavior-change strategy is in turn, used to change a group’s behavior, 
resulting in a changed behavior of an individual as a consequence of group 
pressure, or conformance; 
- Supplemental employees strategy aims to solicit voluntary participation, on the 
assumption that employees’ participation can contribute to a specific and agreed-
to, goal; 
                                                 
55 Du Plooy, G.M. 2001. Communication Research. Techniques, Methods and Applications.  Juta. p283-292 
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-  The co-optation strategy’s aim is to elicit participation through the election of 
suitable representatives who give effect to procedures and policies and 
decisions, in order to achieve specific goals; and 
-  Community empowerment strategy aims to give a group of people power and 
rights to exert influence and enforce decisions. This inevitably leads to 
confrontation, which in turn forces other levels of participation. 
 
 Du Plooy,56 however, recommends that the researcher should carefully assess any 
targeted entity or organisation – being the proposed subject of any particular research 
– to understand the nature of such entities, its sentiments, its social position, its skills 
and experience, as well as its values, aspirations, goals and expectations. 
 
This process inevitably requires the participants to be representative of the research 
phenomenon, and to be stimulated – through a process of awareness – to become 
aware of a specific problem, in order for eventual recommended solutions, based on 
findings, to be implemented by consensus. 
  
The research topic is normally posed as an element of a process that will bring about 
change in a social system, or as an awareness of a specific problem or an issue, 
such as the actual economic and industrial value of the South African DIP 
programme, and its influence on the DRI. This is to be followed by a process of 
research to determine the context of collective decision-making that is preceded by 
the dissemination of information, the creation of awareness and the sharing of 
information. Work groups, workshops and focus groups are established and organised 
with the aim of including all these participants as active research contributors. The 
participation of the focus group is justified by complying with the indicators gauging the 
level of representivity of the various members. Once the collective decision has been 
approved, the intent of the research is translated into a series of actions to reach a 
certain outcome. Communication plays a key role, as the same information needs to 
be shared and disseminated to all stakeholders participating, giving due cognisance to 
                                                 
56 ibid, p 293-303 
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the constraints on information posed by the defence security and company 
commercial restrictions. 
 
The participatory action research process is summarised (by Du Plooy) as the 
participants’ collective collaboration with the researcher, in determining the actual 
nature of the problem, the research questions to be asked, the respondents who need 
to participate, how the project can be broken down into smaller tasks with short, 
medium and long-term objectives, what other data needs to be considered or 
collected, what methods needs to be used to collect data, who are the stakeholders 
who need to be involved, how the participants will be involved in the gathering of data, 
and by whom the data will be interpreted, how the responsibility for the task can be 
allocated to participants, an action plan be implemented, based on the findings and 
finally how the effectiveness of the action plan will be monitored. 
 
Du Plooy proposes that ‘triangulation’ be used in research projects with 
multidisciplinary stakeholders, using both the quantitative and the qualitative research 
methods in a complementary manner. 
 
“The more popular research methods used in participatory action research are focus-
groups interviews, in-depth interviews and participant observation, because in the 
words of Bless and Higson-Smith they “acknowledge the value of the opinions and 
thoughts of all people”.57 The research should insure that documented research 
findings and experiences are shared and participants are encouraged to reflect on 
research findings and take specific action. 
 
E. Babbie and J. Mouton58 refer to a new paradigm research that involves a much 
closer relationship between the researcher and the researched, through a mutual 
activity creating co-ownership in, and shared power over, the researched product. This 
is also viewed as a distinctive feature of the classical action research model.59 
                                                 
57 ibid  p 299 
58 Babbie and Mouton, 2006 p58 – quoting Reason and Rowan (1981)  
59 ibid p63 
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E. Babbie and J. Mouton provide several modes for distinguishing participation, as 
drawn from postulations by Brigss (as observed by Cornwall and Jewkes)60, indicating 
that the people are to be contractually included as participants in a research project 
and then consulted by researchers before interventions are made. The parties 
collaborate with each other and then the researcher records his findings by working at 
collegiate level with the participants, through a process of mutual learning and shared 
control.  
 
3. Intervention research and the researcher as a change agent 
 
Du Plooy compares ‘intervention research’ with ‘applied research’, in the sense that it 
extends knowledge of human behavior, while finding solutions for practical problems. 
A concept that is central to this type of research is change, which can occur at various 
micro and macro levels of development. 
 
Du Plooy continues by observing61 that researchers in a participatory action research, 
should take note that their roles become unique as they simultaneously act as 
change agents, team builders, facilitators, or catalysts for change. He also 
provides some practical hints, concluding that participants can be meaningfully 
directed towards group consensus on the basis that they follow an approach towards 
logic argument, instead of accepting individualistic judgments and that support is only 
given to those solutions agreed upon. Difference of opinion is accepted as natural, 
positive and helpful to decision-making and participation is collective-inclusive, with 
conflict-reducing techniques being ensured, while changing one’s mind is avoided. 
This reportedly ensures that mutual trust is maintained, the process of negotiation 
among the participants is promoted and conflict between participants is mediated. 
 
                                                 
60 ibid p 66 
61 Du Plooy, G.M. 2001. Communication Research. Techniques, Methods and Applications.  Juta  p300-302 
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Participatory research action is, according to Mouton62, the conceptualisation and 
mode of reasoning, which is more inductive that deductive, with an emphasis on the 
participants and their world-views, earmarked by the reluctance to impose any pre-set 
theory or explanations. The main danger lies in possible manipulations by research 
participants of the process, to serve their own interests.  
 
Du Plooy recommends that there should not be a specific format for participatory 
research. He provides some cautionary notes on this subject, namely that researchers 
should, for example, observe a focus on a specific problem and do not resort to 
generalisation on findings, not to allow participants to become too subjectively 
involved, to be cautious of reactivity responses that may be triggered by the simulated 
research environment and aware of external influences that may impact on the 
research process and the participants. 
 
4. Other research methodologies and practices used by researchers63 in a 
different manner are as follows: 
 
• Researchers use various forms of statistics (either descriptive or inferential), in 
either describing the characteristics of a sample, or the relationship between the 
variables of such a sample; 
• Discourse analysis involves verbal communication and dialogue; 
• Ethnographic studies use qualitative research, aimed at describing and 
understanding different cultures and societies; 
• The grounded theory principle is used, as a qualitative measure, to assume the 
posture of discovery, development and verification through systematic analysis of 
collected data pertaining to a phenomenon; 
• Human behaviour is interpreted, rather than explained or predicted; 
                                                 
62 Mouton, J. How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral Studies. A South African guide and resource book. 2001. Van Schaik. p151 
63 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition.p640-848 
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• Naturalistic evaluation occurs during the process of the qualitative research 
process, and is often associated with process evaluation conducted in natural 
settings posing open designs; 
• Surveys are used as means to provide predominantly descriptive analysis of 
data64; 
• Experimental designs represent laboratory studies of a quantitative nature, 
aiming at providing a causal study of a small number of cases of a highly-
controlled nature65; 
• Evaluation research is used as a mode of answering the question of whether any 
intervention (change) has been properly implemented and whether outcomes 
have been realised as intended, by using a combination of qualitative and 
statistical methods of analysis66; and that 
• Statistical modeling is aimed at providing an accurate representation of the 
theorised real world, through a process of abstraction (the focus here is on 
testing and validating underlying theoretical assumptions and hence providing for 
deductive analysis67). 
 
5. Introduction to the terms qualitative and quantitative 
 
In analysing and understanding where the concepts of qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms fit into research methodologies, it is worthwhile noting Mouton’s views on 
the word methodology (Coetzee 2001), which contains two concepts, namely 
‘methods’ and ’techniques’. The higher order of abstraction is represented by 
‘methods’ and complemented with various ‘clusters’ of research techniques and 
research instruments. At the highest level of the research complexity one finds the 
‘methodology paradigm’ that includes the qualitative and quantitative paradigms. 
 
                                                 
64 Mouton, J. 2001. How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral Studies. A South African guide and resource book. Van Schaik p152-
153 
65 ibid p155 
66 ibid p 158-159 
67 ibid p163 
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According to Du Plooy68 a paradigm, is a set of basic beliefs about how researchers 
view that, which they study. Babbie & Mouton69 state that a paradigm is a model for 
observation and understanding, shaping both what we see, and how we understand it. 
This term was reportedly popularised by Thomas Khun70 who uses it to refer to an 
accepted tradition and set of beliefs and values that guide research. The present 
paradigm on ‘offsets’ in South Africa (and elsewhere) is one of a complex intricate 
process of trade manipulation that is generally perceived not to work in practice. 
 
Quantitative research (also referred to as positivist or empirical research) is viewed71 
as a type of philosophical system that rejects any form of speculation and uses only 
factual arguments. Babbie and Mouton refer to it as a process of numerical 
representation and manipulation of observations for the purposes of describing and 
explaining the phenomenon that those observations reflect, with the emphasis on the 
quantification of constructs. See Table 1 as an example of this approach. 
 
Babbie and Mouton also reflect on qualitative research as the non-numerical 
examination and interpretation of observations, for the purposes of discovering 
underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. The goal is one of describing and 
understanding, rather than explaining and predicting – see Table 2 for example. Du 
Plooy72 views qualitative research as having a common focus on the ability to interpret 
and construct a particular outcome – this includes aspects such as field research, 
interpretive research, naturalism and constructivism. 
 
It is Cooper and Schindler’s collective view that “quality is the essential character or 
nature of something, with quantity being the amount. Quality is the what, where 
quantity is how much. Qualitative therefore refers to the meaning, the definition, or 
analogy, or model or methaphor characterising something, while quantitative assumes 
the meaning and refers to the measure of it”. 
                                                 
68 Du Plooy, G.M. 2001. Communication Research. Techniques, Methods and Applications.  Juta. p19 
69 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition. p645 
70 ibid p 646 
71 Du Plooy, G.M. 2001. Communication Research. Techniques, Methods and Applications.  Juta. p21-28 
72 ibid p29-34 
 70 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
 
The two paradigms, although appearing as seemingly absolute opposites, are, 
however, used by researchers in a complementary manner. In this respect Du Plooy 
quotes Ehlers and Lazenby as having the opinion that it is ideal to use the concepts of 
qualitative and quantitative measures in conjunction with each other, which is in most 
instances complemented by the researcher’s intuition – as was done and applied in 
the drafting of this dissertation. 
 
6. Comparative analysis between the qualitative and quantitative paradigm 
 
6.1 Quantitative paradigm 
 
It appears as if the phenomenon of social research quantification, which is shared 
through surveys and statistical analysis, occurred around the nineteenth century and 
manifested at that time as positivism ideals. The latter, in turn, was linked to aspects 
of behaviorism and operationism73. 
 
They also identify a number of key themes that will be associated with the quantitative 
paradigm, namely that it covers an emphasis on quantification of constructs and that 
the researcher believes that the best, or only, measure of the phenomenon is through 
quantitative measurement, namely through the assignment of numbers to the 
perceived quality of things, which includes the role of variables in describing and 
analysing the phenomena, offers the control of sources to validate the research and 
subsequent findings, and illustrates the relationship between meta-theories, 
methodological paradigms and the social science phenomena in the following manner: 
                                                 
73 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition. p47-48 
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World 3: META-THEORIES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
World 2: METHODOLOGICAL PARADIGM
World 1: SOCIAL SCIENCE PHENOMENA
Positivism Phenomenology Critical theory
Quantitative
Paradigm
Qualitative
Paradigm
Participatory action
Paradigm
OUTSIDER INSIDER PARTICIPANT
 
Figure 7 (Source: Babbie & Mouton, 2006:48) 
 
During the ‘40s and ‘50s interesting debates were reportedly conducted on the 
ontological status (the reality) of constructs, such as self-concept, intelligence and 
anxiety, as intervening variables in behaviorist psychology studies. This 
development was generally viewed as the first steps towards establishing 
quantitative measures in the research of human behavior, paralleled by the social 
research (sociology) sciences, especially at the University of Columbia in the ‘30s 
and ‘40s. Under the teachings of Giddings, Stouffer and Ogburn, the use of the 
quantitative approach was strongly propagated. It was reportedly due to the further 
influences of people such as Paul Lazarfeld and Robertt Lynd at Columbia, and 
Samuel Stouffer at Harvard, that the quantitative paradigm became the dominant 
research approach in ‘the 50s and ‘60s.74  
 
6.2 The qualitative paradigm 
 
The phenomenon of qualitative research was originally dominated by the positivism 
approach, but eventually started to rise in importance, mainly as a result of research 
done in the field of anthropology. The departure point here, was that social research 
                                                 
74 ibid p 50-51 
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was done on the premise of an ‘insider view’, which would include observational 
methods, such as unstructured interviews and participant observation. 
 
Collected data would be analysed, with the emphasis on the grounded theory and 
other more inductive analysis, with the aim to create an understanding, rather than a 
prediction. In this respect, the qualitative research process adopts several 
approaches75, including in-depth interviewing, with the emphasis on process rather 
than outcome; participant observation, in a natural manner; a conceptualised 
objectivity by studying of films, videos and photos; the use of projective techniques 
and psychological testing; performing of actual case studies including in-depth 
contextual analyses. The understanding of the actions in context, rather than 
generalising concepts based on theoretical assumptions, is enhanced by elite, or 
expert interviewing, with the insider view being emphasised. 
 
The research process is often inductive in its approach, resulting in the 
generation of new hypotheses and theories. 
 
In the writings of Babbie & Mouton it is stated that the qualitative paradigm attempts 
to study a phenomenon from the ‘insider’s’ point of view – see Figure 7 in this 
context. The aim is to try and describe and understand, rather than to explain and 
predict. The emphasis is in this instance, more on methods of observation and 
analysis. It also includes aspects of interviewing, participant observation and the use 
of personal documentation, while relying on grounded theories.  
 
The influence of the Chicago School was decisive in breaking away from the social 
survey practice and establishing an independent repertoire of methods for research 
in the sociology fraternity. In this development John Dewey76 was reportedly known 
for his pragmatic philosophies and his concerns for concrete and empirically- based 
findings. This reportedly led to a major methodological shift in the post ’60s, 
                                                 
75 Cooper & Schindler, 2001, p140, as well as Babbie & Mouton, 2006, p309 
76 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition. p53-59 
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requiring researchers to think more systematically about the epistemological 
assumptions and methodological consequences of their research practices.77 
Qualitative fieldwork, according to Mouton requires that extensive field notes and 
observations, with various other forms of data collection, be deployed in order to be 
able to capture the essentials of the context of such observations made in such a 
fashion. 
 
Statistics as an academic discipline, dates back to at least the 17th century, when an 
Englishman William Petty (1623-1687) introduced the phrase ‘political arithmetic’. 
Over the centuries that followed, statistics became the tool used by scientist and 
researchers to quantify findings. Samuel Stouffer (1900—1960)78 (supported by the 
teachings of Giddings) became the “champion of the quantitative paradigm”, 
advocating the rationale for the systematic use of statistics linking to a value-neutral 
and quantifying approach to a social phenomenon.  
 
Methodology and phenomenology have traditionally been associated with the 
qualitative approach to research. Interpretative understanding of a researched 
phenomenon requires a methodology that emphasises clear observation through 
tools, such as open interviewing, idiographic descriptions and objective qualitative 
data analysis, from an ‘insider’s’ point of view.  
 
6.3 Comparative table 
 
Drawing on the analysis of Du Plooy79, the following comparative table was found to 
be quite useful in explaining the differences between the two paradigms under 
discussion and its relevancy to the content of this dissertation on DIP and the DRI. 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 ibid.  
78 ibid p 53 
79 Du Plooy, G.M. 2001. Communication Research. Techniques, Methods and Applications.  Juta. p 35-37 
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Quantitative approach Qualitative approach 
Ontological assumptions (‘the reality of’) 
Tends to be more authoritarian Tends to be more participative 
Access to information leads to 
power 
Access to information leads to 
sharing of responsibilities and 
developing of knowledge 
Perceptions are managed by 
selective dissemination of 
information 
Information is shared on the 
principles of inclusivity 
Authority and credibility are not 
questioned 
Authority and credibility are 
questioned 
Control is centralised Control is decentralised 
Tends to reduce conflict Conflict is acknowledged and 
resolved by analysing relationships 
and agreed-to collaborative 
strategies 
It tends to maintain order through 
prescription 
It tends to create joint 
responsibilities for maintaining order
Epistemological assumptions (‘the knowledge of’) 
Variations are avoided Variations are seen to provide 
opportunities for growth and are not 
distrusted, but instead advance 
dialogue in order to generate better 
understanding 
Status quo is maintained by 
repetition of previous research 
methods 
Renewal is sought on a continuous 
basis, allowing free flow of 
information, reformulation and 
retesting of previous assumptions 
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Research is done in a deterministic 
manner and procedures are 
predictable 
Research is done in a consultative 
manner, within a flexible 
environment 
The effectiveness of the research is 
measured by predictions 
The effectiveness of the research is 
derived from interdependent 
observations 
Research only becomes meaningful 
when predicted outcomes are 
realized 
Developing interdependent 
relationships are more important 
than the predicted outcome of the 
research 
Problem-solving is based on 
established procedures, policies 
and rules 
Problem-solving is guided by 
participative research 
The research design is thus 
intended to observe, predict and 
prescribe the research matter in 
quantitative terms 
The research design is selected as 
a means to explore and interpret 
the research matter in a qualitative 
and holistic manner 
Triangulation is used to combine the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in research, as a method to test theoretical assumptions in 
more than one way, and to increase the reliability and validity of 
observations, analyses and findings. 
 
7. In summary 
 
All research is basically aimed at creating an understanding through the interpretation 
of collected data of certain phenomena in order to control and/or contain and/or accept 
it as it is, or otherwise to change it through various processes involving aspects of 
development, intervention, facilitation, prediction, manipulation, influencing, 
suggestion and/or recommended adjustment. 
 
 76 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
Based on the above statement and the teachings of Babbie & Mouton, it appears as if 
there is not “one neat, tidy approach” to data analysis. What was, however, very useful 
in context of this research on DIP, as per Figure 8 below, is the structure proposed 
by Renate Tesch80, designed to link the broad spectrum of theoretical qualitative 
approaches to various forms of qualitative data analysis: 
 
The research interest is in the economic and industrial benefits of DIP for the local DRI
The characteristics of DIP
DIP as an economic toolDIP as a development tool
Content of DIP Process of DIP
Content analysis Discourse analysis
The discovery of regularities
Identification and categorisation of 
DIP elements and exploration of 
their connections
The discerning of DIP patterns
The comprehension of the meaning  of DIP 
– text and action
The discerning of DIP themes The interpretation of DIP
The case study/life history of DIPReflection on DIP
Interpreting in context the qualitative analysis structure model of Tesch
 
Figure 8  
 
8.  In conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the research design focuses on a specific development 
phenomena, namely DIP, and its relation to the DRI. How  it manifests as a 
development and economic tools, and the academic, industrial and economic 
discourse on this subject matter. The research eventually leads the reader to a full 
comprehension of the phenomena and how it actually manifests in real life. 
 
 
                                                 
80 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2006. The Practice of Social Research. OUP. SA edition. p 490 
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CHAPTER 4: A SELECT LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There has been relatively little engagement to date by scholars within the terrain of 
Development Studies with the burgeoning body of work on defence countertrade 
and offsets. Even the overlapping discipline of economics (with a neo-classical and 
market-oriented epistemology) has at best dealt with the subject matter in passing. 
Indeed, there is a need both in South Africa and internationally to provide for a more 
theoretically grounded approach to countertrade and offsets and their impact on the 
economy, especially a national defence industrial base (presuming it exists) of the 
country where they (countertrade) are deployed.  See for example the respective 
academic and scholary arguments put forward in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
This development research chapter (4) specifically and deliberately therefore 
focuses on the empirical domain of development theory and draws mainly from the 
works of John Martinussen81, J.K. Coetzee82, as well as those of G.M. Meier and 
J.E. Rauch83.  This provides for a reference framework, and a benchmark, against 
which the reviews of the two specific DoD policy papers (see chapters 5 and 6) are 
commented on in context.  Issues related mainly to industrial development, as well 
as various peripheral matters pertaining to a macro-economic, global growth and 
development nature, are reflected upon. Observations made by various independent 
researchers, further contribute to the formulation of opinions as expressed in the 
comments on the contents of each of the two respective policies and endeavours to 
describe in context the relevance and applicability of this research topic on 
defence industrial participation (DIP), in relation to development objectives, 
and the DRI as a key beneficiary under DIP, with government acting as a key 
                                                 
81 Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, State and Market.  A Guide to competing theories of development. Zed Book Ltd. London/New Jersey.  
Ferwood Publication. 
82 Coetzee, J.K. et. al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP. 
83 Meier, G.M. and Rauch, J.E. 2005.  Leading Issues in Economic Development, OUP.  Chapters i-iv 
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role player in leveraging the power of procurement to advance industrial 
(including defence), economic and socio-economic goals and objectives. 
 
In understanding the thought processes and the external influences that reigned, 
during the drafting of key national policy documents, such as the South African 
Department of Defence’s policy on Defence Industrial Participation (May 1997)84, 
and the subsequent policy on the defence-related industry as contained in the 
Government White Paper of December 1999, it is important to view such processes 
against international academic and empirical research on the topic of development. 
 
Both policies directly deal with very specific dimensions of industrial development in 
the South African context, and it is against this backdrop, that each one of these two 
policies is reviewed, considering its respective approaches, its arguments and 
prepositions, its contentions, observations, and finally the strategy it had in mind. 
 
In conclusion, the author makes a call regarding the relevancy and applicability of 
these government policies that still regulate and directly influence the existence and 
prosperity of the DRI – being an integral and important part of the South Africa’s 
industrial base and a valuable contributor to human development, as well as to 
technology and economic growth. What remains fascinating is the fact that the 
various models and application of countertrade as it manifests itself in South Africa 
and elsewhere remains under-theorized by the various relevant academic 
disciplines, including development theory and advanced development research. 
 
2. Development studies – the theory 
 
John Martinussen85 is of the opinion that traditional ‘development research’ tended 
to take a reductionist approach to economic problems in developing countries, losing 
sight of other dimensions, such as social, political, geographical or cultural aspects.  
                                                 
84 Department of Defence.  Policy on Defence Industrial Participation.  Rev. 1. May 1997; and the White Paper on the Defence-related 
Industry (1 Dec 1999). 
85 Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, State and Market.  A Guide to competing theories of development.  Zed Book Ltd. London/New Jersey.  
Ferwood Publication. 
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He observes, however, that over the period from 1975 to 1995, an improved 
awareness of these dimensions became prevalent and countries started to 
understand better the importance of time, relationship, world-market and global 
societies. Increased attention was also given to non-economic issues, such as 
cultural and gender differentiation. 
 
Martinussen identifies three distinct areas of development research, namely the 
concept, i.e. concentrating on what development is; theory, focusing on how 
development objectives can be chosen and be promoted; and strategy, entailing an 
abstract option that refers to planned actions and interventions86. In the latter respect 
it must be noted that the structuralist theory of development maintain that developing 
countries should remove obstacles through substantive and coordinated state action 
– the ideal is to get the state to provide a huge impetus for industrialization. 
 
The view of J.K. Coetzee et al87 on industrialisation is that it is a very difficult concept 
to confront as it encompasses a process that is driven by rhythms and forces that no 
single agency or even group of agencies can control. In South Africa one of the main 
drivers central to the government’s policy on industrial development, is centered on 
an approach relating to the redistribution of wealth. Through the mechanisms of 
national local procurement, as well international procurements, the government uses 
the instrument of industrial participation as a means to create this required 
redistribution of wealth in South Africa, especially by means of the Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) legislation introduced since 2004. The 
latter is a direct reflected against the theories of “dependencies”, which calls for an 
inevitable development of the underdeveloped (Cardoso, 1972).88 
 
It is also worth bearing in mind that the nature and form of industrialization and 
industrial development experienced by a particular country is conditioned by that 
country’s relationship to the world economy, as well as the complexity of national 
                                                 
86 Ibid Pages 1 - 15 
87 Coetzee, J.K. et. al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP.  
88 Cardoso, F.H. and Faletto, E. 1979. Dependency and development in Latin ametica. Berkley: Univ of California Press 
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economy in question. J. Graaff and D. Venter89 drawing from Wallerstein’s theories 
on the world economic system define South Africa as being a “semi-peripheral 
country because of the latter’s exploitation by the more powerful (‘core’) countries” 
(e.g. Europe and USA), while in turn, South Africa is exploiting other weaker 
peripheral countries, especially within its sphere of dominance in sub-Sahara Africa.  
Due recognition is given to the fact that there are many countries “competing for 
position within semi-peripheral economic domain”. Accordingly it is expected that a 
state’s intervention in the economy is critical for creating or attempting to create 
favorable conditions for development.  An example of such intervention is the South 
African Government’s self-conscious enforcement of industrial participation through 
the leverage of national procurement projects.  Sustainable development has 
become a key consideration, as was already addressed in the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (the “Brutland report of 1987”), which propagated the 
kind of economic development that would meet the needs of the present generation, 
but not at the expense of the future generation.  D.C. Korten90 for example states 
that the term ‘sustainable development’ stresses the essential incompatibility of 
economic growth in its current forms with environment-friendly development. 
 
Industrial development and ‘sensible’ policy interventions to improve economic and 
industrial performance require a reflexive state and related policy elites – the kind of 
approach that is encapsulated in the ideal of a development state. (R. Haines. 
Herald article on Development State. July 2007).  But even in the more successful 
transitional industrializing economies in the Far East have to take cognizance of the 
multi-layered and contradictory notion of development. Development cannot be fully 
experienced as a progressive shift to a more complex and competitive economy.  
Nor can such concepts and theories regarding development, ‘successful’ industrial 
development, and the strong development state, fully encapsulate the experience 
and future of a particular developing society. 
 
 
                                                 
89 ibid pages 88 - 92 
90 Korten, D.C. 1991. Sustainable Development: Growth versus Transformation. Draft Article. 
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According to Coetzee91 the word “development” relates to favourable change – 
moving from worse to better, an ongoing hand-in-hand growth and progressive 
process, evolving from simple to complex or advancing away from the inferior.  
Development is thus closely related to human well-being, requiring action plans 
aimed at providing the opportunity for people to become more than they are. 
Development inevitably manifests in the various domains of society, geography and 
time, which impacts and cause a constant review of the dynamics of development.  
(“A continuous affirmation of meaning”)92. In a similar fashion Nederveen Pieterse93  
states that human development, while it endorses some of the principles as popular 
development, remains a state-centred, top-down social engineering, in which the 
state plays the role of the main agent for implementing human development policies 
and actions. 
 
Jurgen Habernas (as quoted by Norma Romm)94, expresses the opinion that 
development involves a continuous process of social dialogue, in an effort to reach 
consensual understanding95. Thus government has to engage more honestly with 
intellectual criticism of its current industrial policies and practices and seek to 
promote development in a more open-minded and modern fashion. Johan Graaff96 
views on ‘functionalist thinking’ can for example be associated with the process that 
led to the creation of the policy paper on the DRI, accepting however that no single 
development theory can really provide for a comprehensive understanding of how 
states operate and how well they will do in achieving their transformation 
objectives97. In the latter respect it is clear that government policies are too often 
overly positivistic and technicist, as well as too derivative of models from advanced 
capitalist societies. Thus the DRI policy paper could have gone through a more 
interactive process taking greater cognizance of seemingly dissident points of view. 
                                                 
91 Coetzee, J.K. et. al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP  - p119 
92 ibid p123 
93 Pieterse, Nederveen. J. 1998. My Paradigm or yours? Alternative Development, Post-development, Reflexive Development. 
Development and Change. Vol 29. 
94 Coetzee, J.K. et. al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP  - ibid Chapter 9 
95 ibid p150 (Author’s note: It is in this above respect that the White Paper on the DRI was put through a structured process that aimed 
to derive at exactly this proposed and desired result.) 
96 ibid p152 
97 ibid p191 
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 There are also strong indications that changing environments and circumstances 
necessitate a review of the types of development approaches to be considered, for 
e.g. Ben Fine and Vishnu Padayachee’s views98 that the South African government’s 
Growth Economy and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy failed and that a return to a 
Keynesian99 approach may be necessary. The latter is also the author’s view as 
would be seen from chapter 8. 
 
However global economic recession and declining commodity prices and mounting 
third world debt contribute to a declining Keynesian influence and cause a 
resurgence in neo-classical economic discourse. Neo-liberalism or market liberalism 
became dominant in development theories and contributed tot the views on 
regulation as more fully discussed in the next section. 
 
3.  The regulatory approach 
 
Countertrade inevitably leads to a broad based outcome through a well structured 
interdependency of the two primary concepts of economics and industrialization, 
while it also embraces the concept of globalization100 and contributing in one form or 
the other to other/specific socio-economic aims and goals of nations. Government 
intervention is however a prerequisite, which within the regulatory approach 
(Aglietta, Lipietz and Boyer,)101 is seen to govern this process to a large extent. 
 
The  “Regime of Accumulation”, of M. Aglietta102 (one of the doyens of the 
contemporary regulationist school) represents a specific and time bound system, 
which assures the correspondence of production and consumption in a phase of 
capitalism. It refers to a set of institutional patterns that serve to contain and limit the 
contradictions and conflicts inherent to the capitalistic mode of production. The 
                                                 
98 ibid p192 
99 ibid p105 
100 www.moital.gov.il - General info on the Israeli industrial cooperation programme. 
101 Coetzee, J.K. (et al) ed. Development: Theory Policy and Practice. 2001. OUP. RSA. p97-107 
102 Aglietta, M. 1982. World capitalism in the eighties. New Left review No 136. 
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concept depicts the development of capitalism as a non-linear, non-evolutionary and 
discontinuous process. It is further associated with a competitive mode of regulation 
through means of state protectionism measures to ensure its industry’s participation 
in an open market domain. This regime however remains constrained by market 
competitive forces, despite any government’s protectionist measures, as at the end 
of the day economics prevail – in other word such business will still have to make 
business sense. This is specifically observable (as per the DIP findings of chapter 8) 
in the real application and use of the various forms of countertrade, especially when 
it comes to co-production, works share and exports. Whereas Gilton Klerck103 in 
conclusion holds the opinion that it is “a theoretically grounded alternative to 
economic determinist, functionalist and teleological concepts of development…is a 
highly complex, socially mediated, uneven inherently unstable process that defies 
simple explanation.” Also in this respect “a mode of regulation (as per the views of 
Gilton Klerk104, quoting Aglietta and Gramci) can for example be interpreted as the 
‘sectoral development’ or industrial clusters approach, as found also in South Africa. 
 
Martin for example observes that the use of industrial policy is aimed at an attempt 
to capture some economic rent caused by imperfect markets. He views a 
competitive economy as one that could attract new entrants to economic rent 
through the utilization of steep learning curves within industries that are already 
important trading sectors. In the case of South Africa, the defence-related industry 
had been involved in the export market since the early eighties and such had moved 
to a large extend beyond the learning curve. Yet under the Strategic Defence 
Package Deal (Dec ’99) the local industry, both defence and non-defence, realized 
(with some shock) that without a reciprocal investment from own resources towards 
non-recurring cost it was very difficult (to impossible) to accept export orders. The 
latter orders were normally placed in small quantities as a trial run to ensure that 
local industry could meet production targets and standards.105 
 
                                                 
103 Haines, R..  and Bradshaw, G. Course outlining for Development  Change and Conflict. SDS508. Masters in Conflict, Transformation 
and Management. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 2006. 
104 Coetzee, J.K. et. al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP  - ibid page 107 
105 These findings and views are incidentally concurrent with the findings and experience of the Author. 
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Countertrade is thus closely related to the construct of development (Coetzee). His 
statement needs to be viewed against the complexities of Figure 6 to fully 
comprehend the macro and micro environments in which countertrade manifests 
itself. Rather than seeing the conception and implementation of countertrade as the 
play of market forces, one needs to see it as both conditioning and conditioned by 
development discourses and practices. And it is usefully seen “in the context of the 
outcome which is the collective of a number of complex uneven processes of 
struggles and alliances of many different social forces happening simultaneously on 
many different terrains, as for example propagated in theories of Gilton Klerck. 
 
Countertrade involves both an economic and development process, which is 
subjected to the full circuit of capital expenditure with its respective phases of 
planning, budgeting, to development, to production, distribution and consumption. 
This is also the case, in the context of defence acquisition and procurement, 
although a number of additional processes may be possible, for example a very high 
levels of testing, evaluation and certification before any piece of equipment is taken 
into operational service. 
 
Very similar to Coetzee’s (again quoting from Gilton Clerck) notion of the 
phenomena of in-equal capacities of the various different capitalists nations to either 
self generate or otherwise assimilate new “techno-economic systems” within the 
same forces in time and space, occurs in the practice of countertrade. Thus when a 
nation decides to buy imported equipment, instead of investing huge amounts of 
money to develop and manufacture it themselves, due consideration is given to the 
use of countertrade mechanisms to semi-counter the impact on their local industry. 
 
The author is therefore of the opinion that countertrade as a means of development 
can also be viewed as a part of a mode of regulation, which by itself can be 
associated with experienced or perceived crisis in any given capitalist economy. 
Three distinct forms of crisis have been identified by Coetzee, these are 
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• the micro crisis – affects individual units and exist in all the forms of 
accumulation and regulation. Such crisis is resolved by “man intervention”; 
• secondly - the conjectural or minor crisis are symptoms of a cyclical downturn 
in the economy and are manifested in the reverse of business indicators (for 
example the Stock Market). This according to Coetzee can usually be 
resolved within the ambit of a particular regime and mode of regulation to “re-
establish the unity of the circuit”, and 
• thirdly - structural or major crisis is an indication of a mode of regulation no 
longer suitable to a regime of accumulation (a) outdated forms of regulation 
constrains new regimes or (b) the development potential of a regime of 
accumulation is exhausted, given corrective mechanisms of regulation. This 
need proper corrective mechanism of regulation to be introduced and 
supported by a complementary mode of regulation. 
 
Briefly in summation (as reflected in the respective works of Aglietta, 1982, Klerck, 
2001 and De Vroey, 1984), the regulatory approach represents structural 
combinations within the international divisions of labour, production and finance. 
This theory categorizes the regimes of accumulation as either extensive or intensive 
and that forms of regulation could be viewed as either competitive or monopolistic in 
nature. 
 
 
4. Industrial policy trends 
 
Development is synonymous with change – whenever change is applicable there is 
an inevitable reaction, commonly referred to as conflict. There will always be those 
for and against change. Development designed to distribute wealth more evenly 
through society will equally threaten the economic elite benefiting from any current 
system.106 
 
                                                 
106  Haines, R.J. 2006. Masters in Conflict Transformation and management. Course outline for SDS508. NMMU.  
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Considering closely the aims and objectives of the Defence Industrial Participation 
policy as more fully set out in chapter 6 and 7 and reviewed and commented on in 
chapter 8, it is worthwhile to note that Bezuidenhout107 for example observes that a 
neo-liberal approach to industrial development strongly reflects on the fact that such 
development is mainly market-driven with minimum state intervention, but on the 
other extreme the ‘developing’ state played a central role in shaping the industrial 
structure through industrial policy measures, with strategies such as targeting certain 
industries for investment, or for other supportive measures. Especially during the 
sanctions era the South African government set up major corporations to supply key 
resources, such as arms (Armscor), fuel (Sasol), power (Eskom), telecoms (Telkom) 
and nuclear (AEC).   
 
He also quotes World Bank findings (in 1999), indicating a weakness in the 
manufacturing industries in South Africa, specifically due to “protection from 
international competition”108.  Moving away from apartheid will, according to his 
views, imply the liberalisation of trade and the removal of all trade barriers, and the 
insurance of investor confidence that will be made possible through “sustainable, 
consistent and credible economic policies”109.  From the mid 1990’s the South 
African DRI in particular, suddenly (post ’94) found itself competing for defence 
contracts in the open market, both at home and on foreign ground and hence it 
made the implementation of a “protectionist type of mechanism” such as the DIP 
process that more imperative in order to “protect’ the strategic defence-related 
requirements of the South African National Defence Force for maintaining and 
servicing foreign procured equipment.110 
 
The Economic Forum (1994) argues (based on earlier works of Michael Porter 
(1990)) that the “approach to competitiveness assumes that it is companies and not 
nations that compete”.  It is also argued that government’s role should be to define 
competitive environments and rules to promote innovation, and that co-operation 
                                                 
107 Coetzee, J.K. et al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP  - ibid Chapter 23, p381. 
108 ibid p385 
109 ibid 
110 These are key objectives of the DIP policy of the DoD and Armscor. Refer also to Chapters 6 and 7. 
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should occur at a ‘cluster’ level111.  The latter work is later complemented by the 
extensive and comprehensive work done by Ben Fine and Zaf Rustomjee (in 1996), 
reporting on the industrial policy of South Africa.  Herein they clearly reflect on the 
fact that the interaction between the state and market is a “very complex product of 
the forces exerted upon them”.  They are also content with the fact that the state 
should actually be involved with industrial development, by developing infrastructure 
and the creation of demand112. Industrial Participation in South Africa is, in fact, 
used as a leverage to achieve such results through the government’s foreign 
procurement process. The DPE has recently implemented the new industry 
development programme (referred to as the Competitive Supplier Development 
programme – CSDP”)113. The latter intends to better leverage the substantial 
planned expenditure on various infrastructure projects by various State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) over the next ten to fifteen years, to further develop the local 
industry.  
 
Bezuidenhout observes that there is a clear movement on the side of the DTI (1998) 
to adopt a more “supply-side orientated” industrial model114 of import substitution, 
and one that is export-led.  The DTI subsequently (since 1996) took steps to reduce 
import tariffs and introduced a tax holiday scheme with low interest loans to 
companies.  Legislation governing competition was reviewed and a support 
programme for the development of SMMEs and BBBEE (broad based black 
economic empowerment) was introduced. The DTI also embarked on the “spatial 
development initiative” (SDI) and created several industrial development zones in 
order to attract investments into certain geographical areas, such as the Coega 
development initiatives in the Eastern Cape.115 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 ibid p387 
112 ibid p389 
113 Interview with Mr Sean Philips, DPE CSDP Unit. 26/03/07 and the DPE website – www.dpe.gov.za 
114Coetzee, J.K. et  al. 2001.  Development Theory, Policy and Practice.  OUP-  ibid p389 
115 Author’s note: The implementation of the National Industrial Participation Program in 1997, already born witness of this approach, 
which manifested strongly in the Strategic Defence Package Deal of 1999. 
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5. Human development and the productivity debate 
 
For the sake of understanding where South Africa features internationally on the 
scale of ‘human development’ and ‘productivity’ it is worthwhile taking note of the 
research of G.M. Meier and J.E. Rauch116.  Based on empirical research, countries 
are compared mainly on a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) earning, 
expressed in US Dollars.  The higher, or the lower per capita income is accordingly 
used to interpret the level of a country’s development programmes.  A correlation 
between the price of commodities and services is observed – the poorer a country, 
the cheaper its labour117.  According to the findings of Meier and Rauch (supported 
by independent findings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), 
South Africa falls into the category of medium human development countries”118 and 
is therefore also categorised as being a “less developed country”.   
 
Meier and Rauch119 quote from the research work of Adam Smith’s “progressive 
state”, where the observation is made that there is a direct correlation between the 
levels of skills, dexterity and judgment, and the level of proportional deployment of 
the labour force in useful and non-useful employment. 
 
Accordingly, it was found that the major sources of growth were (i) the growth in the 
labour force and stock of capital and (ii) improvements in efficiencies with capital 
application to the labour component through greater division of labour and 
technologies, coupled with (iii) foreign trade that widens the market and reinforces (i) 
and (ii) as a result.  The common view is, when once begun, this growth process 
becomes ‘self-reinforcing’ in a progressive state, as long as such growth favours 
profit and savings, which in turn create additional capital accumulation. With capital 
accumulation the demand for labour increases and is absorbed into productive 
                                                 
116 Meier, G.M. and Rauch, J.E. 2005.  Leading Issues in Economic Development, OUP.  Chapters i-iv. 
117 Author’s note: This observation is also very true for South African Industry expected to compete with countries with “cheaper labour 
costs”, especially in Eastern Europe and Far East. 
118 ibid pp22 and 32 
119 ibid p76 
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employment, leading to improved efficiencies and increased specialisation, with a 
resultant rising per capita income120.  
 
It is relevant to note the “accumulation” observations as quoted from the works of 
Bela Balassa121 on the topic of import-substitution industrialisation and the 
consequences of overriding market signals, that he concurs that if accumulation 
proceed far enough, that domestic production (as a primary import substitution 
imperative) can be profitable even at international prices.  However, at the second 
stage of competitiveness, he states that it becomes more difficult due to the 
efficiency scales of capital-intensive, versus labour-intensive industries122. 
 
Domestic markets are traditionally too small to support the efficient levels of plant 
size and horizontal and vertical specialization to protect industries in this second 
phase of import substitution, making international cost competitiveness and the 
consequent ability to export a cardinal imperative123. The latter is specifically true as 
related to the SA government’s decision in 1999 to procure relatively small quantities 
of sophisticated defence equipment from abroad.124 
 
It is subsequently concluded that considerations for “global commodity claims” are 
enhanced through international trade, which in turn contribute to more direct contact 
and exchanges in skills and technologies, with resultant foreign direct investment, 
especially between the developed and lesser developed countries, as was caused 
by the DIP process, as explained chapter 7. 
 
The observations made by Meier and Rauch in their analysis of the “typology in 
development theory” and subsequent findings on the issues of shifting from “primary 
import substitution” to “primary export substitution”, state that the following 
                                                 
120 ibid 
121 ibid p135 
122 Author’s note: This observation is particularly true for the local DRI, as local demand is driven down by budgetary constraints in the 
DoD’s budget, which forces the DRI to export in order to be sustainable. 
123 Author’s note: The local DRI (especially Denel with its vertical integrated cross divisional supply structures) had found it particularly 
difficult to be competitive in the field of lower end manufactured goods. 
124 The Strategic Defence Package Deal – commonly referred to as the SDP in Dec 1999, involving corvettes submarine aircraft and 
helicopters. 
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constraints have to be overcome: (i) the resistance from industrialists to move from 
certain large unit-profit rates on fairly small domestic demand, to much more 
uncertain smaller unit-profit rates, but on much larger export volumes (ii) the civil 
service that is threatened by a reduced power of control and (iii) organised labour 
watching wage rates more than the wage bill125. 
 
Meier and Rauch observe that countries with industrial protectionist policies (aimed 
at import substitution) become less competitive as such protectionist mechanisms 
cause an estimated price increase of six to seven percent of Gross National Product 
(GNP). Another result indicates levels of lower productivity, supported by empirical 
evidence that countries applying a more outward-orientated development strategy 
perform better in terms of exports, economic growth and employment126. 
 
Looking at their economic and development case studies127 on Taiwan and South 
Korea, they conclude that there remains a case to be made for government 
intervention, which can take many forms. The view is expressed that policy-makers 
can coordinate private-sector production and investment decisions through credit 
control, tax incentives, trade policy and “administrative guidance”. Resultant 
government investment subsidisation in “modern sectors” of the economy results in 
large pay-offs, especially evident in the cases of the two countries mentioned. 
Mention is also made of the effective use of “public enterprises” within the 
development strategy of the economic and industrial base of a country. The author is 
however of the opinion that this is unfortunately, as yet, not evident in the case of 
South Africa’s State Owned enterprises (SOEs), and one will have to wait and see 
what the results of the Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) – see 
par 8 hereunder, will hold for the future growth in the SMME domain. 
 
                                                 
125 ibid p149 
126 ibid p160. (Author’s note: On the other side of the scale one finds certain countries (especially in Eastern Europe) that silently 
subsidize its manufacturing industries, which creates very favorable Labor rates, which in turn makes it extremely difficult for especially 
the DRI to compete – also negatively influenced by the long supply lines moving manufactured goods to Europe). 
127 ibid pp166 - 167 
 91 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
The research findings of various economists also reflect on the role of “foreign 
contact and technology transfer” in a developing country. Coetzee quoting from a 
study by Egan and Mody from 1992, states that there are evidence of various forms 
of in-plant training, also taking place in the developed country’s factories; ” …buyer 
may send international experts to train local workers and supervisors … buyer may 
also arrange short-term worker training in a developed country plant…” It is 
observed that technology transfers are key to improved production (best practices); 
contribute to competitiveness, increased exports and sales, and subsequent 
profitability128.  A case in point in terms of the South Africa industrial participation 
programme is the skills development and training that technical staff of Denel 
Aviation (now Denel Saab Aerostructures) has received as part of the DIP 
obligations under the procurement of the Gripen fighter aircraft from Sweden. 
Similarly Boeing has established a manufacturing hub at the same Denel facility by 
donating production machinery and training Denel staff in the principles of lean 
manufacturing in the production of a range of Boeing aircraft parts, regularly ordered 
by Boeing. 
 
In the case of South Africa, the country’s shortage of skilled black people is still 
squarely blamed on apartheid and the fact that black communities in the “Black 
Homeland” programmes were deprived of access to proper/better schools129. 
Despite the South African government’s initiatives with the creation of a skills levy 
fund and the establishments of various training and skills development structures, 
South Africa is still faced with huge shortages in many vocations. These skills 
shortages are further aggravated by government’s interference with demands for 
affirmative actions and equity employment, aggravated by a constant outflow of 
human capital.130  
                                                 
128 ibid pp172 – 176 (Author’s note: This approach has been particularly evident on the SDP’s where numerous employees of local DRI-
companies (and the SANDF) were sent on specialized training courses in OEM countries, e.g. Sweden, France, Germany and the UK) 
129 ibid p206. (Author’s note: Today, as a result of having being historically disadvantaged, the Country is generally suffering, as black 
people who have not been properly skilled are, as a result of the SA Government’s equity employment policy, required to perform outputs 
they were never trained to achieve.  This impacts across the Country, local and central government, as well as in the public and private 
industries.  
130 During March 2007, on the first anniversary of the establishment of Jipsa – a high-level working group attempting to address local 
skills shortages – Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka has called on the business community to do more to address the 
shortage. “For every skilled person the company needs they should train five,” Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (Jipsa) 
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Quoting the World Bank Report of 1999131, T. Alan and A. Thomas conclude with the 
statement “that economies are built not merely through the accumulation of physical 
capital and human skill, but on a foundation of information, learning and adaptation. 
Because knowledge matters, understanding how people and societies acquire and 
use knowledge – and why they sometimes fail to do so – is essential to improving 
people’s lives … poor countries – and poor people – differ from rich ones not only 
because they have less capital, but because they have less knowledge…” 
 
Seeraj Mohamed132, in a recent article on the South African government’s 
macroeconomic policy, expresses the views that such a policy will cause inflation to 
grow beyond the existing targets levels and that the economy will be losing many 
jobs and fixed investments as a result of the government’s neo-liberal macro-
economic policies. He expresses the hope that the SA government’s intended 
infrastructure expenditure will promote more private investment, but that it requires a 
closer integration between industrial and economic growth policies. 
 
The World Bank Report of development policies for the 21st century states that 
development will fail if the following four interactive building blocks are not included: 
? macro-economic stability as an essential prerequisite for achieving growth; 
? growth needs to trickle down in an interdependent process and human 
development needs need to be addressed directly; 
? development should happen coherently and comprehensively and should not 
depend on a single policy; and 
? the principal that institutions matter, and sustained development should be based 
on processes that are socially inclusive and responsive to changing 
circumstances.133 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
achieved significant progress in the first nine months after it was launched. She said this was achieved through better coordination and 
synthesis of information and initiatives 
131 Alan, T. and Thomas, A. (ed)2000. Poverty and Development into the 21st Century. OUP.  p409. 
132 Sareej Mohammed is a senior research fellow at the CSID of WITS. Engineering News, March 2-8, 2007. 
133 World Bank: Entering the 21st Century. World Development Report 1999/2000. OUP.NY. 2000 (p1) 
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The key to development appears to be locked in the word ‘sustainability’. When one 
considers the ‘new world order’ with the concept of ‘globalisation134’ one also needs 
to consider the impact of this phenomenon. This is seen by some as a politically 
convenient135 rationale for implementing unorthodox neo-liberal economic strategies, 
and  furthermore conceived as a powerful transformative force, responsible for a 
massive societal shake-out process.  In turn this makes the imbalance between the 
‘have’s’ and the ‘have-nots’ only that more notable and consistently influence the 
sovereignty of all those involved, especially those lesser-developed societies. 
 
6. Armington elasticities 
 
The use of the Armington136 elasticities model may be one way to measure the 
effects of the South Africa policies on industrial participation, and specifically 
sectoral development issues. This model is reportedly137 being used as an effective 
tool to measure the “elasticities between import substitution and domestic 
production”.  It is interesting, just for the sake of this dissertation, to note that Trade 
and Industry Policy Strategies of the DTI (TIPS) in 2003, determined, by using this 
model, that the most import-sensitive sectors were (in order of sensitivity) coal 
mining, footwear, beverages, tobacco, leather and leather products, and, whereas 
the least import-sensitive sectors were catering and accommodation services, basic 
chemicals, coke and refined petroleum products.  
 
However it is not the intention of this dissertation to debate the issue of import 
substitution versus domestic production. On the other hand it does remain a valid 
topic and reference point as it provides for a research tool/mechanism that can be 
deployed in proving, or disproving whether the SA government’s approach to 
                                                 
134 Held,D. McGrew, A. Glodblatt, D. & Perraton, J. 1999. Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture. Polity Press. 
Cambridge. 
135 Korten, D.C. Dialogue: “Which Globalization?”. The Society for International Development (SID). Development publication. Vol 40 No 
2. Sage Publ 1997 (page 56) 
136 Paul Armington in 1969 came up with an exposition that presented a general theory of demand for goods in order to make estimations 
and do fore castings.  This is reportedly a model also used in most of South Africa’s trade policies.  Source TIPS.  WP12-2003.  
Contiprint Jhb (ISBN1-919982-10-8).  Report written by Katherine Lee Gibson (University of Natal). 
137 Trade and Industry Policy Strategies of the DTI (TIPS) in 2003.  Source TIPS.  WP12-2003.  Contiprint Jhb  
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sectoral development works in practice, through the process of  ’forced’ industrial 
participation measures. 
 
7. South African development benchmarks 
 
In a paper written by T. Bauman of Community Microfinance Network138 on the 
socio-economic policy in South Africa, he expresses the views that certain structural 
reforms were needed in the immediate post-1994, such as a macro-economic 
stability with fiscal and monetary discipline, a faster growth, stimulated by foreign 
direct investment (FDI) with improved capital flows a shift towards higher value-
added manufacturing and beneficiation and a reduced emphasis on natural resource 
exports and agriculture, with comprehensive technological upgrade as part of an 
economical objective, by encouraging the SMME sector to focus on job creation, as 
well as attending to the modernisation of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Bauman also observes that with some exceptions, South Africa is not in a position to 
play a significant role in the decentralised mass production systems of the 
developed world. South Africa’s competitive advantage continues to be in specialist 
capital-intensive industries, such as heavy and civil engineering and mineral 
beneficiation, and in some service sectors139. The problem is, however, a lack of 
enough downstream demand. The success of South Africa’s automotive exports lies 
mainly in the fact that it is part of a global supply chain – there is of course also been 
a good deal of government subsidization evident to actually achieve these 
successes. 
 
The South African economy is energy-intensive140, using a large amount of energy 
for every Rand of value-add. The country’s energy is dominated by coal, which 
contributes 70% of primary energy.  Local coal is relatively cheap, resulting in very 
                                                 
138 Bauman, T.  South Africa as a Developing Country.  Implications for Socio-economic Policy in the second Decade.  Community 
Microfinance Network.  (Available at: www.brcs.co.za). 
139 Ibid  
140Howells, Mark. (UCT, Energy Research Center) and J.A. Laitner, US Environmental Protection Agency.  ACEEE Summer Study on 
Energy Efficiency in Industry.  2005.  (Available at: www.safrica.info/doing_business/…). 
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low energy cost, particularly for electricity, which still is the cheapest in the world.  
The 2005 USA Environmental Protection Agency Report contains a statement on 
“Goals to be met by energy efficiency”, which alludes to the fact that improved 
industrial competitiveness (Goal 6) can be achieved by the adoption of appropriate 
energy efficiency measures. 
 
If one further considers the fact that South Africa has an abundance of mineral 
supplies and substantial labour resources (although under-skilled), a well-developed 
infrastructure and governance system (although poorly managed), together with a 
well-developed primary industrial base and high-tech industry clusters, (especially 
the DRI and the automotive industry), theoretically there should be no reason why 
South Africa should not be able to excel in competitive down-stream manufacturing 
and ensure that its industrial output is very  competitive. 
 
The DTI, in 2002, drafted a policy, referred to the “Integrated Manufacturing Strategy 
(IMS)”, which has not been properly implemented. This reportedly led to a renewed 
effort of the DTI to develop a “new” National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF)”, 
backed by developments in the East Asian economies that reportedly141 showed that 
active industrial and tariff policies could play a role in supporting industrial 
development and exports.  
 
8. The Competitive Supplier Development Programme 
 
The DPE has been working since 2004 on creating a new industry development 
programme (referred to as the Competitive Supplier Development programme – 
CSDP”)142, which intends to better leverage the substantial planned expenditure on 
various infrastructure projects by SOEs over the next ten to fifteen years as a means 
to further develop the local industry. This expenditure is taking place against a 
globally increasing demand for infrastructure-related capital goods, which in turn is 
increasing import costs. 
                                                 
141 Meier, G.M. and Rauch, J.E. 2005.  Leading Issues in Economic Development, OUP.  Chapters i-iv. 
142 Interview with Mr Sean Philips, DPE CSDP Unit. 26/03/07 and the DPE website – Available at: www.dpe.gov.za 
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DPE produced a local supplier development policy in collaboration with the DTI, 
which was approved by Cabinet on 25 January 2007. This policy aims to leveraging 
SOE expenditures to optimise the development of national supplier industries, and 
where possible, build export capabilities, focusing on enhanced competitiveness and 
capacity building. The development of local suppliers is primarily a competitiveness 
initiative – any price premiums must be short-term, transparent and robustly 
motivated in terms of long-term supplier industry development, and ultimate cost 
savings for enterprises.143 
 
For large-scale expenditure with imported components, SOEs must commit to either 
the DTI’s national industrial participation programme (NIPP) or the DPE’s new 
CSDP. NIPP is mandatory when the government and/or SOEs buy or lease goods 
and services with an imported content equal to or exceeding USD10-million. 
Implementing the supplier policy can include international suppliers being mandated 
to partner with local suppliers, or make direct investments. SOEs are encouraged to 
enter into long-term contracts with local suppliers, requiring such suppliers to cut 
costs over time. During the drawing up of supplier development plans by the SOE, 
the DTI sector teams must be consulted to ensure that the alignment between these 
plans and the DTI’s customised sector programmes is optimised. This is to be done 
by the SOE, through the DPE’s CSDP unit.  Presently Denel is being excluded from 
the programme as Denel is not seen as a direct SOE buyer, but actually selling 
equipment to the Department of Defence144.  
 
The DTI will be given one month after receiving the plan, to raise concerns to the 
shareholder representative regarding the alignment of the plan with the NIPP 
objectives, and such concerns will be taken into account before its formal 
acceptance. The SOE must report to the DPE on the progress, and strict criteria 
                                                 
143 Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) announcement March 2007 regarding the newly approved by parliament CSDP initiatives to 
leverage the government’s intended R400bn spent on infrastructure development over the next 10-20 years. 
144 The Author in his professional capacity as General  Manager Countertrade and Offset Solutions at Denel Corporate approach DPE in 
2007, with the request to be exempted from NIP and to pursue the CSDP instead. The minister of DPE subsequently ruled Denel out 
based on the argument that Denel is a supplier and not a procurer as is the case for all other SOEs. 
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apply. The DPE submit quarterly reports on progress of the implementation of the 
supplier development plans to DTI, to assess progress against the intended 
objectives. If, after a three-year period after the submission of the plan, a SOE fails 
to make progress on implementing the plan against the relevant criteria for 
performance, the normal NIPP procedures will be reinstated for that SOE 
immediately. This decision will be taken jointly by DPE and DTI.  
 
SOEs have the strongest interest in securing the development of their supplier 
industries, as this will enhance their own competitiveness in their core activities and 
ensure security of supply in high-value, high-risk areas, ensuring and security of 
supply, the decrease of foreign exchange risks, greater supplier responsiveness 
through proximity, while addressing monopolies and improving the competitiveness 
of the supply base145. 
 
Through total procurement spend (including capital expenditure (CAPEX) and 
operational expenditure (OPEX), the SOEs have the most powerful instrument to 
ensure that foreign suppliers invest locally in skills, plant and technology. At the 
same time, the SOEs should compile detailed technical and commercial data on the 
suppliers and their associated industries, through categorising functional 
requirements and designing a standard procurement process. 
  
The objective of the intervention is to develop a procurement tool kit and create 
supporting measures to promote investment and the development of internationally 
competitive capabilities in the SOE supplier sectors, using capital and relevant 
operational expenditure, to reduce costs through increased efficiencies and reduce 
dependency on imports and foreign exchange exposure, while developing niche 
export areas. 
 
The CSDP remarkably mirrors the challenges facing the DRI in South Africa, and 
can be aptly supported by the DIP programme that has been in practice since 1988. 
                                                 
145 ibid p143 
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The links between the programmes can be seen from the ensuing discussions on 
these two topics per se and are in line with the DTI’s strategic plans for development 
over the period from 2006 to 2009. These strategic plans categorically state that 
“central to the economic growth path is the question of sustainable growth, which in 
turn requires a continued focus on competitiveness and competition. The 
competitiveness of many enterprises in the economy continues to be based on the 
traditional factors of cost and access to raw materials, rather than on the new drivers 
of competitive advantage”146. 
 
The author supports the view that in order to give proper effect to the CSDP 
initiatives of the DPE, the following aspects, as stated in the diagram, contain the 
key building blocks for successful implementation, and need to be considered. 
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Figure 9 (Source: J.J. van Dyk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Medium Term Strategic Framework: 2006-2009. Department of Trade and Industry 
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9. In conclusion 
 
Development theory appears to be a process of ever assimilating and reworking of 
the various elements from more specific fields of economic, social and political 
inquiry.   A key theme in both classical and contemporary development theory is the 
question of industrial development and policy, and the need to understand the 
relationship between focused state intervention and a coherent and workable 
industrial policy. In RSA there has been an increased interest in the development 
state, and since 1994 (if not before) there is a belief in the efficacy of industrial policy 
and a sense that the state can diversify the economy with targeted interventions. 
One such intervention is the industrial participation policy/programme as discussed 
in fair detail in this dissertation. 
 
Considering the contents and arguments and debates in chapter 8, one can clearly 
view the contemporary thoughts and views of the fraternity of strategic scholarly 
debates around industrial development in context of the perceived value adding or 
non-value adding nature of countertrade.  There is a modest but growing body of 
critical work on countertrade – both internationally, and to a more limited extent 
nationally (in South Africa).  
 
However, most of these studies, especially the South African ones appear to be 
based more on hear say and academic rhetoric and discourse than on an in-depth 
analysis of the whole process. In order to address these shortcomings of previously 
reported academic studies the author is of the opinion that this dissertation could 
most probably be used as a base document to engage government with the view to 
allow for an in-depth analysis of the whole industrial participation programme and 
how it should or could be changed to achieve a better result than presently 
perceived by critics to be the case.  
 
In conclusion it is generally accepted that the DTI will announce the so-called “high 
impact/high priority” sectors, to complement the already-successful MIDP, with 
associated incentives for implementation after the 2008 budget. As issues such as 
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costing and import-parity pricing will have to be addressed, it is expected that the 
Competitions Act will also have to be reviewed. Another key element of the NIPF is 
the government’s intentions to build a competitive supplier community around the 
planned R400-billion public sector infrastructure expenditure.147, as well as its 
intentions to implement a DRI sector strategy during 2008/9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147 Creamer T, Engineering News Cover Story. “Policy Development. 2007: Year of Industrial Policy.” Jan 26- Feb 1, 2007. 
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CHAPTER 5 - WHITE PAPER ON THE DEFENCE–RELATED INDUSTRY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter contains the review of the White Paper (WP) on the Defence-Related 
Industries (DRI)148 in South Africa and an effort was made to cover all prevailing (at 
that time) issues relevant to the debate on the local DRI.  As there are presently 
many developments in this area, a fair amount of attention is given to elaborative 
comments on most of these. 
 
The WP focuses primarily on the DRI in South Africa, with a definite assessment of 
the DIP programme in this context – see chapter 6 – viewed as a development 
mechanism for maintaining strategic defence industrial capabilities in South Africa. 
 
In order to put the DRI in perspective, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
background of the DRI, its history, how it developed and minimised its contribution to 
the economy, the human development aspects, as well as the industry’s anticipated 
role in supporting safety and security issues in South Africa149. 
 
In this research, attention is given to debates relevant on the DRI, especially in the 
period post-1994, leading up to the publication of the first government policy 
document on the South African defence industrial base (DIB) in 1999. 
 
The White Paper on the DRI is assessed and reviewed in the context of its 
relevancy, and how it compares with international trends and the relevance of 
academic debates on development, given the sometimes emotional nature of 
matters pertaining to, and surrounding, defence. 
                                                 
148 As approved on 1 December 1999. 
149 The Author was intimately involved with various contributions during the period of the drafting of the WP on the DRI, especially in 
respect of arms control (Jan ’91 to May ’96) during which period he assisted the Secretary for Defence in re-establishing this control 
function under the DoD in collaboration with Prof Kader Asmal, the then chairperson of the National Conventional Arms Control 
Committee (NCACC). His insight into this WP on the DRI and the comments and observations made are thus based on his personal 
exposure and experience in this field.), as well as on the aspects of industrial participation (although not that extensively covered by the 
WP on the DRI). 
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2. The rise of the DRI 
 
In the period preceding 1960, South Africa received most of its armament 
requirements from the United Kingdom, but this was summarily stopped after the 
Sharpville incident in 1976. 
 
By then, South Africa has already established and created some levels of self-
sufficiency in the manufacturing of ammunition, which incidentally was initiated 
during the Second World War. Already in 1948, the SA government founded the 
Defence Research Board, which was required to develop the technical and 
manufacturing capabilities to produce arms locally. In 1953 the Defence Ordnance 
Workshop (DOW)150, later to be known as Lyttelton Engineering Works (‘Lyttelton 
Ingenieurswerke (LIW)’), was established, and by 1965 it reportedly already 
obtained some 120 different small arms production licenses from the UK, France, 
Belgium and Israel. In parallel, the Council for Scientific Industrial Research (CSIR) 
was established in 1945 to undertake, among other, defence research and 
development work. 
 
By 1963, the international reaction to South Africa’s political dispensation was tinged 
with stronger resistance, resulting in the United Nations calling for a voluntary arms 
embargo on South Africa.151 
 
Mounting external pressures, together with the increased levels of insurgencies of 
the various freedom fighter movements, caused the SA government to increase its 
demands for local self-sufficiency in arms. On 19 June 1968, the Armaments Board 
was established, followed by the creation of the Armaments Corporation of SA 
Limited (Armscor) in 1977, in terms of the Armaments Development and Production 
Act (Act no 57 of 1968, as amended). 
 
                                                 
150 Ibid 
151 United Nations Security Committee Resolution 818 dd 7 Aug 1963 
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The task of Armscor was to further develop the local defence industrial base in 
South Africa and a number of Armscor subsidiaries were created, together with 
some 1 000 other private industry local companies, creating a supplier network with 
cross-manufacturing capabilities and a vertically-integrated supply chain structure. 
This process was further promoted and accelerated as a result of the second UN 
arms embargo in 1977.152 By the mid ‘80s, the DRI was in a position to supply 
almost all of the SADF’s requirements,153 as well as covertly exporting to various 
other (mostly pariah) states. 
 
Due to the increasing international isolation of South Africa and increased levels of 
insurgencies and acts of terrorism, the need for technology to further develop the 
DRI, increased. This resulted in Armscor having to resort to all kinds of ‘surreptitious 
methods’154 of procuring and acquiring whatever was needed. Armscor extensively 
made use of ‘fronting’ companies to disguise its modus operandi and protect the 
identity of its sources supplying technology, sub-assemblies (for example engines) 
spares and components. 
 
The SA government’s drive towards self-sufficiency led to the establishment of 
production capabilities (between 1956 and 1985) that covered a wide range of 
technologies, and words such as “proven in battle”, and “leading-edge technologies” 
were frequently used to boast with, and reiterate, these achievements. Products 
quite unique in design and suited to the harsh South Africa environment saw the 
light and managed to draw the world’s attention to South Africa’s technological 
capabilities. 
 
By 1985 the local defence industry capability, as developed by Armscor, reportedly 
employed between 130 000 and 150 000 people. By then, the industry acquired the 
abilities to design, reverse-engineer, manufacture, produce and maintain, as well as 
                                                 
152 United Nations Security Council Resolution 418, dd 4 Nov 1977. 
153 Willet, S. 1994. Open arms for the prodigal son: The future of SA arms trade policies. Center for Defence Studies, Kings  College, UK. 
Publ. African Defence Review No 17.  
154 ibid 
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refurbish, upgrade and modify the following items (note that this list is not 
exhaustive): 
?  various types of aircraft, including the Cheetah fighter aircraft based on the 
French  Mirage III air frame; 
? various helicopters, all of French design, and ultimately the SA-designed and 
developed Rooivalk attack helicopter; 
? missiles, rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); 
? ordnance and landmines of various shapes and sizes; 
? world-renowned 155 mm artillery systems (G5 and G6); 
? various types and sizes of small and medium caliber ammunition, guns and 
cannons; 
? various types of vehicles, most with unique anti-mine capabilities; 
? state-of-the-art mine clearing methods, equipment and practices; 
? various types of pyrotechnical products, including red and white phosphor; 
? various anti-riot equipment, teargas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades; 
? a range of sensors and electro-optical equipment, as well as electronic measures 
and counter-measures, radio equipment and encryption; 
? a space launch and satellite capability; 
? a nuclear weapons capability (although at that time this was kept secret); and 
? various high-tech test ranges and facilities all over South Africa. 
 
The DRI became a technology leader in South Africa as a result of the beneficiary 
and privileged dispensation it enjoyed under Armscor’s seemingly never-ending list 
of requirements (generously funded by the government) to satisfy the needs of the 
SADF (now SANDF) during a period that was characterised by serious security 
threats from within South Africa and from its neighboring countries. 
 
In a research paper commissioned by the Institute of Security Studies155 it was 
reported that by the mid ‘80s Armscor had concluded contracts with some 2 270 
private sector companies and that the armaments industry employed 131 750 
                                                 
155 Botha, D. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Paper on the South African Defence Industry. Chartering a New Course. Occasional 
Paper 78. Sep 2003. 
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people, which figure represented 8.3% of the total number of employees in the 
manufacturing sector at that stage. By 1989 the DRI emerged as one of SA’s major 
industrial sectors that contributed nearly 4.5% of the GDP and 19% of manufacturing 
output, after gold and coal, as well as being the largest exporter of manufactured 
goods.156  
 
The DRI’s export successes into the international arms market, resulted in additional 
steps by the UN to isolate South Africa even further, in introducing yet another arms 
embargo, requesting member states to refrain from importing SA-manufactured 
weaponry.157 Despite this arms embargo, SA continued with its arms exports to 
countries such as Iraq, Iran, Taiwan, Israel, Chile, Peru, and the UAE, to name but a 
few. Armscor’s skills at evading sanctions developed to such a degree that it 
became sought-after by other clandestine exporters. Chester Crocker, US under-
secretary of State, when appearing before the House of Foreign Affairs on 17 April 
1985158, admitted that “Our experience with the UN arms embargoes against South 
Africa has not had the crippling effect on South Africa’s military capabilities as 
desired. Indeed it has provided the impetus to turn South Africa into the world’s 10th 
largest exporter”. 
 
3. Regulating the DRI 
 
3.1 Until 1994 
 
Since Armscor’s inception, the Act on Armaments Development and Production (Act 
57 of 1968)159, explicitly charged Armscor with the task and responsibilities to effect 
defence industrial development and to simultaneously regulate such an industry: 
a. Section 3(1) states that the objectives of the corporation (Armscor) are to meet 
as effectively and economically as may be feasible, the armaments 
                                                 
156 Willet, S. Open arms for the prodigal son: The future of SA arms trade policies. Center for Defence Studies, Kings  College, UK. Publ. 
African Defence Review No 17. 1994 
157 UN Security Council Resolution 558 of 1984. 
158 Harvard Business School Class Paper, 9-796-186 dd 21/06/1996 
159 This Act has since been repealed and replaced by Act 51 of 2003. 
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requirements of SA, as determined by the Minister (of Defence), including 
armaments for export. 
b. Section 3(2) (lA) mandated Armscor to exercise control over the development, 
manufacture, acquisition, supply, export or marketing of armaments.  
c. Section 4C vested certain powers in the Minister of Defence to issue various 
types of regulatory permits related to anything that deals with armament and/or 
related matters. (This control was mandated to Armscor by the Minster of 
Defence under numerous Regulations, published over time, in the Government 
Gazette.) 
 
In short, Armscor was constituted and mandated by law, to develop the armaments 
industry, and was given considerable freedom within an environment that was fairly 
unconstraint by normal bureaucratic limitations usually associated with government 
departments. 
 
3.2 During transition (1989 to 1994) 
 
In 1989, FW de Klerk took over the reins of the National Party from PW Botha. This 
happened at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismantling 
of the Berlin wall. Closer to home, a settlement was reached in Namibia, followed by 
the country’s transition into a democracy in 1989, allowing for the SADF to withdraw 
from Namibia. 
 
In 1990, De Klerk embarked on a campaign to totally transform the political 
dispensation in South Africa. First, the African National Congress (ANC) was un-
banned, with all the other ‘freedom movements’ following, and in 1992 the political 
detainee Nelson Mandela, was released from prison. These acts have put South 
Africa on a non-reversible road of reform. During the elections in 1994, the ANC 
secured a landslide victory and for the first time in South Africa’s history, the country 
became a democracy. 
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However the ‘peace dividend’ started taking its toll on the DRI with the result that 
there was an almost total halt in defence spending on new equipment. This caused 
the DRI to downsize, despite the fact that the export market was now willing to 
accept SA defence exports after the lifting of all the UN arms embargoes in 1994. 
 
During this transition period (‘88/89 to ’94) the DRI resorted to so-called 
diversification. A process that aimed to create survivability and sustainability for the 
DRI, by establishing cross-subsidisation by producing non-defence related 
equipment to ensure the optimal use of industrial capabilities. This process did not 
work particularly well for the DRI. 
 
As the Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968 barred Armscor 
from deploying commercial/civilian conversion actions, a decision was taken to form 
a new government-owned enterprise that could explore such opportunities. This 
gave rise to the birth of Denel160 (Pty) Ltd on 1 April 1992, a private state-owned 
company established under the Companies Act. Armscor’s role was henceforth 
reduced to that of an acquisition and procurement agency for the former SADF, also 
attending to surplus SADF stock sales, and maintaining the regulatory control over 
the DRI. 
 
One remaining area, representing a potential conflict of interest, was the fact that 
Armscor was the arms control regulatory authority (as per Section 4C of Act 
57/1968), but was also actively promoting, marketing and exporting defence 
equipment. This eventually landed them in the hot water with the ANC, when a 
shipment of AK47s went astray en route to Lebanon. Consequently the ANC 
removed this function from Armscor and transferred the responsibility to the 
Secretary for Defence (in late 1994). This step was followed by a lengthy enquiry 
(led by Judge E. Cameron) investigating the aforementioned AK47 transaction. The 
findings and recommendations of the Commission resulted in the formation of the 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), by appointment of 
                                                 
160 Author’s note: The name DENEL is reportedly derived from “DE=detonics” + “N=and “ “EL=electronics”. Denel(Pty) Ltd  resorts under 
the Minister of Public Enterprises. 
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Cabinet. All conventional arms control issues were henceforth to be sanctioned and 
approved by NCACC,161 chaired by (a “neutral” Minister) the former Minister of 
Water Affairs and Forestry, Professor Kader Asmal. (The Chairperson now is the 
Minister of Safety and Security). 
 
This regulatory measure had a huge influence on the DRI, especially in the first two 
years of its existence, as the DRI had to become accustomed to a new, rigid and 
much lengthier process of obtaining the various prescribed permits for conventional 
arms, similar to the period pre-1994. The DRI is still complaining that the process is 
lengthy and unpredictable at its best, and AMD is reportedly actively working with 
the DoD to see if relaxations can be implemented162. 
 
3.3 The DRI from 1994 to present 
 
The new political order in South Africa (1994) had a huge effect on South Africa – on 
its people, politics, industry, international trade relations and the economy. SA was 
re-admitted to the international community, which meant that the South African 
industry, especially the DRI, was suddenly put on an equal footing globally. 
 
The level of distrust with which the military fraternity was viewed by the ANC (and 
others) and the previously oppressed people of South Africa, resulted in extended 
debates regarding the role of the military fraternity and the need for defence – 
especially the need for a defence industrial capability. The SA government, through 
the DoD, went through an extremely democratic and transparent process in 
requesting all stakeholders’ views on these matters. The first step was to get the 
White Paper on Defence accepted and approved in 1996. This was followed by an 
equally elaborative consultative process to ensure the acceptance of maintaining a 
defence force capability with certain needs, as expressed in the Defence Review of 
                                                 
161 The Author was intimately involved in this process, having being the Head of Arms Control in Armscor and subsequently seconded to 
the Secretary for Defence where he worked (1994-96) closely with Pierre Steyn and Prof Kader Asmal (as well as Foreign Affairs 
officials, the Non-Proliferation Council under Abdul Minty and the SAPS) in creating a new arms control dispensation for South Africa. 
162 Interview with the Exec Director of AMD on 4 Dec 2007. 
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1998. A comprehensive review was launched and debated, resulting in the White 
Paper on the DRI, also forming the subject of this policy review. 
 
Internationally, especially since mid ‘90s, defence companies started consolidating 
and many mergers occurred, both in Europe, as well as in the USA, as the cost of 
developing new generations armaments became inhibiting.163 On the local front, the 
DoD introduced a revised open-tender approach for the DRI (as envisaged by the 
respective defence policy documents, i.e. The Defence White Paper, the Defence 
Review and the White Paper on the DRI). ‘The old ways’ of collusion between the 
DRI, the former SADF (renamed in 1994 to the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF)) and Armscor were replaced. The SANDF and Armscor had no 
choice but to make peace with the new era of ‘civilian supervision’ initiated by the 
DoD, and vested in the Secretary for Defence as the only accountable officer.164 
 
Similar to the mergers witnessed in Europe and the USA, foreign companies, since 
the late ‘90s, set their sights on local DRI companies, for example: 
? Thales of France acquired African Defence Systems, originally part of the Altech 
Group. The latter ceased all defence business in the mid ‘90s; 
? MTU of Germany took over Prokura Diesel; 
? Saab-CelsiusTech of Sweden acquired a stake in Avitronics, which was part of 
the Grintek group; 
? EADS, Germany, formed a joint venture with Grintek, creating a new companies 
called Ewation; 
? EADS, Germany, procured a share in Reutech Radar Systems (RRS); 
? BAE Systems, UK, took over Paradigm Systems and also procured a stake in 
Advance Technology Engineering (ATE). They may allegedly opt to buy-out BAE 
Systems during 2007/8 and form a joint venture with Denel on UAV products; 
? Saab, Sweden, procured a majority stake in the Grintek group and took over 
AMS; 
                                                 
163 Botha, D. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Paper on the South African Defence Industry. Chartering a New Course. Occasional 
Paper 78. Sep 2003. 
164 Singh, R.P. (ed) Arms Procurement decision making. Vol II. Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland South Africa and Taiwan. 200. SIPRI. 
OUP. 
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? Denel Airmotive sold 51% of its business to Turbomeca France (part of Snecma, 
belonging to the Safran Group), creating a company called TMA (Turbomeca 
Africa); 
? Reumech OMC and Gear Ratio changed hands first to Vickers Plc, UK, then to 
Alvis Plc, UK, and in 2005 to BAE Systems, UK; 
? The latest Denel deals saw Saab Aerostructures, Sweden, acquiring an initial 
20% stake in Denel Aerostructures in 2006, and Carl Zeiss of Germany acquiring 
a 70% stake in Denel Optronics in 2007; and with 
? several other equity-based and local consolidation deals involving Denel, are 
being considered and form part of the company’s turn-around, strategy to 
unbundle, prioritising foreign partnerships that involve Denel’s artillery business 
and its Munitions Group (consisting of several plants, such as PMP, and its brass 
smelter), Naschem (including the La Forge plant) and Western Cape (which 
consolidated Swartklip and Somchem during 2004).  
 
4.  Analytical review of the White Paper on the DRI, from a development viewpoint 
 
4.1 Background to the White Paper 
 
In a covering statement by the former chairperson of the NCACC165, he reflects on 
the fact that the relevant White Paper is the result of a transparent process that 
followed an exhaustive consultation process with government, industry, civil society 
and academia166. He confirms at that stage, that in terms of the Transitional 
Executive Council Act (Act 151 of 1993), the research was commissioned to assess 
the future of the arms and related industries. A committee of Ministers formulated a 
comprehensive framework for an underlying philosophy, policy and approach with 
regard to the various aspects of the arms industry that the White Paper 
subsequently addressed issues of arms control and the defence industry, and that 
                                                 
165 Statement by Prof Kader Asmal, Chairperson of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee on the process that lead to the 
drafting of the White Paper on the DRI – presented to the Parliament after approval by the Cabinet. The NCACC is a Cabinet appointed 
committee and has an obligation to report to Cabinet first then to Parliament. 
166 Author’s note: The drafting team was complemented by representatives from AMD, Armscor and academics from the University of 
Cape Town’s Center for Conflict Resolution. (Author was also an active participant in the process.) 
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the NCACC was tasked by Cabinet to initiate and oversee the preparation of this 
White Paper on 21 August 1996.167 
 
The primary aim of the White Paper was to review the role, nature and current status 
of the DRI in South Africa and to provide a government vision to shape the future of 
this industry and prepare policy options for the governance thereof, also identifying 
areas critical to its viability. 
 
Prof Kader Asmal alluded to the fact that South Africa was the first country to “coin 
the term defence-related industry”, as the research that was done during the drafting 
of the White Paper concluded that a “defence industry” as such could not be 
identified, nor defined as a distinct industrial sector in the South African context. It 
was also observed that many defence-related companies used and deployed so-
called dual-use technologies, creating an overlap between the production processes 
of civilian and military companies. The White Paper is thus seen as a significant 
document based on exhaustive research on a part of the industry that was shrouded 
in secrecy. 
 
The White Paper, as an end-result, is viewed as an incisive policy that directs the 
state on the future of the DRI in South Africa.  The SA government thus recognised 
that the DRI is an integral part of the country’s defence capability, requiring and 
calling for an indigenous strategic capability within the broader, national industrial 
development framework. 
 
Government, does, however, state that it will follow a very selective process to 
govern technologies and needs for self-reliance, although they accept the DRI’s 
industrial capabilities to be singularly different from the components of the national 
industrial base. The DRI’s capability is of strategic importance to the SANDF, 
although only certain components of it actually qualify, and due to the nature of the 
DRI’s output (i.e. defence-related products, services and technologies), it must be 
                                                 
167 Author’s note: The drafting process was coordinated by the Policy and Planning Division of the DoD, and the drafting process took 
three years to complete.  
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subjected to government control, as South Africa is a responsible member of the 
international community. 
 
4.2 Contents of the White Paper (WP) -  per each chapter 
 
4.2.1 Chapter 1 of the WP examines the national policy framework applicable to the 
industry and interprets the WP in the context of the South Africa’s economic, 
industrial and technology policies. Reflecting on the Constitution of South Africa, the 
WP introduces the topic of sovereign rights of the state, which includes the right of 
self-defence and the protection of the country’s national security. It highlights 
specific key aspects of principles that was already accepted by the Government of 
National Unity, including: 
- international rights to self-defence and security; 
- advanced defence technology needs; 
- core defence force concepts; 
- efficient domestic defence industry capabilities; 
- the armaments acquisition process; and 
- arms control. 
 
The base arguments in the WP on the DRI are to be found in the Defence Review 
(of 1998), reflecting on the requirement for long-term planning of the DoD (and 
SANDF) regarding matters such as defence posture, doctrine, force levels, logistic 
support, armament, equipment and human resource needs, as well as other 
resources requirements and funding. It draws on findings as contained in the White 
Paper on Science and Technology, where it was concluded that the balance of trade 
in medium and high-technology industries remains negative (at that time) with the 
exception of the armaments industry, which showed a positive annual balance of 
trade. In this respect emphasis is placed on a technologically advanced SANDF that 
can (theoretically) scale up and mobilise quicker, in times of heightened threats. 
 
 113 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
The DRI WP takes it for granted that key technologies will have to be retained, 
ostensibly within the DRI. The Science and Technology WP’s arguments against 
conversion are captured to promote special efforts to leverage defence technologies 
as spin-offs into the civilian sector, as a tool ensuring further industrial and economic 
development. 
 
Strong collaboration between various government departments is anticipated, with 
references being made to other strategies related to the development of South 
Africa’s industrial base, its general trade, economic growth, the improvement on the 
country’s balance of payments, tariff reductions, incentives, promotion of investment 
and human resource development, the strengthening of competition, as well as the 
development of SMMEs, the promotion of sectoral industrial strategies, the 
restructuring of state assets and the continued rationalisation and reduction of import 
protectionist schemes, while promoting the industrial participation programmes 
related to the foreign procurement transactions of government. 
 
Recognition is given to the government’s focus on driving its industrial policy towards 
providing long-term improvements in employment and wealth creation, through the 
creation of a sustainable, internationally competitive manufacturing base. Industrial 
policy is reportedly shifting away from demand-side incentives to supply-side 
measures aimed at encouraging companies to invest in products and processes that 
are internationally competitive (see the discussion on the DPE’s CSDP (2007 – see 
previous chapter)). 
 
Some research argument is included, examining and scrutinising the history of the 
DRI, how it developed into and whether it actually forms an integral part of the local 
industrial base. The DTI is singled out and criticised for not having any specific 
policies directed towards the DRI.  
 
Comment - The observation is being made that the drafting approach to this chapter 
1 of the DRI WP, is clearly based on several key policy issues, which have already 
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been debated and accepted by the government during the preceding three years. 
The sound argumentative deductions eventually culminate in a general acceptance 
of the continued existence of the DRI, and government support is projected as a 
given. However, the “close collaboration between government departments” in 
optimising opportunities and collaboration never materialised to the extent 
anticipated, neither did the DRI see much of the “anticipated government support” 
for its activities either.  
 
4.2.2 Chapter 2 of the DRI WP is in essence a descriptive narrative containing a 
condensed history of the DRI, with some economic analyses of earnings, value and 
employment statistics in order to provide a basis of significant evaluation and a 
historic overview of the DRI, going back to the Second World War up to the period 
immediate preceding the drafting of the WP. The latter was provided in order to 
inform all interested parties on this rather suspect or covert part of the industrial 
base of South Africa. 
 
The roles that the respective UN arms embargoes play, in conjunction with the 
regional conflict in southern Africa, the apartheid struggle, acts of insurgency and 
terrorism, and the SA government mandating Armscor to create a domestic defence 
industry, are discussed in fair detail, while also identifying the changes in the 
strategic environment since 1989 and how these elements contributed to transform 
the DRI. 
 
The role of Armscor (and its transformation) is covered, as well as its sub-ordinate 
interactions with the newly instituted DoD (1994), vis a vis its regulatory position 
towards the DRI, with a snapshot of what the DRI looked like in 1995/96, an 
overview of its manufacturing capacity and skills base and its contribution to the 
economy and associated effects on socio-economic development.  
 
Details of the decline in the domestic defence market are debated, in the context of 
the dwindling contribution of the DRI to the national economy in terms of 
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manufacturing output. Although an increase in defence exports is cited, it is clear 
that the increased exports did little in closing the gap between the traditional levels 
of local defence spent (1975 – 1985), and that the net result remained negative.  
 
A description of the interdependency between the SANDF’s requirements and local 
defence industrial capabilities is included, with an explanation of the so-called 
‘systems hierarchy approach’. Core competencies vested in the DRI are reportedly 
in areas such as electronics, weapon systems (read ‘systems’ in its widest possible 
context), communications, vehicle systems (read ‘systems’ in its widest possible 
context), simulators, unmanned aerial vehicles and logistics. 
 
The assumption is made that the DRI and the CSIR provide sound building blocks 
for various research and development (R&D) projects and many so-called 
‘technology demonstrators’ saw the light. (The implication of this observation is 
found in the fact that until the mid ‘80s, a substantial expenditure on R&D in the 
defence environment was recorded.) 
 
On the issue of the viability and sustainability of the DRI, a statement is made 
indicating that “many firms” went bankrupt (all in the category of SMME, acting as 
sub-contractors to the larger companies), or exited the defence business, or were 
otherwise taken over by other firms. Mention was then already made of a “less than 
impressive” financial performance of especially Denel. 
 
Comment - The observation is being made that the basic arguments contained in the 
DRI WP are based on sound research and supported by factual data. With ten years 
having lapsed since the last proper review on the DRI, there is an urgent need to 
review the DRI against developments over these past ten years, in order to 
determine its present state of health in terms of capability, capacity, technology and 
contribution to the economy in terms of manufacturing output.  
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As a result of the extremely poor financial state of affairs with Denel, having 
announced a record loss of ZAR1.6-billion in the financial year 2004/5, the DPE has 
for the first time since Denel’s inception in 1992, taken a serious interest in Denel’s 
affairs. The government for the first time acknowledged the fact that Denel is 
regarded as a strategic asset of national security importance. (A substantial portion 
of all SANDF equipment either came from, or via Denel). 168 
 
Other government departments have been asked to support the “save Denel 
campaign”, with both the DoD and Armscor considering a change to their open 
tendering approach. The DoD, on the other hand, remains constraint by the 
insufficient levels of funds available for capital equipment. It is evident that National 
Treasury is not planning any increase in the defence budget, especially for capital 
equipment. The National Treasury (Department of Finance) promised a 
recapitalisation grant to Denel, amounting to ZAR5.1-billion. Of this amount some 
ZAR2.6-billion have already been paid to Denel during 2005/6. During the same 
period, Denel reportedly also earned an additional ZAR400-million through the sale 
of non-core assets.169 Denel during 2007 also earned an amount of ZAR606-million 
for the sale of property (land) adjacent to Oliver Tambo airport to the Airports 
Company of South Africa (ACSA).170 
 
The DTI has also been drawn into the DRI debate and took steps to create the 
Aerospace cluster, made up of mainly DRI companies, together with South African 
Airways Technical (SAAT). DTI collaborated with the Department of Science and 
Technology (DST) and the CSIR to create the so-called AMTS171 initiative, all in an 
effort to increase manufacturing output on a value-add down-stream beneficiation 
basis. In 2005, Denel requested (with the support of the DPE, the DoD, and the 
collective support of all other AMD members) the DTI to structure a DRI cluster in 
                                                 
168 Author’s note: Analyzing Chapter 13 of the Defence Review, 1998, it is abundantly clear that if Denel has to close down the whole of 
the SANDF will also come to a standstill. (The latter analysis was done by JJ van Dyk for Denel in 2004/5 to facilitate discourse with DPE 
on the importance of the survival of Denel) 
169 Business Day, 26 July 2006. (Denel was instructed by DPE (approved by Cabinet in 2005) to sell-off all its non-core business and to 
focus as part of its turn around strategy on its core defence-related business only, accepting dual-use products will remain as part of its 
core business). 
170 Denel infogram 20 Sep 2007 and various media reports following the announcement. 
171 Advanced Manufacturing Technology Strategy 
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order for the DRI to share in certain DTI development incentive schemes. All 
indications are that the DTI may implement such a strategy in 2008/9. 
 
However, the continued lack of adequate R&D expenditure from the DoD’s side, and 
the continued lack of a coordinated collaborative technology management between 
the DoD and DST, result in the repository technology base of the DRI deteriorating, 
with a result that certain types of equipment from abroad become more attractive to 
the DoD, and probably less expensive, as there is now no longer an added non-
recurring development and industrialisation cost included in such off-the-shelf 
procurements. 
 
Since the drafting of the WP on the DRI, the Armaments Development and 
Production Act (Act 57 of 1968) was repealed in total by a new Act, known as the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa Act (Act 51 of 2003)172. Armscor’s role has 
been limited to defence acquisition and managing defence technology, acting as a 
research and development agency. There is, however, a new role included, that 
allude to the prospect of “exploitation of commercial opportunities as a result of the 
corporations duties”. The new Act provides for a formal cooperation structure 
between Armscor and the DoD in the form of a “Service Level Agreement”. The Act 
also contains provisions allowing Armscor to procure for other government 
departments, as well as the ‘legal’ mandate to manage the defence industrial 
participation(DIP) programme of the DoD. 
 
4.2.3 Chapter 3 of the DRI WP addresses the process of acquisition and technology 
management between the DoD and the SANDF (user), with Armscor as the 
acquisition and procurement agency, participating in the DoD process that covers 
the user requirement, through to planning, scheduling, budgeting, tendering, 
approval, contracting and subsequent management, control, and accountabilities.   
 
                                                 
172 Author’s note: Although this new Act 51/2003 was consented to on 20 April 2004, it was only promulgated into law on 8 May 2006. 
There are strong indication since 2006 that Act 51/2003 is going to be repealed and that Armscor with be incorporated under the 
Secretary for Defence. This process is anticipated to be completed by the 2008/9 financial year or earlier. 
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Support for the DRI (referred therein as a ‘subsidy’) refers to the funding of key 
technologies in order to maintain key capabilities in the DRI. Armscor will assist with 
the international marketing activities to promote the DRI’s products, by subsidising 
international shows and exhibitions. It is, however, categorically stated that public 
money should not be used to subsidies the DRI. 
 
Comment - The observation is being made that the basic arguments contained in 
Chapter 3 of the DRI WP, are based on sound acquisition and procurement 
practices that have over a period of some twenty years been ‘perfected’ by Armscor. 
Defence technology and related acquisition management as applied by the DoD 
(and Armscor) aim to identify those technologies that will in time create capabilities 
in the DRI, on a long-term basis, taking into account the SANDF’s threat analysis, 
required operational capabilities and force structure. The assessment is done, 
accepting the life-cycle support requirement of the local DRI. 
 
The author is of the opinion that the following flow diagram, which aims to depict the 
DoD’s technology management process schematically, can also be used effectively 
as an additional tool to implement of the DPE’s CSDP plans under the anticipated 
infrastructure upgrade expenditure of the SA government: 
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The RSA DoD’s technology and acquisition process
Jointly and severally, the SANDF as user dictates requirements, the DoD plans and budgets and Armscor manages the acquisition contracting process
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Figure 10 (Source: Author’s view of the DoD technology policy as contained in its Acquisition policy 
VB1000.)  
 
However, after eleven years the roles of the DoD vis-a-vis Armscor have been 
sorted out to a large extent, and there is now a need to review the present 
acquisition and procurement practices of the DoD and Armscor. 
 
Armscor, on the other hand, took deliberate steps to strengthen its role and secure 
its legal mandate, as can be seen in the new Act (51/2003). The DRI, on the other 
hand, remains rather pessimistic about the “new additional role” Armscor secured for 
itself and it appears as if Armscor may be competing with the DRI, benefiting from a 
substantially subsidised basis. These concerns specifically relate to Armscor’s 
decision to sell the surplus SANDF stock, establishing a travel agency as well as a 
freight forwarding company, and make money from DIP. 
 
The DRI expresses a specific need to be involved in a well-structured acquisition 
process, collaborating with the user (SANDF), the DoD and Armscor, when 
discussing the needs and requirements of the user. During the past ten years the 
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communication and liaison between the DRI and the user deteriorated, as did the 
contact and collaboration between the policy maker, and purse carrier (DoD), and 
the acquisition agency (Armscor). The result is that user requirements tend to not 
take local capabilities into consideration, favouring off-the-shelf foreign solutions, 
and resulting in the deterioration173 of the local DRI at all levels of technology, 
capability and capacity). The SANDF becomes more dependant on foreign support. 
These aspects make for a totally undesired state of affairs as warned against in all 
defence policy papers. The DRI is also concerned about the long periods that are 
needed to finalise decisions regarding the award of contracts.174 
 
The Armscor acquisition procedures contain, by all standards, a very comprehensive 
set of rules and requirements, and as earlier stated, constitute a well-structured and 
professional process. This process was developed over many years and has been 
tried and tested. Unfortunately, it requires some time to grasp the complex process 
and with black empowerment enterprises (BEE) entering the defence-related 
industry wishing to tender for any SANDF goods, equipment, or services, the 
tenderer may be at a disadvantage if the procurement process is not well 
understood. Questions are being raised as to whether SA truly needs such a 
sophisticated acquisition process, and whether the country can indeed afford the 
luxury and cost of such an elaborative programme that contains parallel processes – 
if the DoD and Armscor are considered It is estimated that Armscor annually 
receives ZAR280-million (2003/4) from the defence account.  
 
The follow structures and functions appear to be still duplicated within Armscor and 
the DoD refer to: 
- contract management; 
- financial control and management, especially in terms of the PFMA175; 
                                                 
173 The Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) policy on the other hand endeavors to neutralize the negative effect of foreign procurement 
on the DRI (See Section 3). 
174 Author’s note: In this instance the example is used of the SANDF’s requirement for a new generation infantry fighting vehicle. The 
request for information went out in 2002, closing Feb ’03, followed by a comprehensive request fro proposal   sent out in March 2004, 
closing date Feb ’05 –the DoD awarded the contract in two Phases (first development then production) late 2006. Contract signature was 
in May 2007. 
175 Public Finance Management Act, Act 29 of 1999. 
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- reporting (the Secretary for Defence is the accountable officer, but Armscor still 
report to the Minister of Defence and Parliament); 
- legal services; 
- communications and public relations; 
- security; 
- human resources and payroll; 
- administration and printing services; and 
- project management. 
 
The DRI WP draws heavily on the studies executed by a joint DoD/Armscor team 
(MODAC), commissioned176 by the former Minister of Defence, Joe Modise 
(deceased), shortly after the establishment of the DoD and the Secretary for 
Defence in 1994. The MODAC team prepared four reports177 for the former Minister 
Modise. These reports are up to this day the primary basis of collaboration between 
the DoD and Armscor. 
 
4.2.4  Chapter 4 of the DRI WP, extensively relies on arguments as contained in the 
White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, and highlights the technology 
and systems capability needs of the SANDF, while acknowledging its dilemma to 
satisfy such needs against the threat of an ever-decreasing defence budget. 
 
It was furthermore anticipated that the internationalisation of defence production 
would affect the DRI, and that the latter’s initial independency would actually lead to 
a state of interdependency, ostensibly on international suppliers. 
 
Recognition is given to the ‘dual challenges’ facing the DRI, in the sense that it has 
to satisfy the some times unique demands from the local user, while simultaneously 
fulfilling similar or other demands from their export customers. 
 
                                                 
176 This task team was known as the Minister of Defence Acquisition workgroup, MODAC for short. 
177 MODAC Reports no 1, 2, 3 and 4 
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It is furthermore stated, that the determination of local needs has to be guided by 
SA’s defence policy, ostensibly as contained in the Defence White Paper and 
Defence Review.  
 
Academic discourse follows, discussing various aspects related to global 
developments in defence, such as the concept of “Revolution in Military Affairs” that 
predicts technology advancements in the fields of C4I (command, control, 
communications, computing and intelligence) as the future way in which wars will be 
fought; the challenges facing the SANDF in its anticipated extended role in peace-
keeping; and the realities of other diverse threats (such as piracy, international 
terrorism, international crime syndication, cross-border crime, illegal immigrants). 
These tasks are highlighted in the context of maintaining sufficient levels of 
technology and capacity in the local DRI. 
 
The WP is imploring the stakeholders to put the DRI in a position to plan better. If 
the SANDF could categorise its requirements in order of strategic essential 
capabilities, allowing competition on non-strategic requirements, the DRI would be in 
a position to assess future requirements. It was categorically stated that, “due to an 
already established local capability, or where South Africa has a global competitive 
edge, certain niche systems are more cost-effective, over the life-cycle of systems, 
to secure locally rather than to buy from foreign suppliers ”. 
 
With regards to the arguments supporting the idea of “must have locally at all 
cost”, this chapter continues by describing the needs for specific local defence-
related technologies and capabilities in fair details, mainly stating that these already 
exist in South Africa. 
 
A strong argument is put forward to support the retention of a local defence 
technology base, which is mainly of a scientific and engineering nature. The 
establishment of a Defence Evaluation and Research Institute (DERI) is one of the 
propositions of the WP for the DRI, ensuring that the DoD maintains its “leading 
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edge, high-risk research”, which is not considered as part of the DRI’s 
responsibilities. Such research work is expected to be sub-contracted to the DERI. 
 
Aspects such as ‘diversification’, ‘outsourcing’, ‘industrial participation’, and ‘export 
marketing facilitation’ are just briefly touched upon. 
 
Comment -The general content and basic arguments contained in chapter 4 of the 
DRI WP, are based on a rationale of real needs. It underwrites the DoD’s 
requirements as contained in Strategic Business Plan (for 2005/06 to 2007/08). 
However, due to accelerated international developments and needs in the command 
and control arena has transformed to a ‘C 4 I 3 RS’ approach, which constitutes a 
‘systems type of configuration’, involving all aspects of command, control, 
communications, computing, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance 
and surveillance, which is highly sensorically and electronically sophisticated in its 
nature. 
 
An improved level of skills and expertise is required in the fields of sensoric and 
electronic systems. However, something that remains a constant concern to the DRI, 
is the continuous lack of adequate spending in the above fields in the form of R&D, 
and technology demonstrators in order to satisfy these needs of the SANDF. The 
current scenario, however, is one where Armscor tenders may be awarded to 
international competitors, because the technology gap between what the user wants, 
and what the local DRI can readily offer, is too vast – a gap that widens in quantum 
leaps. 
 
The local DRI resists 178 the Armscor/DoD’s open tender approach where tenderers 
are invited to bid for equipment or sub-systems in cases where a local capability and 
solution exist. The solution may have been created by he DRI, with the support of 
the DoD’s technology funding. An example is the Armscor open tender for the Oryx 
                                                 
178 Denel CEO, Shaun Liebenberg has been prominent, since his appointment at Denel in 2005 through the aid of DPE to push the DoD 
and Armscor towards a local procurement focused approach 
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helicopter midlife upgrade (2004/5). The reality is that Denel is the design authority 
in SA, under license of Eurocopter. DRI players waste a lot of time, effort and money 
in such a process, as there is be little sense in appointing any other contractor than 
Denel. But one has to accept that Armscor has a sound understanding of costing, 
and calculating man-hour rates, and any concerns over exorbitant prices are totally 
unfounded as this tender has not been awarded yet. Production work that relates to 
some engine parts has been awarded to Denel in 2005, with phase 2 planned for 
award in 2008. 
 
Regarding the DERI concept179; although it was proposed and generally accepted in 
December 1999, not much has actually been implemented as yet. During late 2005, 
as a result of Denel’s proposed restructuring, this issue came up for consideration by 
the DoD, because the test facility at OTB, Bredasdorp, is part of Denel’s 
responsibility. As a strategic test facility, OTB should resort under those existing 
“strategic defence test and evaluation facilities of the DoD”, such as Alkantpan 
(artillery test) and Gerotek (high mobility endurance tests), for example. The DoD 
has subsequently requested the CSIR (Defencetek) to investigate the matter and 
make proposals to the DoD on how such a DERI should be structured and 
managed. Presently, all the test and evaluation facilities of the DoD are managed by 
Armscor, with some subsidies being paid by the DoD, reportedly complemented by 
Armscor through the selling of surplus defence stock. 
 
On the issue of ‘logistic support’ there is a growing concern among members of 
the local DRI that relates to the equipment bought under the Strategic Defence 
Package deal (SDP) seven years ago (Dec ’99). The equipment are now being 
commissioned into service, but there is no clear picture as to how Armscor the DoD 
and the respective users anticipate to maintain the equipment. Although all the 
foreign suppliers ‘committed’ to transfer technology to establish logistic support 
capabilities within the local DRI, there is not much evidence, if any, indicating that 
                                                 
179 Author’s note: It sounds like the DERI concept had been agreed on by the DoD and that it would be established under and at the 
CSIR with the DoD the custodian. This process is reportedly to be finalized by the 2007/8 financial year as presented by the CSIR  at the 
Dec ’07 AMD board meeting. 
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these commitments have been honoured. Due to the non-disclosure agreements 
between Armscor/DoD and foreign suppliers, it is almost impossible to get 
clarification on these matters. There is the prospect of the SANDF becoming totally 
dependent on the various foreign suppliers for logistic support, while they are 
located thousands of kilometers from where the actual support need will develop 
after the warranty period is over.  
 
4.2.5 Chapter 5 of the DRI WP addresses government’s role and ‘responsibilities’ in 
supporting the promotion of DRI defence exports. This argument is rooted on the 
premise that the declining local defence expenditure makes it crucial for the DRI to 
ensure exports to guarantee that defence companies maintain those strategically 
essential technologies and capabilities required by the SANDF. It is also a means of 
generating additional income that can complement local R&D spending. 
 
Pro-export arguments  defend this scenario by drawing on statements contained in 
the Defence White Paper, recognising the need for the DRI to have access to 
international markets “in order to facilitate cost-effective performance and reduce the 
unit cost of producing” items for the SANDF. Government will support the export 
initiatives of the DRI by permitting it to contract and honour obligations, which have 
been duly approved. 
 
The complexities and multi-dimensional nature of defence deals are explained, 
requiring the involvement of government and other stakeholder to support the 
marketing and sales efforts of the local DRI. 
 
The control process, procedures and proposed structures for marketing support and 
facilitation, as well as the anticipated roles of each party are described. The location 
and coordination of this proposed structure (referred to as the Marketing Support 
Board) is destined to form part of the DoD and needs to be coordinated by this 
department. 
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Comment - A general observation in respect of the contents of chapter 5 of the WP 
reveals that the general content and basic arguments contained therein, are based 
on assumptions that the SA government will take visible steps to support defence 
exports, ostensibly through a Marketing Support Board (MSB), that forms part of the 
DoD. 
 
Although the MSB did make an effort and recorded some achievements in promoting 
and facilitating DRI marketing initiatives in the initial stages of its existence, it is 
apparent that due to the different agendas of all the respective government 
representatives, it was never easy to reach any constructive consensus on anything 
related to defence exports. Towards 2002/3, and as a result of the ineffectiveness of 
the MSB, Armscor initiated the creation of the South African Export Service 
Organisation (SADESO), based on a similar model applied by the UK Ministry of 
Defence (MoD). The latter initiative however dismally failed to deliver any significant 
results, while some of the DRI role players regarded SADESO with suspicion due to 
concerns pertaining to ‘inside trading’. Armscor was made aware of DRI sales and 
could use such information to promote the use of surplus stock sales to compete 
with new products on offering from the DRI. 
 
From the DRI side, especially Denel complained about Armscor’s marketing role. 
Most DRI companies (with the exception of the smaller and micro enterprises) 
established dedicated marketing structures and advertising campaigns that at one 
stage serviced some 70 countries. Armscor was on many occasions blamed by the 
DRI for ‘interfering’ in ‘their’ markets, by using inside information obtained via its role 
in the MSB, and later in SADESO. 
 
Any worthwhile government support to a SOE, such as Denel, was described as “at 
best erratic, sporadic, unplanned, uncoordinated” and if and when some support did 
occur “actions were never followed through, resulting in a zero effect”. 
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However, as a result of the financial chaos in Denel by 2004/5, the SA government 
made specific announcements regarding the strategic importance of retaining Denel, 
with National Treasury allocating a substantial amount of money to recapitalise 
Denel. Government, especially through the Minister of Public Enterprises, in 
collaboration with the MoD, started making visible efforts to support Denel in its 
endeavours to secure additional contracts, both locally (e.g. the A400M, the new 
infantry fighting vehicle for the SA Army, the A-Dater air-to-air missile development) 
and abroad, with Denel’s bid in Turkey to sell the Rooivalk helicopter (2006)-  a deal 
Denel eventually lost to AgustaWestland of Italy. 
 
It is, however, anticipated that due to the internationalisation of the DRI, the need for 
direct government support (which did not exist in any event) will reduce, as market 
access will theoretically be driven by other market forces, and governed and directed 
by the efforts of foreign equity partners in the DRI. 
 
This approach is very much in line with that of the UK government, through the 
Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO), aiming to secure the support of the 
UK defence industry.180 
 
4.2.6 Chapter 6 of the DRI WP addresses the issues of “regulation of armaments 
production and transfer”. A detailed description is given of each of the international 
control regimes to which South Africa was a signatory/subscriber/participant, 
followed by an equally detailed overview of all the control processes in place in 
South Africa, covering all aspects of armament, arms/guns, ammunition, explosives, 
missiles related technology, dual-use and nuclear-related matters. 
 
Reference is made to the various overlapping legislation, control measures, process 
governing the various aspects of legislation, and a host of not-so-apparent 
interactive roles of all agencies involved. 
                                                 
180 DESO Policy – see  www.deso.mod.uk/policy. Author’s note: During an interview with the Executive Director of AMD in May 2007 
he confirmed that AMD is intended on improving its representative position of the DRI and would play a more active role in future. 
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Measures used to govern conventional arms control are portrayed to be in line with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter and International Law, recognising the 
obligation of countries in respect of effecting responsible arms trade. 
 
The whole process and practice governing the conventional arms control process in 
South Africa, under the auspices of the National Conventional Arms Control 
Committee (est. 1994/95) are explained, while the legal basis of such control 
measures is done in terms of Act 57 of 1968 (Section 4C, with the responsible line 
Minister being the Minister of Defence). 
 
In respect of the conventional arms control process, mention is made of the 
establishment of an independent oversight entity, referred to as the “Inspectorate for 
the DRI”, reporting its findings on a regular basis to the NCACC. 
 
An explanation is provided for the control measures governing weapons of mass 
destruction and non-proliferation. This control process is managed by separate sets 
of legislation and the control is vested in a Non-Proliferation Council (NPC) that 
operates independently of the NCACC, with a reporting line directly to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry. 
 
The interactive roles of the various controlling bodies, under all the various sets of 
legislation are discussed. As a result of having identified the fragmentation and 
duplication of legislation and the diverse range of control processes in South Africa, 
government was requested to streamline the process. Proposals were subsequently 
made on how government could address, approach and implement an integrated 
arms control structure. 
  
Comment - The content and basic arguments contained in chapter 6 of the DRI WP, 
are based on practical experience gained as a result of the Cameron Commission of 
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enquiry in 1994/5 and the latter’s recommendations on arms control, as well as the 
fact that by 1999, the NCACC was a well-established functional organ of state.181  
 
Since the approval of the WP on the DRI, the new Armscor Act (Act 51 of 2003), 
repealed Act 57 of 1968, as amended in 1980, which for almost 25 years formed the 
only legal basis for effecting control over the armaments industry, and all commercial 
transactions involving armaments. 
 
The NCACC passed legislation specifically related to the control over conventional 
arms (Act 41 of 2002), as well as the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 
(Act 15 of 1998). The legislation proposed for the implementation of an Arms Control 
Inspectorate, which is reportedly in process. 
 
As a point of criticism, the SA government did not succeed, as yet, in removing and 
consolidating any of the fragmented legislation and control structures and 
processes. This may be because of the protectionist power-base interests of the 
respective controlling entities. The existing arms control process in South Africa is 
perceived to constitute over-regulation and “hyper-bureaucratic rule”, which fails to 
comprehend the commercial, financial and legal effect of such a process on the 
business of the DRI. The DRI has on numerous occasions publicly stated that it did 
not have a problem with control per se, but required a process that actually 
understands the competitive nature of defence business and the importance of a 
credible supplier reputation. 
 
Although the WP on the DRI contains a statement declaring that “Government will 
support the export initiatives of the DRI by permitting it to contract and honour 
obligations, which have been duly approved182”, there are many examples where 
this was NOT the case! No industry can operate in such an uncertain environment. 
However, having said this, statistics of defence exports have been “growing steadily 
                                                 
181 The Author of this Paper, JJ van Dyk spend from 1991 up till 1996, with managing and implementing changes in the arms control 
process, whilst with Armscor, then seconded to the DoD (1994-96)  and was actively involved with the NCACC, up until May ’96. 
182 Defence White Paper – Chapter 8 par 11. 
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since 1994”. According to statistics from the Directorate of Conventional Arms 
Control, export approvals valued at ZAR1.74-billion183 were granted in 2001, against 
a figure of R854-million (nominal Rands) in 1996. However, this apparent increase 
has to be calculated in US Dollar nominal terms, which then does not reflect the 
same picture at all.) 
 
4.2.7 Chapter 7 of the DRI WP provides a synopsis of the restructuring and the 
transformation of the DRI, against the backdrop of government’s views (in 1995) on 
the restructuring of state assets, and in line with the parallel development of sectoral 
policies. 
 
Mention was already made of the prospects of restructuring, including the 
privatisation of Denel, specific Armscor subsidiaries or other facilities of the DoD, the 
SANDF’s own industrial facilities (e.g. Simons Town Dockyard, managed by 
Armscor; but with the incorporation of Armscor into the DoD, it is not clear how this 
facility will be managed in the future, as well as other government research facilities, 
such as the CSIR, which has since 2005 also undergone several restructuring 
changes. 
 
The goals for the restructuring of the proposed entities are arguably based on 
assumptions related to benefits associated with the:  
- maximisation of revenue and economic benefits for the state; 
- improvement of efficiencies and economy in business processes; 
- exploitation of industrial strengths and the enhancement of competitiveness; 
- redistribution of wealth and support of BEE strategies; and 
- ensuring retention of strategically essential capabilities and technologies. 
 
The prospects of increasing international joint ventures, as well as levels of 
government-to-government agreements, are similarly anticipated. 
 
                                                 
183 Institute for Strategic Studies, RSA. Occasional Paper no 78. Sep 2003. 
 131 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
Concerns are, however, expressed over the safeguarding of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) of the DoD. As the DoD has for many years been funding research and 
technology development in the DRI, such technologies, over time, became the 
sound building blocks of most of the DRI’s business activities. A position was 
adopted by stating that IPR should stay vested in the DoD and that any subsequent 
sales would require the written approval of the MoD, in cases where such sales 
would result in the transfer of technology. It is also stated that the state may, in 
certain cases, invoke royalties on exports where technologies belonging to the DoD 
are used. 
 
On the issue of ‘conversion and diversification’, these requirements are viewed in 
line with the global declining defence market. Conversion is seen as a defence 
company stopping defence production altogether, and focusing on civilian products 
only; but still using the infrastructure brought about by its previous engagement in 
defence business. Diversification on the other hand, is seen as an ‘adjustment’ 
strategy, where a company will keep on pursuing defence business, but in parallel 
will also be involved with non-defence-related manufacturing, arguably to maintain 
levels of sustainability and capability by cross-subsidising its defence business 
during lean times. 
 
It was, however, stated that government would not interfere or intervene in any 
individual defence firm’s conversion and/or diversification efforts, although it is 
anticipated that government may provide ‘measure’ (not defined) to support such 
initiatives. 
 
Comment -The content and basic arguments contained in chapter 7 of the DRI WP, 
are ‘predictions’ made, based on internationally trends, as well as happenings on the 
local front, especially since the mid ’90s. In putting this in context, one has to take 
cognisance of what happened in the DRI since the late ’80s: 
o Denel:  from the date of its inception (April 1992), the company operated 
independently and during the first six to eight years of its existence, Denel 
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survived quite well. The demise started as a combined result of the major 
reduction in local defence spend, international competition, not being able to 
timely exit non-core non-profitable businesses (blocked by Labour Unions 
because Denel as an SOE was supposed to retain jobs at all cost), as well as 
poor senior management interventions in traditional business practices. Denel’s 
responsible government department; Public Enterprises, was, however, forced to 
intervene after Denel’s reported a record loss in the 2004/5 financial year. The 
loss amounted to ZAR1.6-billion, while the 2005/6 loss was reduced to ZAR1.3-
billion, with an actual loss of ZAR549-million for 2006/7. The company’s liquidity 
base remains sound. Denel was subsequently (during 2005) instructed and 
mandated to exit all non-core business and to unbundle its business operations 
into various smaller, independent companies, preferably with foreign equity 
partners. This process was initiated in late 2005, and will be completed by 
2009/10. The entities that will not be able to establish a sustainable business by 
2009, may be considered for closing down, unless the DoD provides for a 
sustainable order flow. 
o Specific Armscor entities (such as the DERI), are the subject of an ongoing 
debate relating to the establishment of an independent evaluation and test 
institute, under which all the existing DoD test and evaluation facilities (as 
managed by Armscor), as well as OTB under Denel, and Defencetek184 under 
the CSIR, can be amalgamated under one single entity. The initial question, as to 
who would be in charge of this new facility, seems to have been resolved.  
o Regarding Simons Town Dockyard, the DoD, in 2001/2, basically ’offered’ the 
facility to Armscor to assess economically viable “privatisation and optimisation” 
options, and a type of Public Private Partnership (PPP) model was envisaged. 
o At the CSIR there were a number of consolidation actions and, all the defence-
related business units (e.g. Aerotek, Aeroflo and Defencetek) merged into one 
unit, called Defencetek (recently again renamed and now known as the Centre 
for Defence, Peace, Safety and Security), with further restructuring anticipated, 
especially in the light of the new DERI concept mentioned earlier. 
                                                 
184 Author’s note: The CSIR has renamed Defencetek during 2007 to “Peace, Safety and Security” 
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o When considering the conversion the DRI, Altech poses an example of a 
traditional defence-related company converting into a civilian business. The 
Altech Group was one of the ‘Big Five’ in the defence industry arena in South 
Africa. The company transformed into a civilian, electronics business. 
o On the topic of diversification, there are more examples, especially within 
Denel, with its factories, until fairly recently (2004/06), producing plastic, 
injection-mould products, drill bits for the mining industry, commercial 
ammunition and hunting rifles, as well as soy bean protein extraction, and 
anodes for the aluminum smelters. The Grintek Group, on the other hand, 
excelled in its business in the field of commercial telecommunications. However, 
not all diversification activities are necessarily success stories and Denel has, 
over time, recorded major losses in most of these areas, mainly due to the fact 
that these businesses were inadequately funded and could as a result not attract 
a sustainable market share. Instead, the businesses started draining Denel’s 
reserves.  
o On the topic of joint ventures and partnerships, the predictions and anticipations 
of the White Paper on the DRI in 1999, are coming true, and there are indications 
that the ‘traditional DRI’, as it was known by the mid ‘90s, will in the not too 
distant future, be absorbed by the global defence industrial base, ostensibly and 
primarily from Europe, as discussed in the following section. 
 
 
5.   Defence-related industry players as in 2006/7185 
 
Engineering News in 2006 published a comprehensive report on the local DRI, 
reporting the state of affairs during the past couple of years. The report draws 
information from a variety of sources, such as academic papers, media reports, 
official government statements and government departmental reports from the 
DPE, DoD, DTI, Denel, AMD and Armscor. The following is an excerpt from the 
report as it relates to this chapter, as adapted and expanded on by the author. 
                                                 
185 Engineering News special Report: “Defence November 2006”. Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd Research Unit. Available at: 
www.researchchannel.co.za 
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In 1994, South Africa’s defence-related industries were dominated by Denel and 
three private-sector companies – Grintek, Altech and Reunert. In 2005, Saab 
raised its interest in Grintek and became the majority owner the company. The 
company is now called Saab Grintek. Altech has, however, left the defence market, 
and Reunert’s involvement in the sector has lessened. In 2006, Reunert 
announced that it was considering the disposal of most, if not all, of its defence 
businesses. The majority of private-sector turnover in the defence market is spread 
over several companies – Grintek, Reutech (the defence arm of Reunert), 
Advanced Technologies & Engineering (ATE, partly owned by BAE Systems), 
African Defence Systems (ADS, partly owned by Thales of France), OMC (formerly 
known as Alvis-OMC, now partly owned by BAE Land Systems) and Tellumat - it is 
anticipated that further consolidations will be seen in the next two-three years, 
especially in the light of Denel’s unbundling strategy. 
 
The South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association 
(AMD), has 43 members and claims to represent, from a total turn-over point of 
view, over 90% of all defence-related business in South Africa, and over 97% of 
defence-related exports. 
 
State-owned Denel has been included in the restructuring plans of the DPE. In 
2002, the British firm, BAE Systems, announced that it wanted to acquire a 30% 
stake in the Denel group, but this never came to pass. Turbomeca, forming part of 
the French group Snecma, has acquired a majority shareholding (i.e. 51%) in 
Denel’s Airmotive division, which has been renamed Turbomeca Africa (TMA). 
Despite these restructuring efforts, the South African government has indicated 
that it intended to retain control of Denel, as it regarded the company as a strategic 
asset. 
 
Denel is by far the most significant contributor to South Africa’s defence-related 
sector, both in terms of the value of its defence sales, and its dependence on these 
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sales – averaging 48% of the local defence-related market, with the private 
sector’s share averaging 52%. Although this is less than the almost 70% held by 
Armscor subsidiaries during the ‘80s and prior to the formation of Denel, the 
company continues to dominate most of the seven main sectors of the market, 
particularly aerospace, ammunition (small, medium and large caliber), weapons 
systems (including infantry artillery and turret systems and missiles), as well as 
electro-optical sub-systems. 
 
The three main sectors of the market not controlled by Denel – electronics, 
maritime and support equipment – are dominated by Saab Grintek, Reutech, ATE, 
ADS/Thales and now BAE Land Systems OMC, together with a large number of 
small and medium sized companies, none of which focuses exclusively on defence 
work. The defence-related industries contain a number of small skills-based 
entrepreneurial companies that subcontract to the larger companies, and tend to 
also find other work, both locally and abroad, migrating defence industry skills to 
other industry sectors.  
 
Denel’s financial performance has been volatile since its establishment in 1992. 
Between 1992 and 1996, its turnover dropped by nearly six percent a year in real 
terms, while the three largest private sector companies – Reutech, Altech and 
Grintek – recorded increases in their turnover during the same period. 
 
Mainly as a result of the financial predicament of Denel, the DPE, with the backing 
of the DoD, the DTI and AMD took the initiative in 2006/7 to initiate an independent 
audit of the status of the DRI. The local based research agency, McKinseys, was 
contracted by DPE186 during late 2006 to do an analysis and to prepare a report on 
the DRI187, which was to form the basis of the DRI Sector strategy for the DTI to 
implement in collaboration with the DoD. 
 
 
                                                 
186 Interview with Mr Arthur Oates of Denel at the time at the Strategy Implementation section - Corporate. 
187 The research report done by VuXaka for AMD in 2005 were reportedly seen as being to bias and not objective enough 
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6.  In conclusion 
 
As a general observation, it can be safely stated that the WP on the DRI is the 
result of a well-defined, researched framework that eventually reflected on a 
number of position papers and research reports generated by experts, 
stakeholders and interest groups. The process took from August 1996 to 
December 1999 to complete. 
 
An implementation strategy for an aerospace industry support initiative (AISI) was 
completed at the end of 2005 by the DTI - implementation was announced late 
2007. The strategy recognises that the ability of the South African industry in the 
defence arena should be used as a platform, ensuring that technologies, skills and 
internationally-recognised products are retained and ultimately accept civilian 
aerospace manufacturing opportunities. Asia’s objectives are to enhance the 
global competitiveness of the South African aerospace industry, to provide an 
institutional platform to facilitate partnerships, to identify and develop South Africa’s 
aerospace industry, and to accelerate the achievement of government strategic 
growth and equity. 
 
The National Aerospace Centre of Excellence (NACoE)188 is seen as the 
government’s first steps to advance a growth path and further develop the 
aerospace industry in South Africa. The NACoE was registered in the first quarter 
of 2007 and that it hopes to attract membership from various local and major 
foreign aerospace companies. The center’s vision is that by 2010, it should be 
recognised and supported as a valuable and integral part of the SA aerospace 
industry. It intends to act as a facilitator to effect meaningful partnerships between 
industry and universities and to also contribute to the government’s goals of 
establishing a competitive industrial base and realise the long-term growth 
objectives for the aerospace industry. Local aerospace companies, such as Denel 
Saab Aerostructures and Aerosud are seen as first tier suppliers to international 
                                                 
188 As reported by Francois Denner of the NACoE, who was, whilst at the DTI responsible for the establishment of the DTI’s aerospace 
cluster strategy. Engineering News. Feb 9-15,2007. (The Author also participated in the initial start-up process, from Denel’s side.) 
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aerospace companies, such as Airbus and Boeing. Partnerships with Brazil’s 
Embraer and Canadian Bombardier are also envisaged. 
 
Concerns are raised by the defence industry over the DTI’s industrial development 
plan for the aerospace sector, and more specifically the new generation military 
transport aircraft, commonly referred to as the A400M. The latter programme is a 
DTI-initiative and some argue that the funds for the programme should come from 
the DTI, instead of from the defence budget. The A400M programme is posing a 
financial threat to other local defence programmes as it has weakened the cash 
flow of the DoD budget. The DTI maintains that the programme was a strategic 
and essential investment and that South Africa’s Air Force will reap the benefits in 
the long run. Many jobs are supposed to be created and South Africa’s 
involvement will ensure that skills acquired while working on the A400M, would be 
retained in the country. There is still, however, an ongoing argument over the 
short-term benefits of the A400M for the SANDF. What is also not clear, are the 
stringent commercial contractual conditions that Airbus included in the contract, 
with Denel (SA government) facing a substantial penalty if the parts of the aircraft 
are not delivered on time and within specifications, especially some stringent 
weight limitations189. 
 
There is a feeling among certain DRI players that work on the DIP projects may 
have obstructed other potential aircraft and other projects, owing to the fact that 
many small parallel activities resulted in an overloading of the production facility 
and that DIP activities called for multi-tasking, making the logistic management of 
labour problematic. 
 
Another suggestion is made, stating that government has decided to preserve190 
the DRI as an extension of European companies, as the bigger picture of the arms 
                                                 
189 Author’s note: The A400M was not a scheduled DoD acquisition programme till 2012. The work that Airbus is putting in South Africa 
has advanced industrial participation prospects for local companies, such as Denel. Aircraft weight is a critical requirement and Airbus is 
slapping heavy penalties on companies not achieving the maximum required weight specifications. 
190 The DPE, in agreement with the DTI, the DoD and AMD had tasked the research company  McKinseys in late 2006 do prepare an 
extensive report on the DRI in order to inform a decision on how best to draft a DRI Cluster Strategy for DTI to implement. It is anticipated 
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deal could also be interpreted as South Africa buying an admission to a corner of 
the Western-dominated international arms industry. South Africa is in need of a 
defence industrial strategy that favours the local defence industry, ensuring that 
the industry is sustainable, according to AMD executive director, Simphiwe 
Hamilton. (In 2006, the DoD191 confirmed the strategy followed in the footsteps of 
countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom.) 
 
In a recent presentation192 made to the local defence-related industry, UK-based 
Ernest and Young, elaborates on the UK’s defence industry strategy stating that 
the defence industry needs insight into defence spending, that there must be an 
industrial support strategy in place and that it is government’s responsibility to keep 
such an industry alive. The industry, on the other hand, must get their act together 
and become efficient, more streamlined and optimise collaboration by working 
together to ensure successful deals that will strengthen the industry to become 
financially strong. Hamilton comments that without such a strategy, “South Africa 
will, at best, be left with a fragmented and unsustainable defence industry”. At 
worst, however, he says “the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may 
find it increasingly difficult to maintain, modify and upgrade externally sourced 
equipment, while also becoming dependent on foreign suppliers”. 
 
A strategic defence industrial strategy that identifies the country’s strategic 
capabilities, long-term acquisition plans and creates a home market of preferred 
suppliers would prevent what Hamilton calls ‘open competition’, which can lead to 
the further fragmentation of the industry and will result in too many small 
competitors in a small market. It will also prevent the negative impact on the 
country’s balance of payment, owing to expensive maintenance and support 
options associated with foreign equipment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
that this DRI Cluster Strategy will be aimed at proposing certain incentives for DRI participation. Since 1980 the DRI had been removed 
from the DTI cluster support initiatives, as a result of Armscor having been mandated to create and expand a local DRI capability. 
191 Engineering News. November 3-9,2006 
192 Presentation on 5 Feb ’07 at the CSIR by Amin Mawji, a partner and expert in Aerospace & Defence industry from the Ernest & Young 
London office.(Manje.Padi@za.ey.com) 
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A further issue is the higher maintenance costs of the new equipment. For 
example, it is argued that the highly sophisticated nature of the German vessels 
will entail higher operating costs and an increased reliance on maintenance 
arrangements with overseas contractors. Generally, concerns were raised about 
the use of offset (DIP and NIP) deals as a means to justify the acquisition of 
weapon systems by economic rather than systematic benefits, as the true price of 
the weapon systems may be disguised through offset agreements. It is being 
alleged by certain entities and individuals, that offset provide a platform for 
corruption and policy confusion, and compromise debates concerning alternative 
paths of security and development. 
 
During and post the SDP contracting process, various allegations surfaced, hinting 
that the South African procurement process was flawed, and that bribes, 
influencing the awarding of contracts were accepted by government officials. Such 
allegations prompted a joint investigation by the Auditor-General, the Public 
Protector and the National Director of Public Prosecutions.193 
 
Government welcomed this investigation’s results, which concluded that “No 
evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the government. The 
irregularities and improprieties point to the conduct of certain officials of the 
government departments involved and cannot be ascribed to the President or the 
Ministers involved in their capacity as members of the Ministers’ Committee or 
Cabinet. There are therefore no grounds to suggest that the government’s 
contracting position is flawed”. The report states that the procedures in the 
acquisition process are in line with international best practice. (At the start of 2008, 
there was an announcement by the ANC that they will re-open the SDP 
investigations.) 
 
This joint investigation is controversial as it displaced a process that included 
parliamentary oversight in the form of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
                                                 
193  Auditor General’s Office of South Africa. Joint Report on the Defence Package Deal. 14 November 2001. 
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(SCOPA). The now-dismantled investigating unit headed by Judge Heath, may 
have lifted uncertainty regarding the deal as a whole, but left a question mark 
regarding the conduct of certain government officials and arms contractors. Since 
then, there have been a few ‘high-profile’ arrests and prosecutions, and 
investigations continue. 
 
A local aggrieved businessman, Mr Richard Young, of the company CCII, claimed 
that the DoD did not honour promises relating to his company’s participation in the 
Corvette programme, but instead allowed ADS/Thales (supplier of the combat 
suite), to award the sub-contract (allegedly intended for CCII) to another French 
foreign supplier to provide certain parts of the command and control system. After 
a legal battle of almost seven years, Mr Young eventually “made peace” with the 
DoD in return for a ZAR15-million settlement payment.194 
 
Government emphasises that countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland all require 
offsets when they procure defence equipment from abroad. The joint task team 
that investigated the strategic defence package on behalf of the Standing 
committee on public accounts (SCOPA) surveyed countertrade practices in a 
number of countries and found that South Africa’s policy compares favorably with 
international practice, although in most countries the threshold for requiring 
industrial participation is lower – in some cases as low as USD1-million. 
 
Beyond the criticisms and defence of the decision to include offset arrangements in 
the procurement of defence equipment, lies a larger complaint against the decision 
to procure defence equipment as a rule. At the center of these arguments lies the 
opportunity cost of spending more than R30-billion on defence capacities, when 
social services continue to be under-funded, and poverty alleviation and 
development issues continue be neglected or ignored. It is anticipated that, despite 
the fact that payment for the procurement package was spread over a number of 
                                                 
194 As reported in the local newspaper BEELD of 28 May 2007 
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years, it will increase the share of the budget allocated to defence, and reduce the 
percentage allocated to infrastructure and public works programmes. This, in turn, 
will undercut the provision of more funds for poverty relief and will affect the more 
peripheral provinces, such as the Eastern Cape. In terms of regional development, 
there are promises of important contributions, but they are not categorised into a 
clear policy framework. 
 
Despite the initiative being project-driven, there is not much being done to provide 
public awareness of the investment possibilities on offer. To some extent, it 
appears as if government attempts to create the impression that, because of the 
offset deals, South Africa actually will not pay for the weapons. This is not the 
case, and for every decrease in the value of the South African Rand, the cost of 
the package increases. Of course, for every such increase in the cost of the 
contract, the converse effect of the valuation of the industrial participation 
packages should be taken into account. While this sounds positive, it is dependent 
on whether the primary contractors deliver on their industrial participation 
commitments. 
 
In defending its decision to procure defence equipment, however, government 
emphasises the need for South Africa to be able to defend itself against threats to 
national security. Such threats include regional instability, cross-border banditry 
and coastal piracy, and affect the country’s ability to develop its economy and 
attract investment. 
 
The Minister of Public Enterprises also defends the arms deal and stating that it 
will be vindicated. “We would not be able to dictate the political development of 
Africa, and you will not be able to prevent small military powers from accumulating 
weaponry, therefore to protect your own democracy… we have to be at the leading 
edge of military technology. That is why we went for the fourth generation fighters, 
submarines, Hawks, etc.” 
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But, regardless of whether the contractors deliver on the industrial participation 
obligations, and regardless of whether the promised benefits to the country and the 
defence industry result, a number of significant indirect benefits to the defence 
industry can already be seen. For example, in the process of procuring the 
equipment for the strategic defence packages, the local defence industry is 
showcased to a large numbers of senior representatives from the European 
defence sector that would otherwise not have been aware of South Africa’s 
defence capabilities. Also, during the selection and bidding process, gaps in local 
capabilities are identified and tackled. As a direct result of this, several South 
African companies increased their exports, much of them are not involved in DIP 
efforts. 
 
There is also a growing need for additional purchases for the Army, demanding 
large quantities of armoured vehicles. It is expected that these needs will be met in 
the next decade or so through a mix of imports and South African manufactured 
goods. The debate on the SDP and its resultant offset package caused much 
controversy, but offered some valuable lessons for South Africa to learn. As the 
debate continues, it has yet to be seen whether the cost of the programme had a 
positive or negative effect on the economy as a whole. This approach is already 
visible, mainly as a result of pressures from Denel, collaborating with the DPE, to 
secure privilege access for Denel and the rest of the DRI in local defence 
contracts. Lately, Denel received two major development contracts: A-Dater, a 5th 
generation air-to-air missile195 and a new generation infantry combat vehicle196. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 Author’s note: The A-Darter will be a main weapon system on the Gripen aircraft of the SA Air Force. 
196 Author’s note: The DoD’s project is named Hoefyster and is meant to replace the aging fleet of Ratel Infantry Fighting vehicles that 
dates from the mid 70’s. 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE’S DIP POLICY  
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reflects on the DoD’s policy that was approved in May 1997, for the 
implementation of a defence industrial participation (DIP) process governing all 
defence procurements with an imported content of USD2-million and more. This 
policy is an independent policy from that of the DTI’s formal policy on National 
Industrial Participation (NIP), approved by Cabinet in the same year. NIP is relevant 
to those government contracts with an imported content of more than USD10-million. 
Comment is thus made in the context of the present relevancies and possible 
improvements of this policy document, ONLY in respect of the DIP element. 
 
The aim is to provide an analytical review of the DoD’s DIP policy, which is a ‘sub-
set policy to the Department of Trade and Industry’s National Industrial Participation 
(NIP) policy of 1997. 
 
The DoD’s policy document is therefore assessed, analysed and subsequently 
discussed and commented on, against the background that led to its inception, in 
May 1997, with some reflection on the rationale that governed the thought process 
that actually guided the drafting of the DIP policy, as well as how the latter compares 
against international benchmarks197 citing those international practices as mentioned 
in chapter 2. 
 
Almost ten years have passed since the writing of the DoD’s DIP policy. Therefore 
some attention is given to the prevailing applicability of this policy, especially against 
                                                 
197 The Author of this had been employed in the defence-related fraternity since 1 September 1980 (Armscor) and was actively involved 
in the countertrade process since May 1996 (till date).  Mr van Dyk was the “drafter” of the DIP policy as approved by the Secretary for 
Defence (P.D. Steyn) in May 1997.  The DoD DIP policy formed the basis for the subsequent Armscor DIP process.  (He was also 
involved with the early stages of the DTI NIP policy and provided various inputs (1996) as well as being actively involved with 
implementation of the NIP process during the strategic defence package deal (SDP) between 1997 to 2000) and with subsequent 
monitoring from within Denel since 2001. 
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the events associated with the huge defence package deal concluded in December 
1999. 
 
2. An introduction to the history of countertrade in South Africa 
 
This chapter on the South African DIP Programme aims to explain how South Africa 
intends to use the principles of government procurement to leverage countertrade 
(industrial participation) in a very structured manner, with a view of securing 
industrial and economic benefits for the industry, which ultimately create jobs and 
contribute to social upliftment. The author, however, wishes to state upfront, that the 
SA DIP regime is not flawless, nor are any of the role players – whether it is 
Armscor, the DoD, the DTI, the obligors, or industry participants, innocent when it 
comes to procedural inadequacies and subsequent performance and execution of 
the DIP requirements. On the other hand, it must be stated that South Africa’s 
programme is not the exception at all! 
 
3. The origin of DIP– Defence Industrial Participation 
 
DIP, as it is commonly referred to today, was initiated in 1988. Between 1988 and 
1996, Armscor’s countertrade programme included direct offsets, indirect offsets and 
countertrade. The latter mainly in the form of counter-purchased goods for export, 
excluding all raw materials, precious and semi-precious metals, gems and related 
stones and diamonds, but including the export of tyres and wine. 
 
Until 1996, Armscor was the only organisation in South Africa requiring countertrade 
for foreign procurements. The initial percentages were low and based on a best 
effort. The scenario later changed to a performance-based penalty, mainly because 
Armscor realised that best effort undertakings have (and still do have) the potential 
of becoming a ‘never-never’ process. As the percentage of countertrade was 
gradually increased by Armscor (in 1996 it was intended to be 80%) the percentage 
penalty also increased. By late 1996 Armscor required a 30% penalty, resulting in –
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major international rebuke. The penalty now sits at between five percent and 15% 
and is applied on a sliding scale. 
 
4. The National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) 
 
It was not until 1996, that the DTI started considering the reciprocal benefits offered 
by government purchases abroad, as a means to secure business through 
investments and exports for the country. 
 
Towards the end of 1996, the DTI made a submission to Parliament and requested 
approval to implement countertrade – referred to as industrial participation (IP) 
applicable to all SA government and parastatal organisations. Whenever purchases 
are made, and the imported content value equals or exceeds USD10-million, either 
in one contract or a number of contracts to the same supplier over a two-year period, 
there is a 30% mandatory requirement for NIP. 
 
During the first half of 1997, Cabinet ratified Parliament’s late 1996 decision to allow 
the DTI to impose the National Industrial Participation process – referred to as the 
NIP guidelines, as a mandatory government procurement requirement. The policy 
made provision for other government departments (and parastatals, including SOEs) 
to impose their own industrial participation or local content requirements – such as 
the case for defence procurements – as Armscor already had a process and an 
established track record in place. This is why there is currently a parallel process in 
place, for defence contracts, requiring DIP (managed by Armscor on behalf of the 
DoD), as well as NIP (managed by the DTI)198.  
 
 
                                                 
198 Author’s note: It is interesting to observe that no other Government Department nor SOE had been practicing any similar approach to 
that of Armscor’s DIP programme, although they do resort to specified minimum levels of local content in their tenders which does not 
qualify for DTI NIP credits. One can basically assume that “local content” in such instances, is the equivalent of “DIP”. This position may 
now drastically change because of the newly imposed policy on the Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) of the 
Department of Public Enterprises as described above or even a possible replacement by another mechanism is possible. 
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5. DIP policy - key players 
? The DoD: The Secretary for Defence is the accountable officer for defence. The 
DoD is inter alia the civilian oversight, policy, planning and budgeting authority for 
all defence matters, the procurement and acquisition approval authority, as well as 
the custodian of the DIP policy. In terms of the latter policy, the DoD has a 
monitoring role, through the office of the Chief of Acquisition, having appointed 
Armscor to manage the process through a dedicated DIP Division for, and on 
behalf of the DoD. This process is now a legal requirement. 
 
Once the Arms of Service (AoS) of the SANDF has submitted its user staff 
requirement (USR), the DoD processes the requirement in a very structured 
manner. Once the DoD has secured approval for a project, the Chief of Acquisition 
issues an instruction to Armscor for the issuance of a tender (whether RFI or RFP, 
or other).  
 
? Armscor, as the formally appointed acquisition agency of the DoD, has a 
dedicated DIP Division responsible to effectively implementation and manage the 
DIP process, ensuring that tenders invited contain the necessary stipulations 
regarding both DIP and NIP, whenever applicable. 
 
? A formally constituted DIP Committee, co-chaired by the DIP Division’s head and 
the Chief of Acquisition (or their nominated proxies), is still responsible for 
approving all DIP requirements for tenders, as well as subsequent proposals, 
agreements, amendments, substitutions, credit claims and reduction of 
guarantees. The DIP Committee ultimately makes recommendations on penalties 
to the Armscor Board, especially on sizable contracts and/or contentious issues, 
i.e. issues not in line with existing policy. 
 
? The DTI operates independently and whenever there is a requirement for NIP, 
prospective bidders are required to liase directly with the DTI’s Industrial 
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Participation Secretariat, to discuss NIP concepts and requirements for 
compliance. The NIP input to the tender response must be forwarded to Armscor 
as part of the total tender response, which has to be presented with a technical 
and commercial proposal, as a separate DIP proposal (and a NIP proposal). 
 
6.  Confusions regarding countertrade terminology 
 
Quoting Coetzer199, he expresses the opinion that despite the growing presence of 
countertrade in international trade transactions, there is a lack of standardisation of 
countertrade terms (see in this respect the author’s depiction in Figure 6) and that 
“…a number of different expressions are often used to mean the same thing and 
sometimes the same expression is used with several different meanings…” In this 
context there is still  confusion today as to what exactly constitutes imported, foreign 
content and foreign contract values. This is especially true for those contracts placed 
with local companies, acting as prime contractor. The latter has to import parts, 
components, sub-assemblies or services from overseas suppliers. Aggravating this 
problem is importing products on a ‘commercial-off-the-shelf’ basis. A number of 
relatively small contracts collectively accumulate, which causes the DIP (or NIP) 
thresholds to be reached. 
 
Coetzer continues by stating that the matter becomes even more perplexed as 
countertrade transactions can actually assume infinite forms, varying from country to 
country, aggravated by a lack of conforming definitions and the application of a 
diverse set of terms to such transactions. 
 
7. Countertrade and defence procurement – an international perspective 
 
Defence equipment represents very expensive commodities and defence budgets, 
especially in the light of constant calls to rather spend money on social and socio-
economic programmes rather than on defence, often do not have adequate funding 
                                                 
199 Coetzer, J.H. 1995.  International Countertrade Contracts:  Principles and Practice.  Info Africa Nova CC. 
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to satisfy operational demands.  Such constraints cause difficult decisions, and off-
the-shelf procurement has to be compared with the cost of indigenous development 
programmes. 
 
Due to cost considerations, linked to the capacity and capability of local industry, as 
well as to the time it takes to develop a specific piece of defence equipment, 
decisions ultimately result in a choice to buy off-the-shelf solutions. The mechanism 
used to involve local industry, is industrial participation programmes (or commonly 
referred to as ‘offset’).  Martin for example thus observes200 “…governments have 
followed procurement forms, which yielded benefits for the domestic economy, as 
well as being less costly than an indigenous program”.  Governments otherwise 
choose to create collaborative co-operation models, especially in aerospace.201  
 
The exact number on countries applying the concept of countertrade procurements 
(whether defence only, or also civil or public programmes) varies from source to 
source and seems to range between 75 to 100.  The Quarterly Bulletin of CTO Data 
Services UK, contains a write-up on each country applying some form of 
countertrade. This list presently (April 2007) contains records of 77 countries with 
active countertrade policies, especially for defence programmes. 
 
“Although commonplace, offset202 requirements vary considerably from one country 
to the other… and policy differences will reflect different experiences… and 
objectives”. Martin 203 actually observes that this international diversity makes for an 
interesting comparative study, but at the same time he alleges that “economists 
have long neglected defence matters although the level of resources devoted to 
defence spending, as well as the offset element attached to it, warrant substantially 
increased research effort”. He also remarks that due to the relatively unavailability of 
reliable data on offsets, researchers have to rely on the goodwill of those in the 
                                                 
200 Martin, S.  1996. The Economics of Offsets.  Defence Procurement and Countertrade.  Harwood. 
201 An example of this is the Airbus A400M aircraft which is being developed and built on such a model. Airbus signed a deal with the 
DoD in 2004, whilst  South African and Brazil are also looking at such a joint development program on an air-to-air missile(2006). 
202 Author’s Note: Academic literature and research studies constantly use the term “offsets” which is normally associated with defence 
procurements.  “Offsets” as such is however a sub-set of Countertrade, which is used as the collective term.  
203 Rowe, M. 1997. Countertrade. 3rd edition. Euromoney Publ 
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defence industry and the controlling authorities. M. Rowe204 for example remarks, 
“… many companies hide their countertrade commitments as they would 
secret vices”. (This appears to be true for government’s as well.) 
 
Martin (see also Chapter 2) reflects on the various arguments used for having or 
using countertrade, these include aspects/arguments such as: 
- offsets are used as a tool by various governments to transfer new technologies 
into the domestic economy, which ultimately diffuses throughout the economy; 
- to ensure savings on foreign exchange (analysts such as Mirus and Yeung 
(1986)205 are not convinced of this); 
- offsets enhance the local defence industrial base and improve on capabilities, 
mainly through work-share agreements; 
- offsets are used as a tool to force market entry and improve on labour conditions; 
- offsets can overcome protectionist sentiments by overseas exporters; and 
- offsets reduce the adverse impact on the balance of payment. 
 
8. Analytical review of the DoD’s DIP policy 
 
The formation of the (new) DoD with an accountable officer in the person of the 
Secretary for Defence (appointed in 1994 by the President), resulted in Armscor 
(and the SA National Defence Force) losing their autonomous functioning on all 
matters pertaining to defence-related policy, acquisition and procurement matters. 
 
As defence industrial participation is regarded as a sub-set of the acquisition and 
procurement process, the former Secretary for Defence (PD Steyn) adamantly 
insisted that only the DoD could make and issue policy, and hence the DoD in 1996 
became the custodian of the DIP policy that was initially vested in Armscor since 
1988. 
 
                                                 
204 ibid p3 
205 ibid p19 
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In terms of the newly-structured and published DIP policy, the Secretary for Defence 
mandates Armscor to continue managing the DIP process for, and on behalf of, the 
DoD. This ruling is now also encapsulated in the new Armscor Act (Act 51 of 2003). 
 
The introduction of the DoD’s DIP policy reflects on the Constitutional rights of South 
Africa to defend itself, and the need to have a defence force that can be deployed in 
a certain manner. Reference is made to the fact that defence-related acquisition and 
procurement are governed by SANDF needs, implying that a local defence industrial 
base should be retained and maintained, not only for satisfying equipment needs, 
but also to provide for life-cycle logistic support. It is stated that the DIP process will 
be used to leverage benefits on a reciprocal basis for the local DRI, whenever 
purchases from sources abroad are to be made.206  Reference is also made 
simultaneously to the co-existence and co-applicability of the non-defence/national 
industrial participation (NIP) policy of the DTI.207   
 
The principles that were, at that time, considered for the DIP process, (in parallel 
with similar announcements by the DTI) relate to the following main issues: 
 
Price. The departure point today, is still that DIP must not contribute to an increase 
in price (of the goods acquired). The assumption that prevailed at that time was that 
any cost of execution would be an integral part of programme cost and that it would 
not be reflected as an additional, below the line, cost element. 
 
Comment - In reality, countertrade does not, and cannot happen for free, and 
suppliers constantly use this argument to ‘fight off’ any DIP requirements by offering 
discounts. Discounts are sometimes attractive to the DoD due to budgetary 
constraints and it therefore can create a level of conflict. The DoD may in some 
                                                 
206 In parallel to the drafting and approval of the DIP policy, the DOD with the SANDF were engaged with Armscor in the drafting of 
various MODAC (1-4) papers, which together with the DIP policy formed the basis of many of the “informed” inputs and arguments to the 
Defence Review (1998) and subsequent White Paper on the DRI (1999). 
207 The NIP policy was approved in parallel, first by Parliament in November 1996, followed by Cabinet’s ratification in April/May 1997. 
(Author was involved in the latter process.) 
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instances decide not to invoke DIP on contracts, but this will be the exception and 
not the rule. 
 
Whether the DoD, or Armscor prefers it or not, the programme eventually pays for 
the implementation of DIP, and the penalty guarantees required eventual 
performance.  However, the question that needs to be asked is ‘what level of cost’ 
the programme is prepared to carry and what benefits the intrinsic and/or economic 
elements of DIP offer. 
 
DIP requires that at least 50% of the imported content value of a foreign contract (of 
USD2-million or more) become the DIP requirement. Normally, between 30% and 
40% of this 50% involve some form of direct work-share activities, with an additional 
ten percent for technology transfer. If, for argument sake, the cost of executing DIP 
is between 2.5% to 5% of contract value, the net benefit will still be considerable. 
 
On the other hand, almost all Armscor tenders are assessed on a competitive bid 
basis, and prospective suppliers can ill afford to load their prices to ensure that DIP 
(and NIP) get executed. 
 
Mutual benefit situation.  This principle requires DIP to be profitable for the seller 
and beneficial for the SA economy, and the DRI at large. This in itself means that 
DIP (and NIP) is not expected to have any detrimental impact on any party involved. 
 
Comment - Only a detailed transaction analysis of each DIP-related transaction will 
prove or disprove this assumption. Access to research data is an extremely onerous 
task, as both Armscor and suppliers and beneficiaries, are not prepared to share 
such information, based on commercial confidential considerations. Denel gained 
much experience as a beneficiary of DIP (and NIP), and received some level of 
insight into the DIP principle. It is the author’s view that the DIP programme did 
indeed result in work-share and the transfer of technology that resulted in exports. 
Although DIP boosted turn-over, until now it remains, at best, marginally profitable 
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for Denel. (Other DRI companies have expressed a different opinion on the subject 
of DIP profitability.) 
 
Another concern, based on Denel’s experience, is that the DIP policy does not 
regulate aspects related to capital equipment requirements, infrastructure 
improvements/upgrading, non-recurring cost and learning curve constraints and that 
there are resultant negative influences on the local DRI, resulting from obligor 
demands to the local DRI to secure its own investment into these areas in order to 
receive DIP work. Although the policy implies that DIP activities must be sustainable, 
Denel’s experience is that on many occasions, obligors are offering DIP activities 
that are non-sustainable, resulting in work packages that cannot be offered on a 
competitive price basis, due to too short production runs. Industry (especially Denel) 
is furthermore risk adverse and cannot sustain itself on promises of additional work-
share packages. DIP obligors unfortunately use such non-competitive, or non-
compliant examples to discredit the DRI, Armscor and the DoD. There are 
exceptions to the rules as is the case for Aerosud, a privately owned aircraft 
component manufacturing concern. 
 
Additionality: this principle requires the obligated party to create, or ensure new, or 
incremental new business in order to prevent historic and or ongoing business to be 
claimed as DIP. 
 
Comment - This principle appears to be working well in practice, although obligors 
constantly submit claims to Armscor, especially based on pro-active transactions 
that fall in the “marginally acceptable/non-acceptable category”, depending how 
good an argument the obligor can put forward. In most cases such claims fall 
outside of the ‘effective date conditions,’ stipulating that only those DIP transactions 
entered into after the effective date of a DIP agreement will be considered. 
 
Another concern from the controlling authorities (Armscor/DoD) is to what extent the 
obligor colluded with a local beneficiary in ‘creating additionality’. (Armscor of course 
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has the right to initiate any audits if there are any substantive reasons to suspect the 
validity of any claim.) 
 
Sustainability: this principle anticipates that DIP transactions will not be 
implemented as once-off activities, but will result in a medium (three to seven year) 
to long-term (seven to ten years) economic activity between foreign obligated parties 
and local DRI companies. 
 
Comment - Although this principle, as a policy statement, is a fair assumption, the 
DRI (especially based on Denel’s past six years of experience as a DIP 
recipient/beneficiary), is of the opinion that the issue of sustainability of specific DIP 
transactions, becomes rather suspect when assessing the micro level. Many DIP 
activities reflect transactions that constitute relative short production runs, based on 
once-off contracts, and this is particularly true when considering the direct work-
share element of DIP. 
 
One of the main reasons why DIP obligors are perceived to be unwilling to award 
long-term work-share contracts, lies in the relative uncertainty of such suppliers’ own 
markets, as well as the challenge to satisfy other offset demands while attending to 
multiple co-production expectations if all the other clients insist on similar demands 
This phenomenon unfortunately results in a very fragmented approach, although 
certain suppliers are much more efficient in their planning of work-share, and Denel 
is increasingly witnessing an approach where foreign suppliers reduce the scope of 
activities, selecting only a few that could be developed on a long-term sustainable 
basis (an example of this is Denel Aviation (now Denel Saab Aerostructures), 
together with Saab and Boeing, cooperating as DIP and NIP obligated parties). 
 
Short production runs constantly cause the DRI to be non-competitive, as the 
financial impact of non-recurring cost and learning curve cannot be recovered 
economically. A stop-start manufacturing process is also problematic, mainly due to 
capacity constraints related to available facilities, skills and materials. Some 
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materials take up to twelve months and longer to procure, especially if it is 
prescribed aircraft grade aluminum that can only be procured from certain accredited 
foreign suppliers. 
 
The principle of causality assumes that a DIP obligor will be the effective cause of 
any claimable DIP transaction. Armscor (and the DTI) still applies this principle very 
strictly. 
 
Comment - Although the principle is sound, there remains a concern on either side 
of the process that relates to the extent that such an obligor is required to prove 
causality in a transaction. 
 
When it comes to especially non-core business activities, which are claimable as 
DIP (primarily indirect), the DIP obligor often has no choice but to use a third party to 
actually give effect to the execution of such a DIP element, and it is in these 
instances that ‘causality’ sometimes becomes blurred and extremely difficult to prove 
to the satisfaction of the controlling authorities (Armscor/DoD/DTI). 
 
Causality and ‘instrumentality’ are sometimes used as synonyms. There is, however, 
a distinct difference between the two when it comes to the level of involvement of an 
obligated party in a transaction. One can be instrumental in a deal by merely making 
a telephone call, sending an e-mail or writing an introductory letter to a deal. In such 
instances, although one was instrumental, one has not necessarily ‘effectively 
caused’ such a transaction. Effective cause is seen as some level of ‘physical and 
direct’ involvement of the obligor in any claimable DIP transaction. 
 
As in the case of additionality, there is a similar concern at Armscor that DIP obligors 
may be colluding with DIP beneficiaries to ‘create causality’, but again, Armscor has 
the right to effect any audits if it so wishes. 
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Responsibility: this principle requires that the obligated DIP party will at all times be 
solely responsible to give effect to the execution of its obligation and that such 
obligation cannot be attended to by, or transferred to, any third party. 
 
Comment - Although this is a sound principle, it often does happen that obligors 
have to resort to ‘transfers’ due to the prospect of multi-dimensional, cross-linked 
international transactional business opportunities. 
 
The DIP policy, in principle, requires that any DIP obligor fully discharges its 
obligation in the country. If this principle is to be applied too strictly it could restrict 
the ability of cross-linking, which is a useful tool to ’trade-off’ or ‘swap’” DRI 
commitments in other countries, with local DIP obligors. Until now, it is, however, the 
DRI’s experience that Armscor keeps an open mind in such matters, although the 
same can unfortunately not be said about the DTI. 
 
The terms and conditions, regarded as the ‘ground rules for DIP, cover the 
following principles: 
 
DIP is applicable to all imported content where contracts of USD2-million or 
more are awarded, and when such contracts exceed the USD10-million 
threshold, the DTI requirement for NIP also becomes applicable. However, the 
practical problem with these threshold levels comes to the fore when local DRI 
becomes the prime contractor in an Armscor contract. 
 
Comment - Almost all defence equipment manufactured in South Africa, contains 
some level of imported content, and based on Denel’s experience, such imported 
content can vary between ten percent and 30%. The imported content in major 
systems contracts is even higher, and is usually represented by a fair amount of 
smaller contracts, comprising items bought off-the-shelf. It is not always practical, or 
possible, to require foreign sub-suppliers to participate in the DIP (and NIP) 
programme, due to the nature of their supply to South Africa, being in the form of 
 156 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
commercial off the shelf.  Although Armscor and the DTI have agreed to some 
relaxations for the local DRI in this regard, approval must be requested on a case by 
case basis. 
 
South Africa is the only country in the world that applies a dual approach to offset. 
This may be because Armscor has been applying countertrade to all of its foreign 
procurements since 1988, developing expertise and a solid track record in industrial 
participation. The DoD recognised Armscor’s achievements and expertise in this 
field and instituted the DIP policy as a sub-set of the National DTI NIP policy, also 
allowing Armscor to continue managing the DIP process. 
 
From an international benchmark point of view, the combined 80% requirement is 
not excessive. 
 
Discharging the DIP obligations must happen over a period not exceeding seven 
years, in total. 
 
Most other countries link the discharge period to the duration of the main supply 
contract. However, when an obligor plans its discharge schedule, it tends to do it by 
adopting the ‘hockey stick’ principle, meaning that the bulk of the activities are move 
as far into the future as possible. From an obligor’s point of view, this offers the best 
possible discharge model, posing the least risk, but from an industry perspective, the 
discharge period becomes too long, causing uncertainty in business and making any 
planning on the local DRI side regarding order cover, almost impossible. They are 
constantly on the look-out for ‘easy opportunities’ and consequently resort to 
substitutions and diversions that are removed from local DRI companies’ capabilities 
and from the beneficial solutions initially identified. For Armscor, this practice also 
represents some concern, as it becomes a fairly difficult process to manage, with 
obligors compelling Armscor, closer to the end of their programmes, to extend the 
discharge period in order for them not to pay penalties, which could damage their 
reputations and future business opportunities with Armscor. The DRI, on the other 
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hand, will welcome a more structured discharge process, with specific minimum 
levels of performance at closer intervals. This will also contribute towards the DRI 
order cover. 
 
Penalties for non-performance in the execution of the DIP (and NIP) commitments 
are set at five percent. On the DIP side, there is a sliding scale penalty, calling for 
penalties of up to 15% when the obligations are between USD2-million and 
USD9.99-million. 
 
Comment - If one compares the trend internationally, the SA penalty appears to be 
at the lower end as the norm, which is closer to ten percent. The international scale 
of penalties ranges from a ‘best effort, no penalty’ (for e.g. UK) to a 100% penalty 
(for example Poland). 
 
Paying penalties is not a viable option for either of the parties, as nobody wins. In 
most instances the regulating authorities will consider extensions to discharge 
periods, and such extensions are granted occasionally by both Armscor and the DTI. 
 
Many governments may blacklist non-performing obligors, although this fact is not 
always openly published, and even if penalties had been imposed, such facts 
normally are not made known due to strict non-disclosure agreements governing 
commitments. However, such information does get circulated in communiqués 
between governments and they increasingly insist, even at the pre-tendering stage, 
that bidders provide details of previous and current countertrade commitments, 
reporting on their achievements. The countertrade element of a tender is in many 
instances (as is the case in South Africa specifically) used as a discriminating criteria 
in the tender adjudication. 
 
In providing for penalties, obligors have to secure bank guarantees that have to be 
issued in favour of the regulating authorities. Corporate guarantees are not 
acceptable, regardless of the standing of the company. The bank guarantee is a 
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form of surety, and is valid until such time as the obligor has fully discharged its 
commitments. Guarantees is recorded on a company’s balance sheet, reducing 
prospects of borrowing and influencing its liquidity. Guarantees cost money to 
establish and to maintain. It is thus in the interest of the obligated party to discharge 
its commitments as quickly and effectively as possible. 
 
Evaluation of DIP proposals are still today assessed “…to the extent [that] they 
support defence, industry, skills, products/services…” All Armscor tenders include a 
specific value system, informing all potential bidders of what the considerations for 
tender adjudication will be. The DIP commitment (and to the extent that it is 
applicable to the NIP commitment) is used as a discriminating factor, and in some 
instances, especially with large acquisition programmes, the DIP offer will translate 
to a specific score in the tender value system. For example, in the tender for the SA 
Army’s new infantry fighting vehicle (2004) the DIP commitment had a weighted 
value of 30%. 
 
Comment - Other countries use a similar approach on major programmes. Turkey’s 
tender for the attack helicopter (2006), allocated a consideration value of 50% to the 
offset portion of the tender. For example, in the Strategic Defence Package (SDP) 
deal of 1998/99, the consolidated DIP and NIP results counted 33%. 
 
DIP credits are still expressed in monetary terms and normally in the same foreign 
currency used in the main supply agreement. 
 
Comment - In South Africa’s case, the ‘offset credit model’ predominantly in use, is 
referred to as the ‘input model’, implying that credits are earned at the time of an 
event, referring to the award of the order to a local company, or completion of an 
investment, or transferring technology, or contractual payment being made. This 
approach is meant to assist obligors to realise their milestones quicker, resulting in a 
certain benefit to the local industry. The ‘output model, on the other hand, only 
grants credits once a specific activity has materialised in a tangible result. In this 
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instance the credit is only granted once the foreign obligor have awarded a contract 
to a local company, and that company has produced the stated goods, delivered it, 
and invoiced for the work done. 
 
Only when the obligor (claimant) submits proof of payment, will the credit be 
granted. However, irrespective of which model is chosen, one sees that obligors 
plan their discharge on the ‘hockey stick’ model, where most of the credits only 
realise in the latter quarter, or latter third period of the programme. This practice may 
to be too liberal, offering too much freedom to the obligors in discharging their 
obligations. Although flexibility is the key to a successful discharge, it is unfortunately 
true that it may be detrimental to the local DRI, as obligors award contracts very late, 
and for much lower quantities than originally agreed to. Individual local companies 
continuously run the risk of losing the prospective business that was offered, as 
obligors are quick to realise the ‘low hanging fruits’, diverting business to entities not 
originally identified as beneficiaries. No local company can include any DIP promise 
in its business plan, due to the uncertainty of such a promise and the obligor’s right 
to opt for another route. Unfortunately, Armscor does allow substitutions, but not 
always in collaboration with the local DRI, as the factors that did spark such a 
substitution, may be presented from only the obligor’s position and not from the 
originally nominated company point of view.  
 
Investments are still one of the anticipated results of DIP activities, either the form 
of foreign equity capital, or foreign loans with a beneficial interest rate. 
 
Comment - The DIP process differs from the NIP policy in this regard, as NIP initially 
required that at least a 70% (of the 30% NIP commitment) be discharged as a 
foreign direct investment. It does, however, appear as if the DTI has changed this 
requirement and although foreign direct investment remains a mandatory 
requirement, the percentage is decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
size and nature of the NIP project.208 As DIP requires no minimum level of 
                                                 
208 Interview with Teresa de Risi of the DTI’s IP Secretariat 
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investment, and the fact that there are no incentives linked to such investments, very 
few DIP commitments have been made in this category. However, on a more 
positive note, quite a number of equity partnership deals have been announced 
since the inception of the DIP policy in 1997. Examples of these are Thales and 
ADS, Saab and Avitronics, BAE Systems and ATE, EADS and Reutech Radar 
Systems, Saab and Grintek, BAE Systems and OMC, and most recently Saab and 
Denel Aviation. It is presently not clear how Armscor assesses such deals when 
granting credits, or how the issue of additionality is addressed. In the case of 
Saab/Denel Aviation, it was reported that the DTI granted Saab (as part of its SDP 
investment obligation that it committed to, together with BAE Systems) a NIP credit 
to the value of USD2-billion, in return for a 20% equity shareholding in 
Aerostructures, worth about USD10-million, including a firm turn-over of about 
USD30-million over five years. It is not known how either Saab, or the DTI, came up 
with such a credit ratio. Also of interest is the fact that the DTI still refuses to allow 
any exchanges between NIP and DIP commitments. The DIP policy on DIP 
investments, in the absence of any investment incentives, has to my mind, thus 
failed. 
 
Technology transfers are still required to improve defence-related industrial 
efficiencies, and assist the local DRI with product development and after-sales life-
cycle support. The number of credits is determined by the appointed DIP committee 
(consisting of members from Armscor and the DoD) and no multipliers are allowed 
when credits are granted. 
 
Comment - As technology validation is globally viewed as a difficult subject to grasp, 
and the concrete benefits tricky to determine. Armscor implemented a fairly 
elaborative and systematic evaluation and validation process involving all parties in 
a transparent procedure that leaves auditable traces. This process compares 
favourably with international practices and is probably the most pragmatic and fair 
process of them all. Other countries resort to the use of multipliers for certain types 
of sought-after technologies. Transfer of technology, as part of one DIP (or offset) 
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commitment, is normally used as a tool to minimise the company’s exposure and 
loss of work-share, to others. Most obligors will be content to resort to a process 
whereby they can readily transfer their older technologies (which have already ‘wrote 
off’) to lesser-developed countries. 
 
Strategic considerations require DIP to also focus on areas of national ‘strategic 
concern’, such as the CSIR, Gerotek and OTB (Denel’s ‘Overberg Toets/Test 
Baan/Range’). 
 
Comment - However, there is no mention made of any incentives for doing so, with 
the result that very little DIP business is allocated to these areas. Unless the DoD 
and Armscor can implement attractive incentives, such entities will remain at the 
mercy of the DoD in trying to maintain and sustain their capabilities, resulting in an 
eventual considerable cost to the defence budget and the tax payer. This goal of the 
DIP policy has largely failed, although some DIP commitments were made in these 
areas. 
 
The legal basis pertaining to the DIP (and NIP) commitment prescribe separate 
agreements, subject to South African law – one managing the supply, one for DIP, 
and the third (if applicable) for NIP.  
 
Comment - South Africa is the only country in the world with such a requirement. 
The SA government should seriously consider the consolidation of the DIP and NIP 
processes, streamlining the process of arms acquisition and procurement. Using the 
legal basis of the DIP agreement does not present a criterium for an obligor to place 
DIP contracts with local nominated companies – this puts local industry at a 
disadvantage. 
 
The regulatory environment pertaining to the DIP process, is still today vested in 
the form of a constituted DIP committee (DIPCOM), which is a joint committee 
consisting of representatives from the DoD’s Acquisitions Department, Armscor DIP 
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Division and other supporting Armscor divisions (e.g. legal, finance and technical 
and technology). This DIPCOM is mandated to consider all DIP claims and to grant 
credits, as well as releasing obligation on achievement, reducing bank guarantees, 
and making recommendations to the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC) of the 
MoD, whether to invoke penalties, or not. This process appears to be working well in 
practice and the DIPCOM meets every four to six weeks, depending on the number 
of claims. The DIPCOM is managed by the DIP Division, which also appoints a 
chairman for such meetings.  
 
Imported content cannot be claimed as DIP. The rationale behind this policy 
statement is found in the fact that imported content does not represent any 
economic benefit to the local economy, or the DRI. This is still the case today. 
 
Comment - From an obligor point of view, there is an ongoing plea to get Armscor to 
allow at least a portion of imported content to count as a 100% credit. Most other 
countries do accept such an approach. Armscor requires all local companies to 
certify a DIP claim as correct, providing information on imported content, which is 
then deducted from the claim. The problem that the DRI  is that it is not always 
possible to identify, or calculate of the value of imported content, nor substantiate 
each and every element of the contract deliverables; as such imports may not be 
identifiable as they end up in processed materials, parts, components and sub-
assemblies. There is merit in adopting a more flexible and pragmatic approach, and 
some policy changes in this respect may be worthwhile considering. 
  
The pro-active approach to DIP is still, to a large extent, a concept that is unique to 
South Africa, as it allows prospective obligors to claim DIP credits for pro-active 
activities,  using such credits to ‘offset’ a part of a future DIP obligation. 
 
Comment - As the tender process is an open, competitive process nobody can 
certify any outcome, but to grant credits to foreign companies for pro-actively 
awarding contracts to the local DRI, without them having a definite and defined DIP 
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commitment, place them in a position to trade or transfer such credits if they do not 
win the tender. The recipient of such traded credits can use them to partially 
discharging its obligations. The pro-active (or banking) agreements are used as a 
means to collect excess credits, which can in future be used to satisfy DIP shortfalls. 
Banked credits must be used within four years after award – this is to prevent the 
pooling of credits that can result in the elimination of new business prospects. This 
preventative measure is working well in practice. Furthermore, it creates an incentive 
to any prospective obligor, giving him a head-start when he eventually commits to a 
legal obligation. (The DTI applies a similar process in concluding a ‘Strategic 
Partnership Agreement’ with prospective obligors. The rules are, however, 
restrictive, especially when it comes to the use of such credits.) 
 
Liaison between Armscor (the DoD) and the DTI, is crucial in order to ensure a 
comprehensive approach and the IP requirements are included in every tender, 
ensuring that prospective bidders fully understand the requirements and conditions 
for compliance. Although this process appears to work fairly well, it does appear 
from time to time that communication processes, especially between the Armscor 
DIP Division and the DTI IP Secretariat, do fail during the bidding phase – which is 
incidentally the most crucial part of any tender. Armscor and the DTI seem to be 
aware of this and are working on improving communication during the tender 
process. The sequence of the tendering event is actually describe in more 
detail in par 6 of the DoD DIP policy, and still closely resembles the process as 
described back in 1996. Some additional control measures have, however, been 
implemented subsequent to the Auditor General’s report on the Strategic Defence 
Package deal (SDP). 
   
9. Armscor’s role and responsibilities in the DIP process 
  
As already alluded to, Armscor is the officially mandated entity responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the DIP process. This management process, is as 
contained in three specific Armscor DIP policy documents, still governs Armscor’s 
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responsibility, and relates to the other various acquisition process policies of 
Armscor.    
 
• DIP policy: A-POL-6000 [Issue 1. Base date 1/4/97. Rev 11/02/02] - The policy was 
officially approved by the Armscor Board on 2 April 1997. It is basically a repeat of 
the DoD’s DIP policy, including the relevant responsibilities and procedures on how 
to establish a dedicated DIP Division and a joint DoD/Armscor DIP Committee. It 
also establishes broad terms and conditions for contracting of certain obligations on 
foreign imports. 
 
• DIP practice: A-PRAC-6030 [Issue 1. Base date 11/11/02] - The DIP practice refers 
to various Armscor acquisition process policies and practices, applicable to defence 
procurement and acquisition projects, governed under The Armscor Acquisition 
Management policy (A-POL-1000), as well as the Defence Review and the White 
Paper on the DRI. 
 
It further defines the responsibilities of the DoD, Armscor Acquisition Divisions, the 
DIP Division and the DTI, during the tender process. The practice details the roles 
and responsibilities of the DIP Committee and the process related to the levying of 
non-performance penalties. It makes provision for the Armscor DIP Division to 
charge certain facilitation fees for arranging any swap (credit trade-off deals). This 
revenue is used to complement Armscor’s income. 
 
• DIP procedure: A-PROC-6031 [Issue 1. Base date 19/03/01. Implementation 
11/02/02] - The DIP procedure focuses on process issues and reiterates the basis 
for implementation of DIP (and NIP) obligations, referred to as the ‘threshold value’ 
of procurement/acquisition contracts with foreign suppliers. 
 
This procedure specifically and still states that “DIP shall be applied in such a 
manner that it contributes to independence, as far as it is practically possible, as 
regards the maintenance and advancement of South Africa’s defence industrial 
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capabilities… DIP programmes will provide for a planned, organised and controlled 
approach, and are to support the DoD/MoD goals regarding inter alia the promotion 
and coordination of the development, manufacture, standardisation, maintenance, 
acquisition or supply of armaments and related products and services”. 
 
The procedure still makes a clear distinction between three sets of contracts, 
namely: 
- the Main Agreement that governs the scope and conditions of supply; 
- the DIP agreement that governs the 50% DIP obligation; and 
- the NIP agreement (if applicable) that governs the 30% NIP obligation. 
 
10.  In conclusion 
 
The DIP process still requires obligated entities to include the local industry (DRI) in 
the execution of their activities, and award contracts to them for:  
- direct work-share (for example production, assembly, integration, testing); 
- receiving and assimilating various levels of technology, skills development and 
training; 
- executing export contracts; 
- establishing joint ventures, with associated financial considerations (investments 
and loans); and 
- promoting SMME and BBBEE (broad-based black economic empowerment) 
activities. 
 
It dictates the relevant terms and conditions, the criteria for earning credits, and the 
use of pro-active agreements as a mechanism for banking credits for future use in 
the absence of any contractual obligations. 
 
It also describes the generic process of tendering (as per Figure 11) and the 
sequence of events that leads up to assessment, evaluation, award and subsequent 
contracting management and oversight. The DIP process requires specific business 
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plans that are used initially for evaluation purposes, and subsequently for contracting 
the obligation. Each tender contains the evaluation criteria and the weighting scale 
for requirements pertaining to technical requirements, price, BBBEE and DIP/NIP. In 
certain instances, DIP/NIP is used only as a critical criterion, and does not carry any 
specific weight. Normally, only the DIP weighting portion is expressed as a 
percentage, which could be one-third of the total weight.  Armscor’s DIP process is 
still subjected annually to both an internal, as well as an external audit, to ensure 
that all processes, approvals and recordings were done in accordance with the 
prescribed and approved policy, procedures and practices. The Armscor annual 
report also reflects on all DIP obligations and approvals granted for each year. 
? DEFENCE PURCHASES > USD 10 MILLION ?
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Figure 11 (Source: the DTI NIP guidelines of 1997) 
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CHAPTER 7: KEY FINDINGS OF THIS DIP RESEARCH 
 
1. Introduction - data gathering and analysis. 
Data and information were gathered through an extensive literature search on the 
subject of industrial participation in South Africa as applied by Armscor, 
complemented by selective interviews over time, feedback from questionnaires, and 
the author’s personal and daily experience in DIP activities (over a period of 11 years), 
and how these manifest in the South African DRI. 
 
 The integrity of information and data was ensured by using only reputable sources as 
a basis for quotations, and arguments relevant to applicable data and 
observations/findings. The information was also cross-verified, where possible, taken 
due cognisance of the constraints placed on this research as the result of various non-
disclosure agreements between Armscor, foreign suppliers (obligors) and the local 
industry. 
 
Questionnaires were sent to most of the DRI members registered with AMD, who have 
been exposed and involved in the DIP programme for the past six to seven years.  
(Refer to the findings in Table 2.) 
 
Data was subsequently analysed by using descriptive analytical statistics and 
qualitative analyses, whereas the classification of the collected data and the 
correlation analysis were both used for qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
 
Considering also Habernas’ theories on development, it is in this respect that the 
White Paper on the DRI is the subject of a structured process that aims to derive the 
proposed and desired result, namely to create an understanding and an acceptance of 
the DRI as part and parcel of the industrial base of South Africa. 
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2. How did DIP actually benefit the DRI, since 1999 
 
Considering chapter 4 on development discourse, as well as having studied the views 
of Babbie and Mouton, and the assessment of the DIP policy, it is clear that the policy 
actually represents four major building blocks (which is termed by them as the 
“multivariate analysis approach”), When presented schematically, it looks as follows: 
 
Systems
hierarchy
Skills &
abilities
Defence
sectoral
DIP aims and
objectives
(imperatives)
Defence
strategic
Direct work-share,
technology, skills 
and training on
the equipment purchased
Other activities,
mostly related to exports,
as well as some swap and
trade-off deals
Economic and industrial benefit result
The DIP strategy
 
Figure 12 (Source J.J. van Dyk) 
 
 
3. The DIP strategy is based on four very distinct building blocks, namely 
• “Defence strategic” – relates to those capabilities needed by the SANDF to 
satisfy its defensive, offensive and peace keeping operational needs. 
• “Systems hierarchy” – reflects on the lowest level of material procurement (e.g. 
armour steel  - level 1) up to level 9, which represents the complete integrated 
joint defence capability in the SA. Equipment requirements are normally 
submitted to the respective Arms of Services by a Level 5 prime contractor base. 
• Defence sectoral – relates to the sectoral structure of the DRI in disciplines such 
as mechanical, electro-mechanical, electrical, electronic, electro-optical, 
chemical, metallurgy. 
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• Skills and capabilities – reflects on the industry’s ability to adequately provide 
for skilled manpower to execute acquisition, procurement, support, maintenance, 
refurbishment and upgrade programmes related to the SANDF’s operational 
requirements. 
 
 
4. Statistical data. The reader’s attention is drawn to the fact that DIP has been in 
existence in the Armscor procurement process since early 1988, although the 
research for the drafting of this dissertation, only focuses on the period from late  
1999 to mid 2007.  
 
During an international Offset Conference in Vienna209 the following statistical data 
was presented to demonstrate how the DIP programme’s aims and objectives, as 
depicted in the DIP strategy diagram above, were in practice underwritten by the DIP 
proposals that were received from the various bidding companies at that time. 
                                                 
209 SMi Conference in Vienna, Austria on International Offsets on 18-19 June 2001. JJ van Dyk from Denel (having just joined Denel 
from Armscor in April 2001) made a presentation on the “Implementation of offsets in South Africa” 
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Figure 13 (J.J. van Dyk)210  
 
In the Armscor annual report of 1999-2000 it was subsequently reported211 that Armscor 
was managing a DIP portfolio of some 17 contracts to the value of USD5.1-bn – an amount 
of USD4.5-bn was accordingly discharged at that time. 
 
At the time, it was also reported by Armscor that six additional contracts were signed as 
part of the SDP deal, amounting to USD2.3-bn in total, although the Lynx maritime 
helicopter contract was only officially ratified on 14 August 2003, due solely to the DoD’s 
budgetary constraints. In the 2000-2001 report it was only reported that for that year, an 
amount of USD1.226-million in credits were granted, and in the period 2002-2003, credits 
amounted to USD594-million. No mention was made of the criteria applied to grant these 
credits. In the subsequent reports the following table (also referred to as a “multivariate 
                                                 
210 Source: Presentation made by the Author at the SMi conference, International Offsets, Vienna. 18 -19 JUNE 2001 
211 Author’s note: The reported information related to various aerospace-related projects, which included missiles, fighter aircraft, the 
Astra PC7-trainer aircraft  from Pilatus, Switzerland and the refurbishment of the C130 transporter aircraft under main contract with 
Marshalls of Cambridge in the UK, as well as some heavy transporter vehicles and fire fighting vehicles. 
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table”212) is used to reflect on composition and spread – refer also to the table on Denel, 
further down that was used to report on the SDP – no further mention was made of to the 
status of any other contracts. In the Armscor report of 2005-2006 it was, for example, 
reported that some 25 BEE companies benefited from the DIP process. (The conversion 
rates that were reportedly used for reporting on progress versus commitment are: 
USD1:ZAR6.25; Euro1:ZAR6.40 and GBP1:ZAR10.00)213 
 
DIP performance related to the SDP up to 2006/7: 
 
Project Year Obligation 
Rm 
Planned 
performance 
Rm 
Actual 
performance 
Rm 
DIP Categories of performance 
Sales & 
Export Rm 
Transfer of 
Technology 
Rm 
Investments 
Rm 
Meko A200 
Corvettes 
(x 4) 
2004/5 2,941 1,632 1,595 1,241 348 6 
2005/6 2,941 1,763 1,716 1,319 390 7 
2006/7 2,941 1,979 1,950 1,423 501 26 
A209 
Submarines 
(x 3) 
2004/5 1,121 703 609 576 34 0 
2005/6 1,121 717 660 612 48 0 
2006/7 1,121 746 741 639 95 7 
Agusta      
A 109 –
Light Utility 
Helicopter –
“LUH”       
(x 30) 
2004/5 1,194 943 710 356 324 30 
2005/6 1,194 1,035 905 548 325 32 
 
2006/7 
 
1,194 
 
1,194 
 
1,194 
 
676 
 
487 
 
31 
Hawks 100 
(Lead-in 
Fighter 
trainers)    
(x 24) 
2004/5 4,252 2,358 2,221 1,922 292 7 
2005/6 4,252 2,843 2,769 2,289 463 17 
2006/7 4,252 3,616 4,001 3,195 789 17 
Gripen 
JAS39 
(Advanced 
Light 
Fighters)     
( x 28) 
2004/5 5,050 1,864 2,459 932 1,385 141 
2005/6 5,050 2,459 3,130 1,209 1,750 171 
2006/7 5,050 3,130 3,383 1,461 1,750 172 
Super Lynx 
–Maritime 
Helicopters 
( x 4) 
2004/5 550 80 93 93 0 0 
2005/6 553 117 103 103 0 0 
2006/7 553 188 149 118 29 2 
 
Total 
2004/5 15,108 7,580 7,687 5,120 2,383 148 
2005/6 15,111 8,934 9,283 6,080 2,976 227 
2006/7 15,111 10,853 11,418 7,512 3,651 255 
Source : Armscor annual reports 2004-2007 
Table 1 
 
 
When comparing the above data to the DIP proceeds as recoded independently by Denel 
for the period 2000-2007, there is a resemblance in the two sets of statistical data, mainly 
                                                 
212 Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. The Practice of Social Research. 2006. OUP. SA edition. p435 
213 Confirmation was provided by Armscor DIP Division in May 2007.  This confirmation included also the DIP progress figures of the 
Armscor 2006/7 Annual Report. 
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in terms of the broader percentage of achievement. The main reason for this lies in the fact 
that Denel was promised more than 50% of the total DIP amount of the SDP. 
 
00-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08
Contracted
-
2,000,000,000
4,000,000,000
6,000,000,000
8,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
12,000,000,000
14,000,000,000
Denel's DIP picture
Contracted
Promised
 
 
Figure 14 (Source : JJ van Dyk, Denel Corporate Office, Pretoria) 
 
 
5. DIP’s manifestations in practice 
 
The following types of DIP activities214 were reportedly awarded to the DRI by the 
respective original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and their respective foreign 
sub-contractors. The following quotations and examples mainly come from sources  
in the media and industry itself, while it was problematic to rectify information from 
OEMs and Armscor, due to the legal constraints posed by the various non-
disclosure agreements in place, (although Dawid Botha’s Institute for Strategic 
Studies study report published in 2003 does contain many cross references and 
confirmation of data as herein reported as well): 
 
                                                 
214 Sources: Armscor Annual Reports since 2004, various Engineering News reports 1999-2007. www.researchchannel.co.za 
 173 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
5.1 Corvettes (Meko A200 Class) 
? significant technology transfer to Simons Town dockyard (no details 
provided); 
? warranty repair work performed by smaller companies; 
? export orders - some 75% of the Corvette combat suite are reportedly 
sourced from SA suppliers under the prime contractor Thales Naval-France, 
which forms part of the German Frigate Consortium; 
? ADS/Thales locally, was awarded command and control work, with various 
Denel divisions delivering surface-to-air missiles, the 76 mm gun upgrade, the 
35 mm naval dual purpose gun and ammo; 
? Saab Grintek provided radios and communications, and Reutech Radar 
Systems (RRS) the tracking, surveillance and target acquisitions systems; 
? other companies, such as MTU Africa (previously Prokura Diesel), Booyco 
Engineering and BAES Land Systems OMC Gear Ratio were involved; and  
? Hyflo Southern Africa specifically designed controllable pitch propellers; 
? Several other beneficiaries included companies such as DCD Dorbyl, 
Siemens KZN, Booyco Engineering and Bennet Engineering215. 
 
5.2 Submarines (Class 209 Type 1400 MOD) 
? technology transfer related to the manufacture of parts and components of 
periscopes; 
? marketing assistance for export of optical equipment and components; 
? development of the submarine combat suite software; 
? transfer of technology for local manufacture and export of a 40 mm self 
destruct fuse under license from Junghans, Germany to Laingsdale 
Engineering; 
? Grintek Avitronics (now owned by Saab) provided the electronic warfare 
system and the optronic mast; 
? Siemens delivered the main switch gear; 
                                                 
215 According to U. Scheel the ThyssenKrupp offset manager – reported by CTO in December 2007. 
 174 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
? local company Tellumat collaborated with German STN Atlas on an integrated 
sonar system; and 
? Denel Optronics, under a USD45-million contract from Zeiss, was tasked with 
the complete design and manufacture of the high precision periscopes – it 
was this contractual relationship that actually led to Zeiss acquiring a 70% 
equity stake in this Denel division in 2006/7216. 
? Ferrostaal, one of the German Submarine Consortium members, was 
reportedly responsible for awarding a contract to Denel OTB for weapons 
flight tests on the German Air Force Tornado’s.  
 
5.3 LUH- Light Utility Helicopter (A109) 
? license for the local manufacture of the A109 helicopter for the SA Air Force 
from aircraft 7 to 30, by Denel; 
? export of armoured vehicles by the now-owned BAE Land Sysems OMC; 
? Grintek was awarded the a multi-sensor warning system and self protection 
electronic warfare suite, as well as a comms sub-system and navigation; 
? local ADS/Thales delivered a procedural cockpit trainer; 
? Denel Optronics (old Cumulus) delivered the Argos 410 observation system; 
? Chelton supplied antennas and direction finding equipment; 
? FBS supplied certain logistic support elements; 
? Aeroflo (at that time part of Defencetek at the CSIR) was awarded the 
contract for a new sand filter system; 
? TMA produced the Makila engine and did the design and integration of the 
Arrius gearbox. (as a result of an undertaking from Turbomeca, France, as 
contained in the Agusta Westlands offer, acquired a 51% equity stake in 
Denel’s Airmotive Division in 2002); and 
? Tellumat reportedly supplied the IFF systems (‘Identify friend or foe’). 
 
5.4 Hawk 100 
                                                 
216 The Zeiss Denel Optronics company should be officially registered towards mid 2007 
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? certification of BAE Systems of various local companies as aerospace 
suppliers; 
? transfer of technology to Aerosud and securing Airbus orders for the delivery 
of 240 ship-sets of wing components with a value of R500-million; 
? companies that received orders from BAES, include Denel Aviation (final 
integration and manufacturing of components), Denel Optronics (for helmet 
sights also for the Eurofighter), Saab Grintek for power supplies and displays 
and Saab Grintek (Electronic Systems – GES) for communication sub-
systems; 
? TMA was involved with the Hawk’s engines and gearboxes, under sub-
contract from Rolls Royce; 
? ATE (in which BAES holds a 20% stake) was involved with the design, 
development and integration of the Hawk mission systems (valued at R500-
million), with AMS (now also part of Saab) tasked with the design and 
development of the health usage and monitoring systems (HUMS), which 
subsequently lad to various export contracts; 
? BAE Systems procured export business for its OMC company by supplying 
the US Marines with the RG33 armoured, mine-protected personnel carrier 
(order value USD55-million, with reportedly more contracts forthcoming,; 
? British defence giant BAE Systems awarded South African company Aerosud, 
a USD20-million (R137-million, €15.6-million) contract to make components 
for the European Eurofighter programme. Under the contract for Eurofighter 
parts, set to run for at least six years, Pretoria-based Aerosud is to 
manufacture up to 3 500 detailed parts and minor assemblies for Eurofighter 
Typhoon, Europe’s biggest defence programme. "While strengthening our 
partnership with Aerosud, this contract also illustrates BAE Systems ability to 
deliver new export business opportunities to South African industry,” said 
BAE Systems' South Africa chief executive Mike O'Callaghan217; and 
                                                 
217 Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg, South Africa. 4 Aug 2006 
http://www.earthyear.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=279800&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__business/ 
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? AMS is a focused defence industry electronics company218 and at an early 
stage of its development it got involved in health and usage monitoring 
systems (HUMS) for all types of military aircraft, getting its first big opportunity 
with the development, manufacture and support of a comprehensive HUMS 
system for Denel Aviation's Rooivalk helicopter in a programme that was 
initiated in 1987. AMS developed and manufactured HUMS systems for a 
wide variety of aircraft-types, including all versions of the C-130 (Hercules) 
transport aircraft as used by the SAAF, the unique turboprop version of the 
DC-3 (used locally for maritime surveillance), the BAE Hawk lead in fighter 
trainer, and the Augusta 109 helicopters that form part of the local defence 
acquisition programme. As the work undertaken by AMS forms a very 
important part of BAE's DIP programme, all future Hawk aircraft for other 
buyers will include the AMS system. The value of this business for AMS is 
huge, and in addition to the 24 aircraft ordered by the SAAF, the Royal Air 
Force is expected to take 44 new Hawk aircraft into service before 2008, 
while India ordered 66 aircraft. The AMS HUMS system is already operational 
on the 22 aircraft delivered to the NATO Flight Training Centre in Canada and 
the 33 aircraft being delivered to the Royal Australian Air Force. Although the 
supply of the HUMS system to the international market began as a DIP 
project. The standing that AMS now has as a supplier to such giants as BAE 
and Thales, speaks for itself, and the local company is receiving orders from 
other countries and companies.  
 
 
 
 
5.5 Gripen JAS39 
? A major skills transfer activity, including a design and development centre, 
have been established by Saab at Denel Aviation (now to become Denel 
                                                 
218 DATAWEEK . Maurice McDowell - 1/28/2004. An update on the state of the electronics industry in South Africa - Part I. Electronics & 
Communications Technology. Technwes.  http://dataweek.co.za/article.aspx?pklArticleId=2806&pklIssueId=476&pklCategoryId=31 
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Saab Aerostructures)219. This entity is tasked with several production 
contracts for the NATO standard pylons, rear fuselage and main landing gear. 
(The Eastern Cape-based company Comau-AIMS was reportedly involved 
under a sub-contract for the design of the NATO pylon.); 
? Denel OTB will be tasked with various flight tests; 
? Denel Optronics (now part of Zeiss) also secured contracts (in 2003) for its 
helmet-mounted display/tracking system (HTS) for Gripen, also for the export 
market. This eventually led to an export contract to the value of ZAR200-
million being awarded in May 2007 for the Eurofighter-Typhoon aircraft.220 
Some 450 units of the HTS will be manufactured over the next four to five 
years.221 Denel Optronics (now Carl Zeiss Optronics) is a pioneer in head-
tracker systems, having designed and produced operational pilot helmet-
mounted sighting and tracking systems the early ‘70s. Evaluations have 
reportedly shown the Denel system to be superior to any  other similar 
systems available in the world; 
? Denel’s Munitions group (PMP) received, via BAE Systems, a number of 
contracts for the export of brass parts and components of ammunition. This 
was the largest single contract ever awarded to PMP in its 68-year history, 
and it occurred in late 2006, and amounted to ZAR296-million. PMP is 
reportedly increasingly recognised as a producer of world class ammunition 
and related components; and 
? Saab also secured equities, first in Grintek Avitronics, then in Grintek Holding, 
while acquiring AMS. Saab Grintek is now engaged in the development of a 
civil aircraft missile protection system (called ‘CAMPS’). Critics say the ’real 
rot’ in the arms deal lies in the way the offset part of the deal was structured. 
In effect, they claim that “investments” such as SAAB's recent purchase of a 
controlling 80% stake of Grintek was done using R600-million of South 
                                                 
219 Author’s note: Denel, as part of its unbundling and establishment of foreign equity partners had engaged Saab in 2005/6 with the 
view of them acquiring an equity stake in Denel Aviation. This equity is set at an initial 20% growing (circa USD10m) over the next couple 
of years to a majority share. The new company would probably be registered in 2007. Saab had been promised some USD2bn in NIP 
credits in return, whilst Saab is also insisting on a ZAR1,6bn indemnity from the SA Gov on Airbus A400M work. See also Countertrade & 
Offset Volume XXV No 3. Feb 12, 2007. 
220 Business Day report 1 Jun 2007, as well as a Denel internal “Infogram” dd 31 May 2007. 
221 Engineering News June 15-21, 2007. “Looking out and up” Keith Campbell 
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African taxpayers' money and was simply a scam under which Grintek's entire 
product range had been ”stolen" – but for which the DTI awarded SAAB with 
offset credits amounting to R14-billion222. It was also reported that Saab was 
promised a USD2.2-billion waiver on its offsets in return for a meager ZAR66-
million equity investment in Denel Aviation in late 2006 early 2007. Saab is at 
the same time insisting on a ZAR1.6-billion indemnity from the SA 
government for risks for the Airbus A400M production contracts. 
 
5.6 Maritime Helicopter – Super Lynx 300 
? Agusta Westland (AW) reportedly funded a new material cutting machine for 
the manufacturing of tents and canvas items; 
? AW reportedly secured several export contracts for infrared suppression 
systems, armoured helicopter crew seats, electronic warfare items and 
related countermeasures; and 
? Denel Optronics’ (Cumulus, now Carl Zeiss Optronics) stabilised observation 
systems were procured at the request of the SA Navy. 
 
6. In conclusion 
 
As a general observation in respect of abovementioned activities within the DRI, 
the 2005 Engineering News defence report concluded that DIP had indeed 
provided a life-line for the DRI, although the impact appears to be concentrated in 
the aerospace sector, with limited benefit to the struggling maritime and electronics 
industries. It was also remarked that the DIP involvement was mainly in the 
manufacturing side, at a level that was not regarded as high-tech, considering the 
local industries capabilities in this regard. 
 
In the present international environment, the requirement for offsets has become a 
major part of the arms trade. There are few importers of arms who do not make 
strenuous attempts to gain some form of offset, directly and indirectly, linked to a 
                                                 
222 'Such a strategy is more often fraught with failure' This article was originally published on page 6 of Pretoria News on October 07, 
2006 
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major arms procurement. There is, however, some debate223 on the concrete 
benefits of offsets and countertrade. Questions have been raised as to the actual 
value-add, the linkages with the economy, and the accuracy of the estimated 
benefits to the economy. This debate is particularly noticeable in South Africa, 
where the large defence offset deal announced by the South African government in 
1998 (signed in December 1999), and subsequently restructured and refined, is 
now in the final stages of completion – with the single seater Gripens to be 
delivered between 2008-2011. 
 
As a key component of government’s Industrial Participation (IP) strategy, the 
defence procurement exercise includes both defence-related countertrade 
investment, (DIP), and non-defence related investment, (NIP). These two forms of 
offsets are seen by public and private sector protagonists as providing a major 
boost to industrial and development investment, and job creation. Of particular 
interest, is the role that such schemes can play in the development of particular 
regions in South Africa. The degree of public debate and the availability of 
information make South Africa a particularly interesting case study when 
considering the economics of offsets and their effect on regional development.  In 
the current rethinking of industrial policy, the question of industrial participation and 
specifically the defence offset investment interventions, should be the subject of 
inquiry. 
 
A tendency to marginalise environmental concerns in policy considerations and to 
opt for project interventions that consolidate rather than challenge the discourse of 
the mineral-energy complex, needs to be recognised and reconsidered. The DIP 
and NIP schemes need to be planned and evaluated within a wider sub-national 
context that considers the spatial inequalities in the South African economy. Policy-
makers need to address the question of using natural resources in a sustainable 
and equitable fashion, and explore the potential synergies between such resources 
                                                 
223 Defence Procurement and Regional Industrial Development in South Africa :A Case Study of the Eastern Cape. Paul Dunne and 
Richard Haines. Middlesex University and University of Port Elizabeth. August 2001 
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and broader-based industrial and high technology development. This would require 
a proper and much clearer understanding of the regional implications of national 
policy with a serious attempt to develop a coherence between national and sub-
national planning, allowing them to be mutually reinforcing. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. In conclusion on the White Paper on the DRI 
 
It is thus the author’s view that as a ‘development and regulatory policy’, the White 
Paper on the DRI remains a well thought-through policy statement that succeeds in 
explaining the DRI for what it was at the time of drafting the paper, while putting the 
DRI’s position in South Africa in context, assessing its contribution to high-technology 
development, and manufacturing and exports opportunities, offering associated 
economic and socio-economic spin-offs. The White Paper thus establishes a general 
acceptance for the continued existence of the DRI. 
 
What is, however, clearly visible, is that despite the government’s declared support for 
the DRI, nothing major has actually come of these intentions, although there have 
been, since late 2005, some very positive developments insofar as it relates to the 
restructuring and recapitalisation of Denel, specifically. 
 
Other areas of concern to the DRI are: 
- a marked deterioration in the arms trade control administrative processes 
governing the DRI commercial actions requires and urgent 
streamlining/consolidation of arms control legislation and processes; 
- a lack of local industry’s involvement in determining and agreeing on user 
requirements when decisions are made on the equipment needs of the SANDF, 
the DoD and Armscor; 
- a lack of visibility in the acquisition planning and budgeting for requirements by 
the DoD; 
- a lack of adequate local defence spend, or delayed equipment renewal 
programmes; 
- the failure of the DoD to establish the DERI; 
- no visible changes to the rather complex procurement process of Armscor in 
order to ensure that SMME and BEE enterprises entering the defence market; 
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- no visible effort to create a defence-related industrial cluster at the DTI, although 
initiatives related to the Aerospace cluster (by the DTI) and the AMTS (by DST 
and the CSIR) are indeed commendable; 
- streamlining the roles of the DoD and Armscor to eliminate costly duplications; 
- Armscor’s continued involvement in commercial business and the perceived 
conflict of interest in the selling of surplus defence stocks; 
- an absence of any measures to ensure the retention of strategic capabilities in 
the DRI, such as increasing the funding of R&D and technology building blocks, 
and consolidating the technology development between the DoD and DST; and 
- the lack of implementation of a proper, unbiased marketing support structure.  
 
However, it is worthwhile noting that the DoD’s strategic business plan for the financial 
years 2005/06 to 2007/08, contains specific deductions that are made as a result of a 
systematic environmental analysis and review process, which considers aspects such 
as the political, economic, social, and technology impact on the SANDF’s abilities to 
perform its functions. The DoD specifically infers that a local defence industrial base 
was accepted as a given and that the DRI will by ‘default’ almost, always be there to 
attend to its strategic needs, BUT nowhere in the DoD’s strategic plan is there any 
reference as to the steps they intend taking to ensure that the DRI will still be there 
when they need it. The DoD may one day wake up and realise that the DRI they 
thought existed, was no longer. 
 
The restructuring actions of Denel, since 2004/5 and the threats to summarily close 
down certain factories, such as PMP, were rude awakenings to the DoD and the 
SANDF, as well as to the SAPS. There appears to be very specific actions underway 
to ensure a minimum base-load at PMP to prevent it from being closed down. This is 
just mentioned as an illustration of how complacency may eventually bite one in the 
back – the DoD and Armscor (and government) cannot keep on paying lip service to 
the DRI, but need to take active steps to ensure a healthy, local supplier and support 
base, to be able to attend to heightened security needs, albeit of a non-conventional 
defensive nature. 
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In the DRI study report prepared by VuXaka (Pty) Ltd in 2005/6224 they allude to the 
fact that the local DRI is still a very important element in the local industrial base, with 
a contribution of around 3.42% to the manufacturing GDP of the country, and creating 
exports in the region of R4.3-billion. 
 
The VuXaka report on the DRI states further that this industry is already well-
entrenched in the international supply chain network, with defence electronics being 
the biggest element. The importance of having a dedicated DRI sectoral strategy 
similar to other government sectoral schemes (such as the MIDP, the AMTS and the 
Aerospace cluster) is again stressed, and the report further recommends various 
steps to be taken by government and AMD. 
 
The new executive director of AMD, Mr Simphiwe Hamilton, was quoted early in 
2007,225 having expressed similar views on the need for a specific strategy that would 
favour the local DRI. Otherwise he states that the DoD will be faced with serious 
problems brought about by a too fragmented industry, which will no longer be in a 
position to fully support the needs of the SANDF for maintenance, repair and 
upgrades, or refurbishment of equipment. He concludes by stating that the DRI has to 
respond to transformation expectations, which are in line with government’s objectives 
for BBBEE development, and to assist, generally, in achieving the government’s aims 
for a six percent GDP growth. The City Press (in early June 2007) quoted Hamilton as 
having said that the DRI was out there to claim its rightful place in the broader South 
African society as it was one of the sectors with the most prominent technology-
intensive characteristics, contributing immensely to the country’s innovative 
capabilities. 
 
                                                 
224 Author’s note: The 2006 South African Defence-related Industry Study was done by VuXaka (Pty) Ltd under contract from AMD. 
The later however categorically stated that the VuXaka report does not represent the views of AMD but that the Report is intended as 
source of researched information on the DRI which could be used to further that aims and objectives of the DRI strategy.(Available at: 
www.AMD.org.za) 
225 Interview conducted and reported on by the Engineering News of Feb 23-March 1, 2007. 
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Dan Henk226 an associate professor at the Department of Leadership and Ethics at the 
US Air War College, expresses the view that the White Paper on the DRI gives the 
armaments industry the opportunity to collaborate with government in defining its role 
in the new South Africa, tying the industry into a comprehensive national security 
vision.  
 
Henk goes on by saying that employment and other economic benefits derived from 
the industry extend into a considerable proportion of the country’s economic base. 
Many of the old structures and organisational cultures are, however, still evident, but 
both evolved in significant ways, he states. The government still coordinates the 
industry’s efforts to serve national priorities – a legacy of the years before democracy. 
He expresses the opinion that the motivation of the current ANC government seems to 
be quite different, as they admit there is no immediate external military threat, yet seek 
to safeguard defence industries to preserve strategic capabilities, provide jobs for 
citizens, and economic benefit to the state through arms sales and trade agreements. 
He also expresses the view that partnerships between South African companies and 
foreign arms producers, will increase access, for both parties, to state-of-the-art 
technology, and to the international arms market. Such circumstances are 
economically desirable, yet these same connections included a degree of foreign 
influence, and even control over South Africa’s industries that may perhaps limit the 
country’s options. Potentionally a gradual loss of strategic autonomy is the price one 
has to pay for ensuring integration into the global economy. 
 
2. The academic, empirical and practical discourse on DIP. 
 
It is thus the author’s humble conclusion that both policy documents reflect on the 
Keynesians way of thinking, while dealing with Bezuidenhout’s views on neo-
liberalism, and at the same time, conforming to Michael Porter’s view of “shaping 
industrial structure”, as is also echoed by Ben Fine and Zaf Rustomjee (in 1996) 
                                                 
226 DAN HENK :”Guns And Butter: Reframing South Africa’s arms industry”. Available at: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/13No3/Fhenk.pdf 
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reflecting on South Africa’s industrial policy. It however, is also worth noting what other 
academics found and researched and wrote on the subject of South Africa’s industrial 
participation policy and programme in the context of international benchmarking and 
other development considerations. What follows hereon is a comprehensive review of 
the various scholars, academics and interested parties on the subject of DIP in 
relation to its economic, socio-economic and industrial development value for South 
Africa as perceived at the time. 
 
In a research paper done by Prof R. Haines and G. Wellmann227 on the industries’ 
experience in the Western Cape associated with the proclaimed benefits of the 
strategic defence package offset programme, they focus on the an apparent lack of 
investments in what they term “an emerging high-technology knowledge industrial 
sector in the region”. They observe that the DTI may have given some consideration 
to its value-chain approach as proclaimed in their ‘Integrated manufacturing strategy 
that is to group and consolidate the various industrial participation projects and the 
alignment of investments to provide a link-up to the Spatial Development Initiatives 
(SDI). They, however, conclude that the industrial participation net impact on the 
Western Cape region as part of the DTI’s SDI, cannot be seen as anywhere near 
substantive, whether in its nature or scope, or whether through investment, 
technology, exports or job creation. 
 
Paul Dunne and Richard Haines228 also convey a message of doubt to national 
economies on the net value of defence offsets and the influence it has on industrial 
and economic development at sub-national level. The observation they make is that 
the South African offset scheme may have been able to play a possible role in the 
development of particular regions in South Africa. The degree of public debate and the 
availability of information make South Africa a particularly interesting case study for 
the economics of offsets and its impact on regional development. They observe, 
                                                 
227 Haines R and Wellman G. 2005. Value Chains and institutional imperatives in regional development: The implementation and impact 
of defence offsets in the Western Cape. Africanus 35 (10 Unisa Press). 
228 Defence Procurement and Regional Industrial Development in South Africa: A Case Study of the Eastern Cape 
Paul Dunne and Richard Haines. Middlesex University and University of Port Elizabeth. August 2001 
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however, that it is extremely problematic to measure the overall impact of the South 
African offsets in terms of job creation, the strengthening of backward and forward 
linkages, and technology enhancement (as also echoed by Martin)229. They refer to a 
study of Saudi Arabia’s defence offset programmes, proclaiming that tens of thousand 
of jobs will be created, while the various programmes generated employment in the 
region of only 2000 (quoted from Matthews 2000). They furthermore express the view 
that only a few countries appear to have been successful in using defence offsets230.  
 
Dunne and Haines, also quote Robin Bloch231, arguing that despite a relatively 
sophisticated set of local and regional plans, there is some lack of integration between 
the relevant actors and structures, coupled with ad hoc interventions in South African 
‘space economy’. In the latter instance they refer to problems, mainly in deeply 
entrenched core-periphery systems of industrial location regions, which are not 
aligned and will therefore not attract the anticipated levels of investments as 
envisaged by the DTI. Nor will these create any new growth centres. According to their 
findings, only a few companies in these so-called IDZs have actually received some 
offset-related (DIP) work.  Dunne and Haines state that due to the relatively ad-hoc 
and project-oriented nature of DIP, that the industrial participation projects from the 
large defence procurement package are unlikely to benefit the Eastern Cape much in 
structural terms. They express a cause for concern that it may, instead, lead to further 
contractions and undermine alternative and more sustainable macro development 
options for the province. 
 
Dunne and Haines strongly advocate that the DIP and NIP schemes need to be 
planned and evaluated within a wider sub-national context that recognise the spatial 
inequalities in the South African economy. Policy-makers need to address the 
                                                 
229 Matthews, Ron. 2000. ‘Defence Offsets and Development: The Case of Saudi Arabia’. Unpublished 
Paper, Cranfield University. 
230 Batchelor, Peter, and Paul Dunne. 2000. “Industrial Participation, Investment and Growth: The Case of South Africa’s Defence 
Related Industry”. Development Southern Africa, Volume 17, No. 3, September 2000, pp 417-35. 
231 Lewis, David, & Robin Bloch. 1998. ‘SDIs: Infrastructure, Agglomeration and the Region in Industrial Policy. Development Southern 
Africa. Vol 15, No. 5, Summer, pp. 727 -755. and Bloch, Robin. 1999. ‘Sub-national Economic Development in South Africa: Towards a 
Strategy for the Department of Trade and Industry’. Paper presented at Annual Forum of Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat, 
Muldersdrift, South Africa, 19-22 September. 
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question of utilising natural resources in a sustainable and equitable fashion, and  
explore the potential synergies between such resources and broader-based industrial 
and high-technology development. In order to do this properly, they need to create a 
clearer understanding of the regional implications of national policy and attempt to 
develop a coherence between national and sub-national planning, that will allow them 
to be mutually reinforcing. The implication of their view is that government should 
become more prescriptive with their industrial participation demands – this view is 
incidentally supported by the author and AMD. 
 
In a research paper on “arms trade offsets”, Jurgen Brauer and Paul Dunne share 
their views on this subject matter in what they refer to as  a “so-called state of the art 
review of empirical knowledge regarding arms trade offsets232”. Reportedly, extant 
evidence suggest that offset arrangements do not yield net benefits for a country’s 
economic development. They state that arms trade offset deals are more costly than 
‘off-the-shelf’ arms purchases, and create little by way of new or sustainable 
employment. They also propose that such offset do not appear to contribute in any 
substantive way to general economic development, and with very few exceptions, do 
not result in significant technology transfers, not even within the military sector. 
 
Brauer and Dunne state that politicians, especially in democracies, must justify 
expenditure of public funds, usually in the face of crying social needs. The logic way of 
going about this is to use offset demands to motivate arms deals, and this practice has 
thus become universal. The use of offsets is by no means restricted to the field of 
arms trade, nor even to intra-government procurement. They observe that offsets, and 
related forms of countertrade, constitute a vast, pervasive business practice – 
involving tens of thousands of people around the globe, reaching far beyond the 
market for military-related items – and is variously estimated at ranging between five 
percent and 30% of world trade. Similar to some other academic researchers’ (e.g. 
                                                 
232 Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. Paul. Arms Trade Offsets: What do We Know? Paper for 8th Annual Defence Economics and Security 
Conference. University of the West of England, Bristol, June 2004 
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Rowe and Martin) views, they also find that nations do not track the value add of offset 
trade separately. All estimates are guesses and it is by no means clear how estimates 
are arrived at either. 
 
Brauer and Dunne acknowledge the fact that arms importing countries’ offset 
objectives evolve over time and their strategies change as their objectives evolve. 
They conclude by criticising the fact that only a few countries now, such as South 
Africa, still seem to believe that offsets can result in across-the-board, generalised 
economic development and job creation and that South Africa also has yet to learn 
from the prevailing experience that general economic development can not be 
attained through the offsets mechanism. Its officials seek to link offset projects “with 
other national economic and industrial policy initiatives, such as Spatial Development 
Initiatives and Industrial Development Zones,” even though analysts suggest that 
many of the promised investments are dubious, and now seem to have been correct 
(quoting from Dunne and Lamb).  
 
Brauer and Dunne also acknowledge some indigenous industrial capacity that can be 
exploited if South African firms are to be integrated into an emerging European global 
arms production supply chain (quoting from another study done by Dunne and Lamb). 
But potential need not, and may not, translate into actual experience. As regards the 
non-defence industry, from an academic empirical point of view they still question the 
whole ’offset deal’. For instance, they write that “it is not clear whether South Africa is 
getting state-of-the-art technology in areas of growth, or old technology in areas of 
overcapacity (e.g. stainless steel - Dunne and Lamb). 
 
Similar to the experience of other academics and researchers on the subject of 
international offsets (also shared by the author of this dissertation), Brauer and Dunne 
observe a total lack of coherent data on the subject matter; the “data situation is poor”, 
still today, is countries’ unwillingness to allow researchers access to offset-related 
data, even in democracies. This is difficult to justify. Any country ought to be 
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interested, whether or not policies work, and what their costs are. Where public funds 
are expended, public accounting is needed. There is no reason to treat the military 
any different. The press widely reports on offset deals and that there can be no fear 
about military secrets being revealed. Even for their own internal use, governments 
ought to want to know what offsets cost their countries. This will improve decision-
making.  
 
Brauer is adamant that audits need to be done on economic principles, counting all 
economic costs. This will include, for instance, environmental costs associated with 
weapon production, the cost of manpower training, special infrastructure construction, 
and other resources used to support offset work, as well as the opportunity cost of 
directing resources to offset rather than to other areas of work. All this will require a 
sophisticated set of monitoring tools and abilities by the relevant state agencies, 
which, especially in developing countries, may not be readily available. Still, expert 
consultants can be hired to take at least a partial look at things. Offsets should not be 
excluded from the planning, execution and subsequent feedback loop. 
 
Brauer and Dunne, as many other experts in the field of offsets, also hold the view that 
“Offsets will not disappear”. 
  
In a study done in 1999 (at the starting phase of the industrial participation 
dispensation in South Africa) by Peter Bachelor and Paul Dunne233 on the subject of 
industrial participation in South Africa, they state that the downsizing and restructuring 
of the local defence industry took place in a policy vacuum, and the government  
adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach to defence industrial adjustment. The announcement 
of a large procurement order with foreign suppliers in November 1998, according to 
                                                 
233 TIPS 1999 Annual Forum at Glenburn Lodge, Muldersdrift. 19-22 September, 1999. Industrial Participation, Investment and Growth: 
The Case of South Africa’s Defence Related Industry . Peter Batchelor and Paul Dunne September 1999. Centre for Conflict Resolution, 
Cape Town. Middlesex University Business School, United Kingdom 
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them, constituted a major threat to the long-term survival of the local defence industrial 
base. It is however not clear on what premises did they base this prediction. 
 
While official publications often herald offset agreements as beneficial to the 
purchasing country, the issue is much more complex and the costs and benefits of 
such programmes have been the subject of many an ongoing debate. If there is a 
local defence industry, it is bound to be affected by the procurement orders going 
abroad, but evidence suggests that maintaining a local defence industry is expensive 
and uneconomic for a small country (Dunne’s views, 1996). This means that importing 
arms may be more sensible, especially as there is usually a premium attached to 
offsets, with the result that the purchase price is normally higher. A study by D.R. 
Cooper (1999) argues that ‘the costs incurred by arms companies as a result of offset 
deals are simply passed on to the recipient…the level of job creation and technology 
transfer over and above that which would have occurred without offsets is generally 
minimal’ (quoted in Business Times, 25 July 1999). 
  
P. Bachelor and P. Dunne234 in yet another study report express the view that the 
welfare issues related to offsets are unclear. Offsets are supposed to relocate 
production to the purchasing nation, and if there are to be defence offsets then they 
can be used for developing civil products and/or to assist with the conversion of 
defence companies rather than attempt to maintain local defence capabilities.  
 
They state that in the case of South Africa, the decision to procure the weapons, were 
motivated primarily by offsets rather than price. While there are clear opportunity 
costs, particularly with respect to the local defence industry, considerable efforts were 
made to implement offset policies that reflected the experience of other countries, 
such as the UK. There is also a reasonable amount of information available, which 
                                                 
234 Batchelor, P. and Dunne, P. Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa and Middlesex University 
Business School, United Kingdom. The restructuring of South Africa's defence industry. Published in African Security Review Vol 
7 No 6, 1998. 
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allows for the consideration of the likely economic impact of the defence offset deals.  
Bachelor and Dunne state that the purported benefits of offset agreements are, 
however, questionable and what little empirical evidence is available, suggest that 
they tend to have a much smaller impact on the local economy than expected. It is 
very difficult to judge whether prices are reasonable and whether the work attached to 
the offsets is actually new work at the same level of technology. 
 
Bachelor and Dunne do acknowledge though (rather contradicting to some of their 
earlier findings and statements), that the local defence industry will benefit from the 
deal and while it may struggle to retain the capabilities to produce a range of 
advanced weapons systems it can become a part of the global industry as 
subcontractor to some of the major players. There are capacity and capability 
problems in the areas relevant to the navy orders, which suggest that the sector will 
probably benefit little. On the other hand, the local aerospace industry has the 
capacity and capability to benefit significantly from the Air Force orders. They do again 
question whether South Africa should be maintaining a defence industrial base at all, 
given the evidence that it can be a drain on the economy. Off-the-shelf purchases 
would have been cheaper and would have allowed the government to allocate the 
savings to encourage conversion in defence-related industries and to develop those 
areas of the economy with the highest potential for economic growth and job creation. 
They could certainly have contributed towards transforming  unemployment figures, by 
allocating the expenditure differently. They admit that it was not clear from their 
survey, whether the implications for industrial policy, which are implicit in some of the 
offset offers, are fully thought through. They state that it is certainly the case that the 
alternatives have not been given adequate consideration. They fail however to 
properly argue the consequences of after sales services and support, upgrades, 
repairs, refurbishments and battle damage repairs. 
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On the issue of the using the arms trade offsets as a development mechanism, Brauer 
and Dunne235 report that an increasingly important facet of the international arms trade 
is the so-called offsets arrangements that obligate the arms seller to reinvest (‘offset) 
arms sales proceeds in the purchasing country. In justifying arms expenditure and in 
promoting local industrial activity, offsets are claimed to offer significant benefits to 
developing countries, yet until recently there has been little research on how well 
offsets work in practice. Their research considered some of the issues and current 
empirical evidence and reportedly found virtually no case where offset arrangements 
have yielded unambiguous net benefits for a country’s economic development. As a 
general rule, arms trade offset deals are more costly than ‘off-the-shelf’ arms 
purchases, creating little by way of new or sustainable employment, do not appear to 
contribute in any substantive way to general economic development, and with very 
few exceptions, did not result in any significant technology transfers, not even within 
the military sector. 
 
Their study concluded that offsets are an increasingly important part of the 
international trade in arms. When countries procure defence equipment from a foreign 
supplier they will look to reduce the cost in a number of ways. They may become 
involved in the development and (co)production of the product, e.g., joint production, 
licensed production, or sub-contractor production. Foreign direct investment, 
technology transfer, and countertrade are other methods of compensation, which 
might take place in the civilian rather than military sector. Each form of involvement, 
lumped together under the concept of ‘offsets’, carries its own implications for costs, 
programme risks, control over specifications and wider industrial and economic 
benefits. 
 
To justify this decision to purchase from foreign suppliers and to win public support for 
the arms deal, the South African government stressed the potential positive effects of 
                                                 
235 Arms Trade Offsets and Development. Jurgen Brauer, College of Business Administration. Augusta State University, Augusta, GA 
30904, USA. And J. Paul Dunne, School of Economics, University of the West of England. Frenchay Campus, Room 3D22, Coldharbour 
Lane, Bristol BS16 1QY. United Kingdom. January 2005 
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the proposed industrial participation offers (the local term for offsets) on investment, 
job creation and growth in the local-defence related industry and the national 
economy.236  
 
It is generally accepted that arms imports are needed for legitimate defence purposes, 
although for many countries this may reasonably be disputed (Dumas, 2004). There is 
nonetheless a crying need for countries to obtain a much better idea of what works 
under what circumstances, and what does not work. (Taylor, 2004, and Markowski 
and Hall, 2004, offer some guidelines and ideas in this respect). This is particularly 
true for developing countries, where the opportunity cost of military expenditure can be 
extremely high. To date, the evidence does not suggest that offsets advance 
countries’ long-term economic, or military goals. To summarise this evidence, there is 
a populist view that offsets do not result in arms acquisition cost reductions, that 
offsets do not stimulate broad-based civilian economic development, that neither 
substantial nor sustained job creation occurs, not even within the military sector, that 
almost no successful technology transfer into the civilian sector is observed, and that 
only limited technology transfer into the military sector occurs, often over decades and 
at high cost. Moreover, whatever technology is transferred is quickly outpaced by 
continuous technology advances in the main developed countries, especially the 
United States. It seems that developing countries should beware of arms offset deals, 
as they allegedly have little to gain and much to lose. 
 
Jurgen Brauer237 in a presentation at an international offset conference in Cape Town 
in 2002, advised on how to arrange offset terms into a plausible order, making it 
                                                 
236Batchelor, P. and Dunne, P. Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa and Middlesex University Business 
School, United Kingdom. The restructuring of South Africa's defence industry. Published in African Security Review Vol 7 No 6, 1998. 
 
237 Economic Aspects of Arms Trade Offsets. Jurgen Brauer, Professor of Economics, College of Business Administration, Augusta 
State University, Augusta, GA 30904, USA. International Conference on Defence Offsets and Economic Development Cape Town, South 
Africa. 25-27 September 2002 
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possible to proceed with the process. He said one should consider the following 
issues: 
• Ask whether arms trade offsets are part of normal trade relations or whether they 
are in some sense ‘extra-normal’ and, if so, ask why it would matter?; 
•  Why are arms trade offsets agreed to? There are two aspects to this question: (a) 
what economic theory will explain offsets? and (b) what are the rationales of buyer 
and seller when they agree to offsets?; 
• Are arms trade offset agreements economically efficient? Is social welfare 
maximized? What is the benefit, net of cost, for whom? What empirical evidence 
exists to inform decision makers? - and 
• is countertrade indeed this vast, pervasive business practice, involving tens of 
thousands of people, reaching far beyond the market for military-related items? 
 
Brauer expresses the opinion that offset is nothing less than coercion. He feels that 
the distinction between coerced and voluntary trade is important because in the former 
case, coerced trade leads to trade diversion and therefore to welfare losses, whereas 
in the latter case offsets are viewed as part of the negotiation over a complex package 
of goods and services which include military and non-military items and may well be 
welfare enhancing, as all voluntary trade is (at least in pure international trade theory). 
Accordingly, the starting point for Hall and Markowski is whether arms trade offsets 
are voluntary or mandated. If mandatory and purchasing governments insist on a 
particular offset percentage, then Hall and Markowski agree that there will be trade 
diversion, trade distortion, and welfare-diminishing effects. But if voluntary, offsets 
could be welfare enhancing, at least in principle and even if viewed by some as 
immoral. Whether they are welfare enhancing would then depend on whether offsets 
are an efficient means of pursuing government’s multiple objectives. 
 
S. Martin and Hartley238, for example state that “in a world of imperfect markets, 
oligopoly rents, complex transactions and asymmetrical information, offsets might 
                                                 
238 Martin, S. 1996. The Economics of Offsets in Defence procurement and Countertrade. Harwood Academic Publishers. 
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enhance the welfare of the purchaser”. All of these academic theories and discourse 
on offsets can be seen as a means to try and rationalise arms trade offsets, as an 
after-the-fact event. They merely suggest that, in principle, offsets may entail net 
benefits when compared to the status quo and that the issue needs to be decided 
upon based only on empirically founded information. In the view of the author, 
comparing the welfare effects of arms trade offsets to the status quo of international 
trade relations remains pragmatic but intellectually dicey. Who is this ‘government’? 
Who makes decisions for whom? This leads to the next issue, namely who are the 
players involved in offsets? 
 
Brauer feels that economists cannot but look with great unease at analyses that are 
limited to one or the other interest group (labor unions, employers, one country). 
Economists are global public servants. An economic valuation of arms trade offsets 
must therefore ultimately ask what the contract contributes to the lives of the people 
that finance it. It must ask this question not only with regard to the flow-back of funds 
(the offset part of the deal) but also, and especially, with regard to the outflow of funds 
– the arms deal itself. And so, to pick up the final strand left from the earlier 
discussion, Brauer squarely questions the notion that developing countries need to 
import major weapon systems in the first place. 
 
In a research paper done by Haines and Dunne239 in 2005 on the impact of the SDP 
(Strategic Defence Package Deal) and its offset, as a continuing and considerable 
factor playing itself out in the defence industry , they question the actual value to the 
South African economy. While the defence projects seem to have some successes, 
the experience with the non-defence projects is poor and overall the value of the deals 
is nowhere near the promises made at the outset. Lack of transparency created an 
environment where corruption was almost inevitable and successful industrial planning 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
239 Transformation or Stagnation?  The South African Defence Industry in the early 21st Century. J. Paul Dunne. University of West 
England,  and SALDRU, University of Cape Town . Richard Haines, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, and Middlesex University 
Business School. December 2005   
 196 
© Development Studies – NMMU                Jan ‘08 
almost impossible. While there is still some way to go, the skepticism of offset 
programmes express by Brauer and Dunne seems to be justified by the experience of 
South Africa.  
 
Interviews reportedly done by Haines and Dunne, during 2004/2005, with a range of 
defence-related companies, show some dissatisfaction with the administration of the 
DIP scheme by Armscor. (The reader’s attention is drawn to the findings of the 
author under par 3 of this chapter.) One of the respondents refers to the 
bureaucratic approach to credit allocation and investment targeting. There is a general 
perception, whether implicit or explicitly stated, that insufficient concern is being 
shown by the DTI in providing state incentives to domestic defence industrial work. 
Several of the firms express concern over the significant amounts of DIP work and 
credits, which are not allocated. Indeed, in the words of one of the respondents, 
DIP/NIP credits are ‘monopoly money’. There are indications that obligors, at times, 
prefer to set up a new ‘sweetheart’ subsidiary in South Africa for some of their DIP 
obligations, rather than work through an existing firm. In addition, there is evidence of 
insufficient linkages between DIP and NIP initiatives in the provinces (Haines and 
Wellman 2005). 
 
Despite some success stories, they conclude a downside effect, namely that DIP work 
‘crowded out’ other potential projects, for example in the aircraft production, as many 
small parallel activities were abnormally loaded in the production facility and multi-task 
DIP work became extremely difficult to handle logistically. A single, large volume job 
would have been easier to handle and more profitable (a report done by Dr R Ferreira 
and R. Haines 2004/2005). They also state that there is a growing concern about the 
value of the offset deal to the South African economy. The compact, but growing body 
of international literature on defence offsets, and their economic effects, does not 
instill much confidence in eventual, successful outcome of the offsets in South Africa 
(see Brauer and Dunne 2004). The impact of offsets is often found to be problematic 
in terms of job creation, the strengthening of backward and forward linkages, and 
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technology enhancement (Struys, 2004). Nor do they constitute a ‘third way’ for the 
economic development of the LDCs (see also Brauer and Dunne 2004 and 2005). 
Few countries appear to have been successful in using defence offsets sufficiently, 
and embedding and extending technology transfers (Matthews 2000) into any value-
added activity. 
 
Haines and Dunne also conclude that government policies on offsets do come under 
public criticism on a range of fronts. The prices of the systems are severely criticised 
as inflated by the offset arrangements, while various reports identify beneficiary 
companies with vested interests. Hidden costs, including unanticipated capital 
expenditure to activate imported equipment, and the R&D expenditure required to 
benefit from technology transfers are highlighted and the issue of reported job 
creations is seriously doubted. Although they concede to the possibility that DIP may 
have a positive effect on the defence industry, it is at a cost to the economy and a lost 
opportunity cost to the use of these resources (Dunne and Lamb 2004; Haines 2005; 
and Haines and Hosking 2005). It is important that research is conducted for the life of 
the projects, to inform future policymaking and provide important lessons to other 
countries considering similar policies.  
 
Dunne and Lamb240 in 2005 completed a DIP study in South Africa. In their research 
paper they state that South Africa faces one of the world’s most controversial arms 
deals involving offsets. They do however fail to mention that as a rule there are many 
arms deals internationally that are deemed controversial from time to time, for 
example Poland and India, to name but two recent (2005-2007) cases). The degree of 
coverage, of both the requirement for transparency and the lack thereof, and the 
public debate being unprecedented on this issue, have provided both important and 
disturbing insights into the workings of the international arms trade. This constitutes an 
important case study for researching the economics of offsets, for which there is, as 
                                                 
240 Defence Industrial Participation: The South African Experience. by J.P. Dunne and G. Lamb. In Jurgen 
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yet, no definite policies, with governments adopting a ‘hands-off’ approach to defence 
industrial adjustment as military spending declined241. 
 
One of the most important benefits of the arms deal is its positive influence on local 
industry. Local companies did benefit through direct DIP activities executed by foreign 
suppliers purchasing sub-systems and components, either under license or in some 
co-production relationship. 
 
The value of purchases from South Africa’s defence industry is dependent on 
European defence companies, having the sole discretion to decide whether or not to 
make investments in South African defence companies, particularly aerospace and 
information technology companies. Most of this investment will in fact evolved into 
equity purchases rather than fixed investment in plant and capital. There is also a 
growing number of joint ventures between European and South African defence firms. 
These are significant in that they involve technology and skills transfers and should 
allow South African defence firms to become part of the European’s global supply 
chains. In addition, some evidence of a significant impact on South Africa’s defence 
exports is noted. In particular, European governments are ‘prompted’ to purchase 
South African defence products, despite criticism from European defence industries. 
Some of the preferred European suppliers also help South African defence firms bid 
for, and win, other foreign defence contracts, e.g. Finland, Sweden, Italy and the USA. 
 
Dunne and Lamb are however bold enough to conclude that, overall, it is clear that the 
arms deal had a positive effect on South Africa’s economy, particularly in the DRI – 
after all, the billions must buy something – but there is little evidence that the predicted 
level of benefits was, or will be reached. Due to the lack of full transparency and data 
access, net benefits cannot be assessed properly. There is also the important issue of 
the opportunity cost of the resources used in the deal. This is considered in the next 
section. Brauer and Dunne, on separate occasions also acknowledge the presence of 
                                                 
241 Dunne, J.P. and Lamb, G. ‘Defence Industrial Participation: The South African Experience. In Jurgen 
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a body of scholarly literature that still suggests that military spending is unproductive 
and generally yields either no statistically significant or a negative effect on economic 
growth in developing countries, with the negative economic effects exacerbated by 
investment in domestic arms production. 
 
On the other hand, Batchelor and Willett  argue, “the expansion of the domestic arms 
industry (during the 1970s and 1980s) distorted the trajectory of the country’s 
industrial development (and) imposed a number of long-term economic costs on the 
economy. The absorption of scarce resources (capital, labour and foreign exchange) 
and the crowding out of non-military public and private investment and of non-military 
R&D, contributed to the under-development, declining productivity and poor 
international competitiveness of the civilian economy.” 
 
Despite marked downsizing and restructuring, South Africa’s defence-related industry 
remains highly capital, skill, import, and research intensive, with very limited links to 
the civilian economy. The country has retained advanced arms production capacity, 
although it does not offer any longer a comprehensive range of systems independently 
of the major international players, as was the case in the mid eighties. Given the 
nature of the international industry and intense competition among the group of 
peripheral producers that South Africa finds itself in, it is clear that its prospects are 
not particularly rosy. 
 
In a paper written by Gillian McEwan242 on defence offsets in the South Africa 
Aerospace industry, he states that within this framework, one of the most contested 
areas to date is the development of an industrial strategy. If the government is to 
achieve its goals, it is vital that a coherent industrial strategy be structured and 
properly implemented. His research paper is broadly concerned with whether the 
government is in fact developing a successful industrial policy. Within this large arena, 
                                                 
242 Defence offsets and the South African Aerospace Industry. Gillian McEwan. UPE. 
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the focus will concentrate particularly on the aspect of Industrial Participation (IP). IP is 
one of the tiers in the South African government’s move toward a new and improved 
industrial strategy. It is concerned particularly with bringing new business into the 
country, and with it greater investment, improved technology and an increased living 
standard for all. Development theory proposes that physical and financial resources, 
as well as organisational capabilities play a significant role in the determination of 
economic development. A substantial proportion of these resources is in the military 
sectors of South Africa. Apart from the high defence budget, this sector also attracts a 
large proportion of highly skilled scientific, technological, managerial and 
administrative manpower. 
 
McEwan, quoting from a paper published in 2004/5 by the Bonn International Centre 
for Conversion (BICC) on “Conversion in Africa: Past experiences and future Outlook” 
(www.bicc.de) states that conversion, or demilitarisation can be looked at from two 
angles; the human dimension and the material dimension. The human dimension in 
South Africa manifests itself in the millions of able-bodied Africans who are 
demobilised en masse from their military duties and careers and who need to be 
socially and economically reintegrated into their respective communities. The benefits 
of reintegration may be perceived in terms of the additional stream of goods and 
services that they contribute to economic growth, as well as the social and political 
stability resulting from their disengagement from military life. 
 
McEwan then quoting from the works of Kaplan243 re-iterates that South Africa’s IP 
strategy should revolve around the acquisition of knowledge, and the best way to 
achieve such knowledge is through R&D. In this sense R&D is the proxy for 
knowledge and knowledge is assumed to diffuse via trade flows. Thus the impact of 
knowledge will be greater the larger the R&D in a trading partner, and the higher the 
share of trade with that partner. McEwan remarks that ‘offset critics’ also argue that 
                                                 
243 Kaplan, D (Trade and Industry economist) Paper on the Role of Knowledge in a contemporary Industrial Strategy. DTI 2000. 
www.thedti.gov.za 
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international experience indicates that armaments companies first raise the prices of 
the equipment to compensate for the burden of the offsets and guarantees, and then 
often walk away from the commitments once the weapons contract has been secured. 
In addition, if the industrial investments were economically viable they would stand on 
their own merits rather than be conditional upon armaments acquisitions. 
 
McEwan remarks and observes that some positive results have been achieved 
through the SDP. For example Grintek in particular, seems to be making progress with 
DIP. Denel on the other hand, may have acquired new partners and export markets, 
but this was at a cost. While the company may be partaking in the manufacture of 
world-class equipment, their own local projects, such as the Rooivalk, touted as 
internationally competitive, fell by the wayside at great expense to the company. 
McEwan states that one cannot question whether the restructuring of the SANDF was 
necessary, although the means though which this was achieved is open to criticism. 
While there are many theories as to why the government chose this route, and while 
the SDP and its related IP may be successful to a degree, international experience  
shows time and again that a peace dividend cannot be achieved by spending money 
on arms. There are very few examples, if any, where offsets are successful in 
developing countries. If we are to look forward to a politically stable and economically 
viable future, he expresses the opinion that government expenditure can be 
concentrated on other areas of the South African economy, rather than through 
defence offsets, with more positive results. 
 
In another paper investigating and commenting on the restructuring of the SA defence 
industry, Batchelor and Dunne244 offer yet another perspective on this subject. They, 
observe that with the decline in domestic demand for armaments, South Africa’s 
defence and defence-related companies had to reconsider their corporate strategies, 
resulting in large changes in the structure of the industry. Denel and the major private 
                                                 
244 The Restructuring of South Africa’s Defence Industry. Peter Batchelor and Paul Dunne. August 1998. Centre for Conflict Resolution, 
University of Cape Town, South Africa and Middlesex University Business School, United Kingdom. 
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sector defence contractors, such as Reunert, Grintek and Altech have all attempted to 
integrate vertically, by outsourcing far less of their defence business than in the past. 
This reduced the demand for the output of hundreds of smaller defence firms, 
particularly those acting as suppliers and sub-contractors for larger firms. In the past 
few years many small and medium-sized private defence firms have merged with, or 
been acquired by, larger defence firms (e.g. Reunert acquired the armoured car 
division of TFM in early 1997), while others just exited the market. These 
developments resulted in the domestic defence market (excluding imports) becoming 
increasingly concentrated.  
 
In South Africa the lack of government policy with respect to defence industry 
conversion left the onus on individual firms to bring about change. This led to offensive 
corporate responses whereby defence firms attempted to capture as much of the 
remaining domestic arms market as possible; to find alternatives to the defence 
market. The offensive activities of both the public sector and private sector defence 
contractors led to increased concentration in the market. In addition to the reduced 
orders, vertical integration by the main defence contractors reduced the value of work 
that they out-source to sub-contractors and suppliers. Firms have since been taken 
over, merged or have simply left the market (for example the Altech group). 
 
It is worthwhile to note the Auditor General’s (AG) findings, after a comprehensive 
forensic investigation into the SDP of December 1999. Not only did the AG investigate 
the process that led to the recommendations and subsequent appointment of winning 
bids, but he also analysed several policies, procedures and practices, with one being 
the DIP policy, as managed by Armscor. Armscor, at that time, used the DOD DIP 
policy to draft a similar document in the Armscor-prescribed format and standards. 
The DIP policy was further complemented with a procedural document, which was 
later augmented by a further ‘practice’ document. The AG could reportedly not find 
any fault with the DIP process and actually states in par 14.1.23 of his report that the 
IP obligations awarded by the prime contractors in terms of the SDP, as well as the 
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performance guarantees in relation thereto, compare favorably with the position in 
other countries that exercise countertrade practices. However, the one concern raised 
by the AG in par 14.2.14 of his report, is that the DTI should obtain legal opinion 
pertaining to the controls in respect of effective implementation of the DIP and NIP 
programmes, to ensure that prime contractors fully meet their obligations. It is not 
clear to the author what, if anything, the DTI did to give effect to the AG’s 
recommendation. 
 
The Pan African Communist Party’s Member of Parliament, Patricia de Lille, (during 
2006245) delivered a speech at the University of Cape Town (UCT) Graduate School of 
Business on the “economics of the controversial R50-billion arms deal”. She still 
maintains that the deal does not make economic sense for South Africa, particularly 
when it comes to the issue of offsets. Offsets are according to her (and some others) 
used to refer to a range of industrial and commercial arrangements, including foreign 
direct investment and technology transfer, that are included as part of an arms deal 
and help to offset the costs of purchasing expensive weapons. Such offsets, says De 
Lille, help to “legitimise large outlays by allowing policy-makers to point to apparent 
economic and eventually social benefits” of a deal. According to her, international 
examples have shown that returns are rarely that high. "South Africa will indeed be 
setting an international precedent if even half of what the government is projecting is 
reached…" 
 
Local defence analyst Leon Engelbrecht246 in an article on offsets, admits that the 
SA's defence industry shrank from “shark to minnow in the last decade”, but according 
to a recent study by AMD, close to 50% of the R10-billion industry is broadly IT-
related. An estimated 22% are already foreign-owned, mostly by companies involved 
in the ‘controversial’ R30-billion Strategic Defence Package Deal (SDP). He shares 
the view of others that the more “conspiratorial critics” have always decried offsets as 
‘voodoo economics’ and hence hints that the arms suppliers include the cost of offsets 
                                                 
245 “De Lille queries economics of arms deal” http://www.adminnews.uct.ac.za/docs/31d0bfa6d45ffc3dbf8c5b4117f37c77.doc 
246 Defence Analyst Leon Engelbrecht. “Offsets bleed local industry”: 25 October 2006. 
 http://www.itradio.co.za/sections/columnists/doubletake/engelbrecht061025.asp?A=COL&S=Columnists&T=Columnist&O=A 
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into their asking price. This raise questions around the position of the taxpayer, who 
may be supporting foreign defence companies that pay for local acquisitions from 
which they then repatriate profits and claim offset credits. Neither the De Lille, nor 
Engelbrecht’s allegations are substantiated by any factual evidence. 
 
However, there are also some other arguments concurring that certain DIP 
components of the offset agreements provide a lifeline to the South African defence 
industry, although the impact of these appear to be concentrated specifically in the 
aerospace sector, while the electronics and maritime sectors are struggling somewhat. 
In addition, much of the DIP involvement of South African companies is in 
manufacturing operations that are not regarded as hi-tech, when compared to the 
technological abilities of South African firms. 
 
Some commentators go so far as to suggest that offset agreements represent an 
attempt to justify foreign procurement, rather than an economic argument in support of 
the benefits of import replacement, and that the move to justify the procurement of 
weapons by economic rather than security benefits, is seen as highly problematic. 
In the annual report to the US Congress247 on the effect of offsets in defence trade, 
which is regularly prepared under the direction of the US Department of Commerce. 
The authority to collect data from US firms involved in offset agreements, in 
connection with the sales of weapon systems to foreign entities is delegated to the 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The ninth annual report to Congress was 
completed in March 2005. The data collected for the latest report covers offset 
transactions and agreements entered into during the time period 1993 to 2003. This 
report, for example, makes the statement that developed countries with established 
defence industries use offsets to channel work, or technology to their domestic 
defence companies. Countries with newly industrialised economies use both military 
and commercial-related offsets that involve the transfer of technology and know-how.  
                                                 
247 http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenceindustrialbaseprograms/OSIES/offsets/default.htm 
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The developing countries with less-industrialised economies generally pursue indirect 
offsets to help create profitable commercial businesses and build their infrastructure. 
Overall, offsets reportedly continue to be an important and necessary factor in a 
climate of increased competition for a declining number of international sales 
contracts. The view is, however, expressed that offsets may be detrimental to the 
strength of the US defence industrial base, particularly small and medium-sized 
defence subcontractors. Offsets can reportedly displace US sub-contractors, and 
enhance foreign competitors, creating excess defence capacity overseas. The US 
government stance on offsets in military exports is that certain offsets are 
economically inefficient and market-distorting. 
Prof Richard Haines248 at an offset conference in London, UK, in March 2007, 
expressed the opinion that he did not think that the SA offsets programme to date had 
any significant impact on the national economy and that specifically in the case of 
Denel, obligors had failed to help stimulate output and exports of the group. Simphiwe 
Hamilton, executive director of AMD, in reporting to the Standing Committee on 
Defence on 27 June 2007249 stated that the countertrade investments as a result of 
the SDP, were not specifically directed towards the defence sector and that the local 
DRI should be protected against foreign competition. Industrial participation should be 
better used as leverage for achieving certain objectives, but that government needed 
to be less risk-adverse. 
 
In a report published in the international publication on countertrade and offsets250, 
which commented on a study done by Prof R Haines, it is stated that he observes that 
especially the DIP process do seem to provide a sustainable lifeline to the local DRI. 
The report also highlights the fact that he commented on an apparent lack of contact 
between the obligors, their agents, the DTI and Armscor, on the one side, and 
organised business and local and provincial governments, on the other. The latter 
being one of the key issues that, according to his findings needs to be addressed in 
                                                 
248 Prof R Haines is the Head of Development Studies at the nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
249 Business Day. 28 June 2007. “Warning on state of SA’s defence industry” Wyndham Hartley 
250 CTO XXIII no 13 
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order to improve the marketing of the offset programme and to sensibly apply the 
knowledge gained in the process. 251 
 
It was also interesting to observe the views of an independent research report on the 
DRI that was done by local company VuXaka (Ltd) Pty, under contract from AMD 
during 2005/6. The report alludes to the fact that the SDP contracts, with the exception 
of the Hawk avionics suite and the Corvette combat suite, are not guided by the 
essential strategic requirements as spelled out in the White Paper on the DRI, and are 
reportedly, and according to most industry players, not in accordance with the 
objectives of the DIP policy. They further allege that the Latter was unclear about 
obligations when a foreign entity is to be contracted versus a local entity, as the local 
content in the case of a foreign contractor counts as DIP, while it is not true in cases 
where local contractors are appointed.252 Yet, in an interview with Dr Paul Potgieter 
the Managing Director of Aerosud253, he states that his company’s turnover now 
stands at 95%, all derived from foreign contracts - as a direct result of DIP and NIP. 
 
3. Recommendations. 
 
The focus of this dissertation, is whether or not DIP delivered the results and 
objectives that motivated its instigation and implementation, and whether any changes 
should be made to the existing process? 
 
The answer, as a result of this extensive research done by the author, over the 
past twenty-two months (complimented by his day to day experience in the 
practical field of countertrade/DIP and NIP over a period of eleven years), has to 
be a qualified yes, especially if one considers each of the specific comments 
passed on each factor of the DIP policy, as portrayed in the context of the 
                                                 
251 Author’s note: The findings of Prof Haines are supported by the Author’s own findings, as contained in this dissertation.  
252 Author’s note: I have been involved with Armscor on this matter extensively during 2005-2007, with a result that they have changed 
the tender value system that now looks at local content as part of the DIP process, but only for evaluation and not for contracting. This 
has now put local bidders in the same cadre as a foreign bidder. 
253 Engineering News. Page 60. September 7-13. 
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research analysis and subsequent findings of this reciprocal trade 
phenomenon, with specific reference to chapter 7. 
 
If one further considers whether the policy is effectively introduced and applied in 
practice, the final assessed assumption, from a procedural and regulatory perspective, 
supported by empirical data, does indicate that there is indeed room for improvement. 
 
Denel, with the support of the DPE, requested Armscor, the DoD and the DTI in 2005 
to review the DIP and NIP policies, in an endeavor to secure a better dispensation for 
the local DRI. Only time will tell whether the plea will result in tangible benefits for the 
DRI. It is, however, the author’s firm believe that there will be some changes 
forthcoming, especially when the DTI introduces the DRI sectoral development 
initiative, underwriting the proposal to accept the DRI as an industrial cluster. 
Indications are that this initiative may see the light in the course of 2008/9. 
 
Denel already initiated steps to request the DTI to affect changes to the NIP policy, as 
it forces non-core activities back into Denel’s business, while Denel is desperately 
trying to get rid of all its non-core activities. Sareej Mohammed254 also, cautions that 
the government needs to carefully review the development of an industrial policy, 
which is to be well-aligned with other growth policies to ensure improved performance 
of the entire economy so that the country does not end up with under utilised 
infrastructure assets – the DRI is anxiously awaiting further news on the DRI Sector 
Strategy initiated by DPE and which now apparently sit stuck in the DoD255. 
 
From a development policy point of view, as covered in Chapter 1, the DIP policy and 
the WP on the DRI make for adequate academic discourse, also in relation to the 
three research aspects that were alluded to by Martinussen (1997). 
 
                                                 
254 Sareej Mohamed is the Director of Corporate Strategy and Industrial Development research Programme in the School of Economic 
and Bus Science at WITS. Article in Eng New April 27, 2007: “SA’s new industrial policy”. 
255 Statements made by Denel CEO and other DRI members during a Denel DRI briefing in Pretoria on 15 Aug 2007. 
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When considering the views of Graaff and Venter (as per Coetzee, 2001) of what 
constitutes a ‘system’, both policies reflect a systems or an holistic approach as the 
environment in which the DRI operates, happens within a macro context, governed by 
numerous and very complex levels of interaction. The SA government shared a 
constructive strategy for the further development of the local economy and industry (in 
this instance the DRI), which is also in line with Coetzee’s views on the subject and 
which actions should further complement the various other actions of government 
related to the automotive, aerospace, and advance manufacturing industries, to name 
but a few. 
 
DRI DIP survey’s primary aim was to collect data from DRI companies as targeted 
beneficiaries under the DIP programme, in order to establish the levels of general 
perception of the effectiveness of the DIP programme. 
 
A random sample of 40 respondents was taken from those DRI companies that have 
been exposed to the DIP programme, under the SDP, over the past seven years. A 
50% response rate was achieved, which in relation to the levels of DIP participation of 
these entities, represents an above average return response. 
 
By using the systematic sampling method256, the responses were abridged to assess 
a selected number of key issues. The questionnaire contained some 58 questions, 
which included double verification statement questions. The following comparative 
table of findings provides the reader with some sense of the content of the DIP 
questionnaires’ feedback that came from DRI enterprises involved in testing, services 
and manufacturing sectors, related to both landward and aerospace products: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256 Martin, S. 1996. The Economics of Offsets in defence procurement and countertrade. Harwood. P476 
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Recorded responses from the DIP Survey 
Questionnaire 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. The DoD/Armscor must keep on using DIP for contracts 
with imported content 
65% 20% 10%  5% 
2. The DIP process works very well in practice 
 
 35% 15% 35% 15% 
3. DIP activities are commercially viable and profitable for 
my company 
5% 45% 15% 15% 20% 
4. DIP forced my company to become more competitive 
 
15% 50% 10% 15% 10% 
5. DIP contributes to job retention in key vocational areas 
 
10% 40% 10% 20% 20% 
6. DIP has caused foreign partnerships being formed with 
my company 
20% 30% 25% 5% 20% 
7. The DIP (Armscor) process should be combined with the 
NIP (DTI) process 
20% 20% 50% 10%  
8. The DIP process should implement incentive schemes to 
secure higher levels of investment 
50% 30% 15% 5%  
 
Table 2 
 
In order to put the rationale of the DIP questionnaire in context, it is necessary to 
observe, once again, what the DIP programme set out to achieve at the time when it 
was restructured in 1996. The DIP aims and objectives were devised to underwrite the 
goals of the National Industrial Participation (NIP) objectives, including industry 
development; specific defence industry needs, such as the retention and creation of 
jobs, maintaining relevant abilities and capabilities; establishing a sustainable defence 
industrial and economic basis, with strategic logistic support capabilities; the 
promotion of exports of value-added defence/dual-use goods; the promotion of 
technology transfers and joint ventures; the maintenance of skilled indigenous 
manufacturing capabilities and the provision for a sustainable local defence-related 
industrial capability. 
 
The DIP questionnaire primarily aimed at measuring perceptions in relation to the 
acclaimed DIP aims and objectives. It was devised to determine a general view of 
the DIP programme in six primary categories, as depicted in the Graph 1. (read the 
‘series numbering’ in context with the explanation of each hereunder), plotting the 
assumptions and deductions, namely that: 
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Series 1: The DIP aims and objectives were perceived not be fully met. Those in 
agreement with this statement were marginally less at 36% compared to those who 
disagreed (39%);  
 
Series 2: On the issue of how DIP actually benefited the DRI, the response indicated 
a 49% in favour of the process, with 28% of the respondents feeling that it did not 
really have any, or much, effect; 
 
Series 3: The respondents’ views on how the DIP process worked in practice 
showed a balanced response of 34% – meaning that the respondents either did not 
know, or had a neutral view on the subject; 
 
Series 4: On the question on how did the DIP process achieved socio-economic 
benefits, (the reader’s attention is also drawn to Table 1), a total of 44% of the 
respondents indicated some benefits were observed, while 34% indicated the opposite 
to be true. The majority of respondents indicated on the specific question on 
profitability, that profits of less than ten percent were achieved. 
 
Series 5: On the issue of job creation and skills enhancement, the general view 
was that DIP did not contribute much to achieve this goal. Some 53% of the 
respondents shared this view, with only 17% indicating that some contributions were 
visible. In the sphere of engineering, respondents indicated that there was NO 
contribution, although some contributions were observed in the technical areas. 
 
Series 6: On the subject matter related to communication and the sharing of the 
general objectives, achievements, aims and objectives of DIP, the general view 
was mostly negative with 57% of the respondents airing their dissatisfaction with 
Armscor’s communication strategy. Only 17% of the respondents expressed 
satisfaction with the level of communication. 
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DIP perception survey: findings
0%
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Aims and
objectives
Support for
the DRI
DIP process
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Communication
effectiveness
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Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly DisagreeStrongly Agree
49/2836/39 17/5344/3434/34 17/57
 
Graph 1 
 
As a general observation – respondents were asked to share some of their personal 
views on the DIP process. The following is a summary of the positive comments, 
opposed by a range of fairly general negative expressions of dissatisfaction with the 
DIP process in general. 
 
The more positive views conveyed the message that the DIP and NIP programmes 
were extremely beneficial and should be retained. There was also a call for a 
DIP/NIP forum to be established to facilitate ideas. DIP was seen as a positive 
experience providing ideal opportunities to establish a sustainable business with 
foreign partners. One respondent proposed, for example, that a national strategy be 
implemented to guide the DRI.  
 
On the negative side observations were made that Armscor was not a fair broker; 
the DIP process was messy, marginal and expensive, and that between the DOD 
and the DRI there was no cooperation and that OEMS made too many promises that 
they did not fulfill. Some of the respondents felt that DIP and NIP are a total waste of 
time and a disaster. Others expressed the view that Armscor actually did not have 
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the capability to manage DIP and that there was not enough support for the DRI in 
DIP. Skepticism was raised as to whether DIP could really help the DRI. The view 
was expressed that it would be more profitable for OEMs to pay the penalties. Some 
respondents felt that Armscor should be much more prescriptive in directing DIP 
activities. Foreign OEMs were criticised for having little interest in the local DRI – 
putting their own interests first.   
 
In a report written by local defence analyst Helmoet-Rőmer Heitman257 he expresses 
the opinion that the real long-term effect of DIP, as also perceived by Reutech chief 
executive officer Piet Smit, is vested in the fact that the DIP obligations "brought 
good opportunities to take South African technologies into the world and to establish 
ourselves in niche areas internationally".  
 
4. In conclusion. 
 
Finally – also read in conjunction with chapters 4 and 8 and considering the various 
changes happening in and pending for the DRI (with specific reference to various 
pending equity partnerships, mergers and consolidations), a review of the DoD’s 
procurement policies (to redress preferential procurement), the possible 
incorporation of a scaled down Armscor into the DoD, the establishment of a 
national Defence Evaluation and Research Institute (DERI), the implementation of 
the SOE CSDP initiative, the role-out of the aerospace cluster initiative and various 
related supply chain improvement processes driven by the DTI, together with 
anticipated changes to the NIPF – the time has come for the South African 
government to consolidate its respective policies and merge it with the various other 
development initiatives in order to enhance our economic and industrial  growth 
prospects to above the anticipated six percent per annum target. 
 
                                                 
257 Janes Defence Weekly. “South African Defence Industry – Opportunity knocks” 27 July  2005 
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Final note from the author 
 
I have found this research extremely challenging, yet gratifying and 
inspiring, as it actually forced me to review and to subsequently criticize 
and comment on a process, I have been personally instrumental in creating 
10 years ago. 
 
Hope you have enjoyed the journey with me! 
 
Johan J van Dyk. 
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